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I. INTRODUCTION
Of all the matters which are brought to our legal system for resolu-
tion, determinations of the best interests of children in custody disputes
CHILDREN AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
are among the most challenging.' These disputes arise in two basic sce-
narios. The first, and most familiar for the legal mind because it is a part
of a larger dispute involving money and property, is the custody battle in
family court, which is usually initiated when a couple is dissolving its
marriage.2 The second, tragic scenario occurs in a court sitting as a
juvenile court and involves a determination as to what should occur with
a child who is alleged to have been abused and/or neglected by his3
parents. In both situations, the court is asked to make determinations
based upon the "best interests" of the minor.4 Although a variety of
legal proceedings involving children require a judge to make a decision
based upon the "best interests" of the child,5 this article deals only with
family court cases where custody and visitation are at issue, and with
child protection matters.
The legal literature has focused primarily on criticizing the best
interests standard for being vague,6 and focused on the roles of chil-
l. For an idea of the magnitude of the problem and the number of children affected by these
proceedings, see Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's
Perspectives and the Law, 36 Aiz. L. REv. 11, 51-52 (1994); see also U.S. COMMISSION ON
CHILD AND FAMILY WELFARE, PARENTING OUR CHILDREN: IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE NATION
(1996) [hereinafter PARENTING OUR CHILDREN] (stating that "the number of children each year
whose parents divorce increased by 16 percent from 870,000 in 1970 to 1,005,000 in 1990. The
number of divorces increased by 67 percent between 1970 and 1990"). Id. at 12.
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, reported that cases of child abuse and
neglect nearly doubled in the United States between 1986 and 1993. See THE THIRD NATIONAL
INCIDENCE STUDY (NIS) OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1996). In that time period, the estimated
number of abused and neglected children grew from 1.4 million to more than 2.8 million. The
number of children who were seriously injured quadrupled. See Child Abuse and Neglect Shows
Sharp Rise, HHS Study Finds, CHILD PROTECTION REP., Sept. 27, 1996, at 165.
2. In this article I deal solely with issues of custody and visitation; issues of child support,
however, cannot be separated from the best interests of the child and should be considered as part
of the systems described and in the proposals I make for reform.
3. I have purposefully chosen to use gender randomly throughout this article in referring to
children, parents, and attorneys in order to avoid the tiresome use of "he or she, her or his," etc.,
and out of a desire to avoid the impersonal "the, they," etc. which would be inconsistent with the
tone of this article.
4. See, e.g., CAL. FAm. CODE §§ 3114, 7890 (West 1994); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§§ 202, 350; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4A-8 (West 1997); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1027(a) (West Supp.
1997).
5. For example, juvenile delinquency proceedings and private guardianships and adoptions
use this standard.
6. See, e.g., Annette R. Appell & Bruce A. Boyer, Parental Rights vs. Best Interests of the
Child: A False Dichotomy in the Context of Adoption, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 63, 66
(1995) (arguing that the standard is vague and subject to arbitrary application and should not be
used for decisions about whether to intervene); Andrea Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best
Interests of the Child and Other Fictions, in CHILD, PARENT, AND STATE 3, 5-6 (S. Randall Humm
et al. eds., 1994) ("'[B]est interests of the child' is not a standard, but a euphemism for unbridled
judicial discretion"); N. Dickon Reppucci and Catherine A. Crosby, Law, Psychology, and
Children: Overarching Issues, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 4-5 (1993) (regardless of how it is
measured, the best interests of children are generally indeterminant, and largely a matter of
values); Richard A. Warshak, Gender Bias in Child Custody Decisions, 34 FAM. & CONCILIATION
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dren's attorneys in protecting these interests.7 Much less attention has
been paid to the underlying question: the appropriateness of relying
upon the traditional legal system to decide such matters. The purpose of
this article is to examine whether the adversarial legal model serves the
best interests of children8 and their families and what changes are
needed to better protect those interests.
For many reasons, the adversarial system, and thus, the role of the
minor's attorney within that system, may be contrary to a determination
of the best interests of the child.9 While the adversarial process may not
seem too damaging or consequential in most civil litigation, where the
exchange of money is usually the outcome, litigation involving the wel-
fare of a child and family encompasses more substantial concerns.
Our legal system relies upon the notion that two or more profes-
sional adversaries representing the parties to the dispute will draw forth
all relevant information to the contest in the process of putting forward
their clients' best positions, thereby allowing the decision-maker to
determine the "truth" and to make the best decision. 10 This process
assumes that the only real interest of the parties is to "win." In that
sense, it reflects an attitude about relationships where interactions are
CTS. REv. 396 (1996); Catherine A. Crosby-Currie, Children's Involvement in Contested Custody
Cases: Practices and Experiences of Legal and Mental Health Professionals, 20 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 289 (1996) (the indeterminacy of the standard vests judges with a great deal of discretion
and very little practical assistance).
7. The Fordham Law Review recently devoted an entire, lengthy issue to the role of counsel
for children. See 64 Special Issue, Ethical Issues In the Legal Representation of Children,
FORDHAM L. REv. (1996); see also Judith Larsen, Does the Child's Lawyer Owe "The Whole
Truth" to the Court in Neglect-Abuse Cases? 47 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 49 (Spring 1996).
8. For more specific discussion in regard to the criminal justice prosecution of child abuse
cases, see John E. B. Myers, The Legal Response to Child Abuse: In the Best Interest of
Children?, 24 J. FAM. L. 149 (1985-86).
9. But see Catherine J. Ross, From Vulnerability to Voice: Appointing Counsel for Children
in Civil Litigation, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1571 (1996). Ross comments that "law for children
should not result in a separate jurisprudential system-a 'children's law' which quickly
deteriorates into the disparaging 'kiddie law'-but should instead rest squarely in our common
law." Id. at 1574. My proposal focuses on the need for a new paradigm and new process; I do not
consider the common law jurisprudence to be the heart of this problem. The real issue for
consideration is how we go about the job of helping children and families. As so well stated by
Nanette Schorr in Law and the Politics of Meaning, TIKKUN, July/Aug. 1996, at 34, 36:
[I]t is not clear that deciding cases according to the law prevents lawyers from
presenting the stories of their clients, or judges from using empathic understanding
to decide those cases. And so the question devolves to both the substantive nature
of the justice being dispensed by the laws themselves and the type of empathic
intelligence brought to the task by the court.
10. See generally Ross, supra note 9; STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A
DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE (1984); Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1033 (1975); M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETmIcs in AN ADVERSARY
SYSTEM VIII (1975).
[Vol. 52:79
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seen as part of a struggle for power or property, and where everyone
must compete to "win" the power and its associated by-products.
Ongoing relationships between the contestants are not a considera-
tion in this model. But, in cases involving the custody and welfare of a
child, relationships are at the heart of the matter.11 For that reason,
among others, efforts have been made to direct custody disputes in fam-
ily court toward a more conciliatory model which honors relationships.12
Even mediation of child protection matters has been explored. 13 Never-
theless, disputes involving the custody of children, particularly where
abuse and/or neglect by one or both of the parents is alleged, tend to be
among the most bitterly fought legal battles. Certainly, the strong senti-
ments underlying these cases are reflected in their contentiousness.
Moreover, the fact that lawyers who represent the parties are trained as
advocates within the adversarial model, not as peacemakers, compounds
the problem.
The adversary system is not humane. It does not concern itself
with the welfare of the parties involved in terms of how the process
itself may affect them. Although much attention has been paid to
attempting to create a more humane and child-centered courtroom,1 4 the
process of engaging in a battle with family members cannot be a positive
experience; certainly it is not for the children who are often placed in the
middle of this internecine warfare. Nor is it generally friendly to the
parents. The adversary system requires parties to refrain from address-
ing each other directly; they may communicate only through their attor-
neys. It forces parties to package their experiences in a way which will
11. See Peter Margulies, The Lawyer as Caregiver: Child Client's Competence in Context,
64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1473, 1482 (1996) ("While a web of relationships defines each person,
children's dependence makes these connections even more salient") (citing HANNAH ARENDT, THE
HUMAN CONDrrION 3, 84 (1958)).
12. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3161, 3180 (West 1994); William Wesley Patton, Child
Abuse: The Irreconcilable Differences Between Criminal Prosecution and Informal Dependency
Court Mediation, 31 U. LouisV.LE J. FAM. L. 37 (1992-93); Douglas D. Knowlton & Tara Lea
Muhlhauser, Mediation in the Presence of Domestic Violence: Is It Light at the End of the Tunnel
or Is It a Train on the Track, 70 N.D. L. REv. 255 (1994); Louise Everett Graham, Implementing
Custody Mediation on Family Court: Some Comments on the Jefferson County Family Court
Experience, 81 Ky. L.J. 1107 (1993); Maggie Vincent, Mandatory Mediation of Custody
Disputes, 20 VT. L. REv. 255 (1995).
13. CAL. WuLF. & INST. CODE § 350(a)(2) (West Supp. 1997) (encourages mediation of
dependency cases).
14. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7891, 7892 (West 1996) (providing for testimony in
chambers to explore the child's wishes); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 350(b) (West 1996)
(allowing testimony in chambers where the child is intimidated by the setting or afraid to testify in
front of parents); CAL. PENAL CODE § 868.6 (West Supp. 1997) (providing for a nonthreatening
environment for minors); see id. § 868.8 (providing for the comfort, support and protection of
minors).
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help them "win" their case, rather than to examine them contextually, in
the unique and complex way in which experiences occur.
The confluence of the breakdown of both nuclear and extended
families, community and other forms of traditional support for families,
with an increased focus on individual rights, has positioned the legal
system as the repository for all of society's problems. This extension of
our traditional belief and trust in the legal system is probably misplaced.
Our legal system has no special insight into the needs of children and
families, nor do we have special training to deal with the complex and
difficult issues which arise in these disputes. Ultimately, when concilia-
tory approaches do not work,15 the parties are thrown into the traditional
adversarial process, a process which relies upon an ability to find a sin-
gle right answer-to declare a winner and a loser.
Perhaps a history of distrust and jealousy toward nonlegal
approaches to resolving problems has misled the legal community to see
the issue of "best interests" as a legal problem. In practice, however,
this is not a field which is "owned" by the law. Social work and mental
health professionals play substantial roles in both juvenile and family
courts. 6 Nevertheless, the legal process seems to be running the
show-a case of the tail wagging the dog.
For a variety of reasons, it is difficult to challenge the merits of the
adversarial system in our legal culture. Perhaps since all of us, as law-
yers, were trained to believe in it, we are comfortable with the idea of
"fixing" it, but not with the idea of doing away with it.17 Even if no
15. The great majority of custody matters are settled between the divorcing parents either
through negotiation or mediation. See, e.g., Francis J. Catania, Jr., Accounting to Ourselves for
Ourselves: An Analysis of Adjudication in the Resolution of Child Custody Disputes, 71 NEaB. L.
Rav. 1228, 1233 (1992); Crosby-Currie, supra note 6. Although even privately settled custody
issues raise questions about the best interests of the children, see discussion, infra notes 64-65, the
focus of this article is on those cases which are currently resolved through traditional litigation.
16. My observation in attending child welfare conferences is that they have been dominated
by social workers who consider themselves to be "the" child welfare professionals. The law and
lawyers are often viewed as unfortunate inconveniences.
17. See Richard A. Garner, M.D., My Involvement in Child Custody Litigation, 27 FA. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 1 (1989):
[T]he adversary system is primarily used in Great Britain and countries that were
her former colonies (like the United States, for example). The rest of the world has
recognized its deficiencies and has little tolerance for it. Law students in the United
States and Great Britain generally are presented with the system without being
provided this information. Usually, they uncritically accept adversarial litigation as
the only (or optimum) way to resolve a conflict and rarely give consideration to
alternative modes of dispute resolution, although these recently have been
introduced into the curriculum in some United States law schools.
While my experience indicates that law students are currently very interested in alternative dispute
resolution, I have found them to be quite averse to examining the underpinnings and rationale for
the adversary system.
[Vol. 52:79
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constitutional rights beyond the right to due process attached to civil
proceedings, the dimensions of our loyalty to the system rise to religious
proportions."8 Our allegiance seems even more stubborn if we consider
that, in many proceedings, parties have no right to appointed counsel
and, thus, are forced to represent themselves, sometimes against a party
who is represented.
Additionally, special rules governing the relationship between the
attorney and the client are an integral part of our adversary system.
These are codified in many forms; all include a duty of confidentiality to
the client. In addition, all jurisdictions have adopted evidentiary privi-
leges which prohibit, with few exceptions, an attorney from testifying
against her client. Confidentiality and privilege mean that some infor-
mation may come to the attention of the attorney, but not to the attention
of the finder of fact, regardless of how relevant or material the informa-
tion is to the appropriate outcome of the case. In proceedings where
the judge is supposed to assess all the facts and make a determination as
to the best interests of the child, barriers to full disclosure are barriers to
accomplishing this end.
Ultimately, proceedings which pit children against parents, or place
children in the middle of a battle between parents, are antithetical to the
best interests of those children. A significant body of social science
research informs us that the best interest of the child is almost always to
have an ongoing relationship with her parents.' 9 We need a system
which encourages and assists such relationships. Professionals from the
18. See JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940):
The game of litigation is in part the continuance of a tradition, inherited from the
spirit of gentlemanly sportsmanship which dominated the administration of British
justice. But it has been intensified, instead of lessened, by the spirit of strenuous
struggle and unrestrained persistence which drives the bar of our country to wage
their contests to the extreme of technicality.
Id. at 49.
19. See generally JUorrT S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP:
How CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE wITH DIVORCE (1980) [hereinafter WALLERSTEIN & KELLY];
Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child Custody
Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota's Four Year Experiment With the Primary Caretaker
Preference, 75 MINN. L. REv. 427 (1990); Jeanine L. English & Michael R. Tritz, In Support of
the Family: Family Preservation As An Alternative To Foster Care, 4 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
183 (1992-93). But see Joanne Schulman & Valerie Pitt, Second Thoughts on Joint Child
Custody: Analysis of Legislation and Its Implications for Women and Children, 12 GOLDEN GATE
U.L. REV. 538, 554-55 (1982) (arguing that these "friendly parent" provisions in joint custody
statutes discourage opposition to joint custody).
Statutory law reflects this research. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3080 (West 1994)
(presumption of joint custody); see id. § 3100 (West Supp. 1997) (visitation rights for
noncustodial parent); see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1997) (legislative
goal to maintain families); see id. § 16000 (West 1994) (family preservation).
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many disciplines engaged in these areas of work need to help parents do
their jobs rather than joining sides in a win-lose battle.
Because this article is about process and systems, rather than stan-
dards, a specific definition of best interests is not necessary to the dis-
cussion. I will examine the conventional legal paradigm, its operation in
the context of child protection and custody matters, and propose changes
to the systems, as well as to the ethical roles and professional responsi-
bility duties of lawyers working in cases which involve the welfare of
children, specifically a determination of the best interests of the child. I
propose that we need a shift in paradigm, reflecting new values and
focusing on custody and visitation matters as family and social
problems, rather than legal issues and "cases." We need to start from
scratch and design a system that makes sense. Part II examines the
inherent conflicts between the adversary system and the best interests
goal. Part III discusses the conflicts which, though not inherent to the
system, occur in practice. In part IV, I look at the effect of the adver-
sarial system on the children and their parents. Part V criticizes the legal
profession's wrangling over the role of children's attorneys. In part VI,
I make recommendations for the establishment of a new paradigm for
these cases, one which still relies upon the advocacy of lawyers, but
rests upon values of relationship and healing.
II. INHERENT CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE ADVERSARIAL PROCESS AND
THE "BEST INTEREST" GOAL
The usual focus in best interest litigation, as in other litigation, is
on the outcome of the case. Yet, the process of the adversarial system
itself must be examined for compatibility with the best interests stan-
dard. The outcome of a case is determined primarily by what informa-
tion is presented to the court. The adversarial system inhibits the court's
access to information. The process alienates parties, delays outcomes,
and focuses attention on matters extraneous to the child's best interests.
In this section, I examine aspects of the adversarial system which are
contrary to the best interests goal as specifically applied to child protec-
tion and custody/visitation cases.
A. The Win or Lose Competition
The adversary process is essentially a win or lose competition.
Each party attempts to prove to the court why she should be the winner.
If the winning prize is money or property, the concerns of the sought-
after object are not relevant. Where the sought-after object is a child,
however, the dispute is of a different nature. While this difference is
widely recognized, the conflicts over the best interest of the child con-
[Vol. 52:79
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tinue to take place in a win or lose framework.2" The language of the
process itself contributes to the attitude that this is a zero sum game.
The parent who is awarded custody of the child considers himself to be
the "victor in the war."'" Unfortunately, the child may be the loser in
any event.22
Because the adversary process rests upon the fight between oppos-
ing parties, it forces the parties into fixed positions from which it may be
difficult to retreat.23 In the child protection arena, this may mean that
social workers are required to take more extreme positions in their cases
than they might otherwise, in order to defend their actions to the court.
In the family custody situation, parents may make extreme allegations
about their ex-spouses to ensure victory.
Families are about relationship. A process which pits family mem-
bers against each other is not conducive to relationships.24 Likewise, a
20. See Vivienne Roseby, Ph.D., Uses of Psychological Testing in a Child-Focused Approach
to Child Custody Evaluations, 29 FAM. L.Q. 97, 97 (1995) (stating that "partly the adversarial
framework dominates because attorneys, no matter how sophisticated their understanding of total
family dynamics, can represent only one of two conflicting points of view").
21. Id. at 98; see also CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN
AND THE LAW 711 (Robert H. Mnookin & D. Kelly Weisberg eds., 3d ed. 1995) [hereinafter
CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE] (stating that "when courts award 'custody' incident to separation or
divorce, the winner usually has less than all the rights included in custody within the on-going two
parent family") (emphasis added); Marion Huxtable, Child Protection: With Liberty and Justice
for All, 39 SOCIAL WORK 60 (1994). Huxtable asserts that:
When conflicts are settled through legal channels, one party wins and the other
loses. When a child is removed from a parent's custody, the parent loses his or her
rights, and the child, although protected, often loses also if out-of-home placement
is prolonged and the family is not reunited.
Id. at 61.
Martha Fineman asserts: "Anecdotal evidence indicates that many women view joint cus-
tody as 'losing'-whereas many men view it as 'winning'-the divorce wars; as a result, many
women bargain away needed property and support benefits to avoid the risk of 'losing' their
children." Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in
Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 761 (1988) (footnote omitted).
22. See WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 19, at 30 (believing that no one actually wins in
these cases).
23. See, e.g., id. (Wallerstein and Kelly state that "the adversary proceeding sharpens and
consolidates the parents' differences, and once it was initiated, compromise, flexibility, and
civilized exchange are neither valued nor possible.").
24. See Fineman, supra note 21, at 748-50. Fineman provides a number of citations to social
science literature about the acrimony of the adversarial process and its effects on families in
custody disputes. Fineman, though, is critical of the result of reform, with its emphasis on
alternative dispute resolution and away from the traditional legal problem solving, in that its effect
has been a change in the substantive law which is harmful to the mother-child relationship. While
her criticism is justified in part, she discounts the damage created by the adversarial process in her
focus on substantive rights. Although she sees the process and substantive law changes as part
and parcel, this is not a necessary result of process change. As discussed in this article, the
problem is that we now have a bastardized system which performs neither the legal nor the
therapeutic function well. I believe there is a better way to integrate the two interests.
1997]
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process which pits family members against those who are attempting to
strengthen the family in order to safely maintain the relationship, makes
little sense.
B. Focus Is on Parents' Rights Instead of on Child's Welfare
The adversary system tends to camouflage issues of concern to the
child by directing the discussion at the rights of the parents." Commen-
tators and practitioners in the custody dispute arena have expressed the
sentiment that child custody matters are really not about the best inter-
ests of the child, but instead are about the interests of the parents26 (i.e.,
a contest between the rights of the two parents). Concerns regarding
gender equality have further focused the discourse on parental rights;
many believe the end product has been court orders which fail to honor
family relationships." This focus on the rights of the parents often
occurs without a discussion of the responsibility adults owe to their chil-
dren.28 On the other hand, the focus of these proceedings on the best
interests of the child may create some pressure for parents' attorneys to
couch their arguments in terms of what is best for the child, rather than
rigidly on their clients' interests.29 Section 202(a) of the California Wel-
25. See, e.g., Frank P. Cervone & Linda M. Mauro, Ethics, Cultures, and Professions in the
Representation of Children, 64 FORDHAm L. REV. 1975 (1996). Cervone and Mauro assert that:
The dilemma is whether to reveal information that is good for the child but bad for
the case. This conflict is best seen in domestic relations custody cases, theoretically
posited as a quest for the child's best interest, but rooted in parental self-interest....
In the lawyer's model, family secrets and events of questionable meaning give way
only to the press of the adversary. The lawyer's ethical obligation is to answer the
adversary's questions honestly, not to gratuitously offer information which may be
helpful to the other side.
id. at 1980-81.
26. See, e.g., Charlow, supra note 6, at 5-6. Charlow describes research regarding parents'
motivations for seeking custody-motivations which include revenge, avoidance of sense of loss,
continuity of parental identity, self-esteem, and dependence on the child. She suggests that the
judge's inquiry should be on why the parents have not resolved the custody dispute, given that
conflict is not in the best interests of their child, and custody should be given to the parent who
can justify the dispute (except where one or both are unfit). See id. at 13; see also Stephen
Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 GEo. L.J. 2665, 2667 (1993) (arguing that
current codes of ethics focus on rights, giving little attention to considerations of care).
27. See, e.g., Catania, supra note 15, at 1234-35 (law ignores fiduciary values which develop
between family members).
28. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on
Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747 (1993). Woodhouse asserts that:
Courts and philosophers writing about parental rights often trace the legitimacy of
these rights to the role parental authority plays in the exercise of parental
responsibility. Rights rhetoric, however, has tended to obscure this foundation of
adult power. Our focus on these adjunct rights rather than on their basis has
distracted us from carefully examining the nature of responsibility itself.
Id. at 1818.
29. See, e.g., Bruce A. Boyer, Ethical Issues in the Representation of Parents in Child
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fare and Institutions Code could be interpreted to require parents' attor-
neys to consider the best interest of the child in child protection
proceedings:
Juvenile courts and other public agencies charged with enforc-
ing, interpreting, and administering the juvenile court law shall con-
sider the safety and protection of the public and the best interests of
the minor in all deliberations pursuant to this chapter. Participants in
the juvenile justice system shall hold themselves accountable for its
results. They shall act in conformity with a comprehensive set of
objectives established to improve system performance in a vigorous
and ongoing manner.
Nevertheless, in both child protection and family court matters, the
issues are often drawn in terms of individual rights rather than focused
on relationships and connections.3°
A scenario demonstrating the conflict between the traditional
rights-based approach of the adversarial process and the protection of
the child is illustrated by In re Maurice M.3 1 In that case, the Baltimore
City Department of Social Services filed a petition asking the court to
take jurisdiction of baby Maurice, after he had been brought to the hos-
pital with a suspicious broken leg injury at the age of three months.
Maurice was returned to his mother after several months under court-
ordered conditions, and remained as a child in need of protection under
the court's jurisdiction. Maurice's mother violated the ordered condi-
tions, and the Department was ordered to remove Maurice. Approxi-
mately eight months passed and the Department had been unable to see
Maurice. The Department asked the court to order the mother to pro-
duce Maurice for an inspection by the Department to ensure that he was
safe and unharmed. The mother refused to produce the child, protesting
that such an order was a violation of her Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination. The. case was eventually heard by the Supreme
Court, which upheld the contempt order against the mother.3 2 Seven and
one-half years later, baby Maurice has not been produced; his mother
Welfare Cases, 64 FORDHAm L. REv. 1621, 1626-27 (1996) [hereinafter Ethical Issues] (noting
that "interests have come to be seen as fundamentally divergent, even in circumstances where
children have significant attachments to their parents").
30. See Martin Guggenheim, The Best Interests of the Child: Much Ado About Nothing?, in
CHILD, PARENT, AND STATE, supra note 6, at 27, 29 [hereinafter Much Ado] (arguing that child
custody cases are not really about children, but are about which parent shall be given legal
entitlement to raise a child); see also Fitzgerald, supra note 1, at 60 (stating that "the 'best
interests' of any particular child always yield to the constitutional claims of their parents").
31. 550 A.2d 1135 (Md. 1988).
32. See Baltimore Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 (1990); see also Albert W.
Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MIcH.
L. REv. 2625 (1996); Mother Ends 7-Year Jail Stay, Still Silent About Missing Child, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 1995, at A18.
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was released from custody late in 1995, after spending more than seven
years in prison, although she has never been found to be criminally
guilty of any act of child abuse. Whatever price the mother has paid in
this situation (if she cannot produce Maurice because he is injured or
dead, her price is small), Maurice may have paid more. The mother's
attorney in this case may have believed there was a duty to counsel the
client to not produce Maurice if producing him (or the inability to pro-
duce him) would be damaging to the client.
Because the adversary process limits parties to fighting for their
own interests, arguments made about the best interests of the child can
be seen as mere manipulations to benefit the positions of the parties
making them.
C. Zealous Advocacy and Client Confidentiality
The zealous advocacy and client confidentiality requirements of
attorneys create artificial barriers to sharing information with other par-
ties and, more seriously, with the court. Important information may
never come to light in a proceeding, creating an obstacle to achieving
the best interests of the children. 33
1. THE ZEALOUS ADVOCACY REQUIREMENT
The lawyer's ethical obligation to zealously represent her client is
probably the cornerstone of the adversary system. In the name of zeal-
ous advocacy, lawyers may engage in behavior for their clients which
would be immoral if committed on their own behalf. For reasons dis-
cussed above, attorneys trained in this tradition have a difficult time con-
sidering alternatives. The American public shares this ambivalence, at
least in terms of imagining the role of their own attorneys, 34 as opposed
33. Additionally, attempts to work in multidisciplinary teams to advance the child protection
and family services goals may be blocked by concerns of the individual attorneys who must
protect the separate interests of their clients. For instance, attorneys representing child welfare
agencies may be reluctant to share information about a case which could result in potential client
liability for some misfeasance. The value of a multidisciplinary team for resolving systemic
problems which will effect the best interests of many children, is thus diminished by the stifling
effects of client confidentiality and loyalty.
34. See, e.g., Norman G. Poythress, Procedural Preferences, Perceptions of Fairness, and
Compliance With Outcomes: A Study of Alternatives to the Standard Adversary Trial Procedure,
18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 361, 362 (1994):
In their comprehensive review of the procedural justice literature, Lind and
Tyler (1988) ... raised concerns with the standard adversary model. They noted
that although the adversary model is often rated as the most fair, research has also
shown that it is the most objectively biased; adversarial, as opposed to inquisitorial,
attorneys are more likely to select from the available evidence that which favors
their party, rather than to provide a representative sampling of the available
evidence. Lind and Tyler characterized the problem for policy makers as "a
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to their feelings about the ethical behavior of lawyers in general. The
zealous advocate protects the "rights" of the client. In a rights-based
system, the client, as a separate and autonomous individual, is the sub-
ject of concern. The lawyer cannot, according to principles of profes-
sional responsibility, do anything which would diminish the "rights" of
the client.
In order to comply with the requirements of zealous advocacy, and
confidentiality rules which support that role, the court and the attorneys
sometimes go through machinations of role playing which serve form
but not substance. For example, the court in a child protection case may
ask the parent's attorney to state on the record the last contact the attor-
ney had with a client who is not present in court. The court has an
interest in knowing if the attorney is in contact with the client, is repre-
senting the client's wishes, and is fulfilling his counseling role. An
attorney who has not been contacted by the client since the last hearing
and has been unable to make contact with the client35 faces a dilemma
when asked about client contact. If the attorney advises the court that he
has not been able to locate or contact the client, the attorney is, in
essence, testifying that the client is not responsible. The solution is for
the attorney to provide the court with the bare statement that there has
been no contact with the client without giving information about the
attorney's efforts to make such contact. This way, the court should not
conclude that the failure to make contact was the fault of the client.
Naturally, this is a fiction; it does not allow the court to acquire informa-
tion regarding the kind of work the attorney is doing, a relevant concern
considering that most of the attorneys are provided at public expense
and that the ultimate outcome of the proceeding may result in termina-
tion of parental rights with due process implications.
Similar issues are raised when the attorney believes that the parent
client is unable to competently participate in the process, necessitating
the appointment of a guardian ad litem. Certainly, raising the issue of
the parent's competence diminishes the likelihood of an award of cus-
tody to that parent, at least in the short term. The attorney is caught on
the horns of a dilemma, having to serve the client's interest and harm it
at the same time.
Children's attorneys are not exempt from these problems. Those
who maintain that the child's lawyer must take the role of zealous advo-
dilemma of whether to choose the procedure that is seen as fairer... or whether to
choose a procedure that provides the decisionmaker with the most accurate picture
of case events." Id. (citation omitted).
35. Many child protection cases involve parents who live a very transitory life style and have
difficulty functioning at a level which would allow them to comply with the requirement to be in
touch with their attorney or the social worker.
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cate36 face equally, if not more difficult, moral dilemmas.37
Existing codes of conduct and standards for child welfare practice
do not provide much guidance for the attorney who is faced with such a
dilemma.3" In fact, the adversary system is based upon the notion that
attorneys should, and must, engage in role-differentiated behavior (i.e.,
perform acts for their clients that would not otherwise be moral).3 9 The
issue here is whether this kind of behavior is appropriate for matters in
which the court is required to determine the best interests of the child.
Complete and objective information is vital in both child protection and
family law cases. It is two-faced to claim that attorneys may press the
wishes of their client because their role is not that of a decision-maker,
while at the same time rationalizing the withholding of information from
the decision-maker. In fact, in some cases, the attorney might be a better
decision-maker, simply because the attorney has knowledge which may
never become available to the judge.
36. See, e.g., Marvin R. Ventrell, Rights & Duties: An Overview of the Attorney-Child Client
Relationship, 26 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 259 (1995) (arguing that the law supports the modem concept
of zealous child advocacy in order to serve the needs of the child in the legal system).
37. See generally Boyer, supra note 29.
38. See id. at 1640-41. Boyer states that:
Because of the subjectiveness and vagaries of the legal standard of best interests that
governs most juvenile court hearings, only in extreme circumstances will a client's
objective be unsupportable by any good faith argument.... If the concerns of the
lawyer stem from the belief that advocating the parent's cause is not in the best
interests of the child, such concerns will generally not rise to the point of
compelling mandatory withdrawal. Initially, the lawyer typically focuses advocacy
on an end-returning the child to the custody of the parent. Although this end may
increase the likelihood that a child will be victimized by abuse, it is not in itself
unlawful.
Id. (citation omitted). Boyer does believe, however, that very few cases actually present such
serious moral dilemmas. Id. at 1644. See also Ronald L. Solove, Confessions of a Judicial
Activist, 54 Omo ST. L.J. 797 (1993):
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer representing a
client in a matrimonial dispute to represent his or her client zealously within the
bounds of the law. In a custody dispute, the lawyer often must do what is best for
the case, as opposed to what is best for the kids.
Id. at 802.
39. See, e.g., Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of
Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1655, 1664-65
("The legal profession . . . protects role-differentiated behavior through the promulgation of
ethical codes that promote moral nonaccountability as a necessary adjunct to adversariness.")
(footnotes omitted); Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, in THE GOOD LAWYER
150, 157 (David Luban ed., 1984) (arguing that there are many "proper" behaviors which impede
the search for truth).
Rules of professional conduct which require attorneys to engage in such behavior also serve
the personal interests of lawyers by keeping them from having to make difficult ethical decisions.
See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REv. 351 (1989).
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2. CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE
The relationship between the client and attorney within the tradi-
tional adversary process results in a number of situations not conducive
to protecting the best interests of the child. Even assuming that the best
interest might be achieved through the gathering of available informa-
tion about the family, the process places barriers to information sharing,
and thus, inhibits correct decision making. The primary obstacle to
information sharing is the ethical rule requiring the attorney to maintain
the confidences of the client."°
One example of how attorney-client confidentiality limits informa-
tion sharing is the use of private psychological evaluations. It is quite
common in child protection and family court custody proceedings to use
psychological evaluations of the parents as evidence to assist the court in
making its orders. A psychological evaluation may be useful in deter-
mining what kind of services may be appropriately provided to a parent
in order to alleviate the risk to the child, and useful in pointing out
potential parenting problems which might affect the best interests of the
child in a custody dispute. Lawyers like to use psychological evalua-
40. See Robert J. Kutak, The Adversary System and the Practice of Law, in THE GOOD
LAWYER, supra note 39, at 172, for an interesting historical explanation of the development of
confidentiality and disclosure rules. According to Kutak, the adversary system is a competitive,
rather than a cooperative system of jurisprudence, being based upon underlying societal values of
unrestrained competition and individualism. He explains that "the American adversary process
. . . is in most respects Darwinian. The principles of individual monopolization of personal
competence and indifference to the incompetence of others imply a 'survival of the fittest' theme.
In the adversary system, there is no obligation, as a general rule, to aid others." Id. at 177-78.
A study of gender differences provides another way of looking at the development of the
adversary system. Carol Gilligan describes the responses of Jake and Amy to the "Heinz"
dilemma of whether it is morally correct for a man to steal from a pharmacist in order to acquire a
life-saving drug, which he could not afford, for his dying wife. The responses of the boy and girl
reflect differences in problem-solving that reach beyond tests of morality.
In resolving Heinz's dilemma, Jake relies on theft to avoid confrontation and turns
to the law to mediate the dispute. Transposing a hierarchy of power into a hierarchy
of values, he defuses a potentially explosive conflict between people by casting it as
an impersonal conflict of claims. In this way, he abstracts the moral problem from
the interpersonal situation, finding in the logic of fairness an objective way to
decide who will win the dispute. But this hierarchical ordering, with its imagery of
winning and losing and the potential for violence which it contains, gives way in
Amy's construction of the dilemma, a web of relationships that is sustained by a
process of communication. With this shift, the moral problem changes from one of
unfair domination, the imposition of property over life, to one of unnecessary
exclusion, the failure of the druggist to respond to the wife.
CAROL GILLiGAN, IN A DIiiERENTr VOICE 32 (Harvard University Press, 2d ed. 1993) (emphasis
added). Male domination of the legal system throughout its development may help to explain our
valuing of a system which translates moral problems into a hierarchy of rules and abstracts the
lawyer from the personal dilemma. See Zacharias, supra note 39, at 368-69 (arguing that confi-
dentiality may be contrary to client dignity; by contributing to the notion that "the client can get
away with anything," the client is demeaned as a moral individual).
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tions to argue that a client is, or has the potential to be, a good parent.
On the other hand, a psychological evaluation which raises substantial
concern about the ability of the client to parent, would be undesirable to
the parent's advocate.
An attorney may suggest that his client submit to a psychological
evaluation in the hope that the evaluator's conclusion will be that the
client is a good parent who does not pose a risk to the child. While the
evaluator cannot predict actual behavior,'" she may report on evidence
of the client's proclivities which may raise concerns about the safety of
the child should custody be awarded to that parent. If the evaluator in
such a case concludes that the client may be a pedophile or a violent
person who is unable to control his impulses, or self-centered and unable
to put his child's interests before his own, a written report could be most
damaging to the client. If the evaluation has been performed as a result
of a court order, the evaluation will be delivered to the court and accessi-
ble by the attorneys. On the other hand, if an attorney hires the evalu-
ator hoping that the report will be favorable to her client, the report is
not discoverable, and the findings of the evaluator will never be made
known to the judge or to the other parties. The attorney is precluded by
the requirement of zealous advocacy from disclosing information which
would harm her client's chances of winning the case. The evaluator is
precluded from disclosing the results of the evaluation to any other party
or to the court through the application of the attorney work product doc-
trine, an aspect of the confidential nature of the attorney-client
relationship.42
Similar considerations attend the evaluation of a child. In deter-
mining the needs of the child, lawyers may need to consult with mental
health or social work experts. Information the lawyer has gathered
about the child is confidential and, therefore, may only be shared with
members of the lawyer's "team" if confidentiality is not to be breached.
When lack of resources or other factors make such a consultant
impracticable, the lawyer may look to experts already involved with
the client, or occasionally court-appointed experts. These latter
41. For a good discussion of the problems of relying upon psychological evaluations as
predictions of future behavior, see the Dissenting Opinion in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University
of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976):
Both the legal and psychiatric communities recognize that the process of
determining potential violence in a patient is far from exact, being fraught with
complexity and uncertainty. In fact, precision has not even been attained in
predicting who of those having already committed violent acts will again become
violent, a task recognized to be of much simpler proportions.
Id. at 360-61 (citations omitted).
42. See generally Gerard F. Glynn, Multidisciplinary Representation of Children: Conflicts
Over Disclosures of Client Communications, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 617 (1994).
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experts, however, do not share the lawyer's duty of advocacy with
respect to the child client's wishes and perspectives, often have other
institutional loyalties, may have important ongoing relationships with
the child that must not be damaged, or may not offer opinion to the
lawyer in a timely fashion.43
The rules of confidentiality require this kind of strategizing and informa-
tion hiding which seem nonsensical outside of the adversarial context.
At stake is the welfare, and perhaps the actual physical safety, of
the child, whose best interests the court has a duty to protect.' Under
the operation of the attorney work product doctrine, the work of the
evaluator hired by the attorney belongs to the attorney and is confiden-
tial and privileged unless the evaluator was hired as an expert witness.45
The attorney will not hire the evaluator to be a witness if the report is
unfavorable. In fact, in all likelihood, the unfavorable report will never
be written.46
Some attorneys, recognizing they may not have the requisite skills,
hire experts to interview children, particularly in difficult cases. This
creates a similar confidentiality problem regarding the discoverability of
the interview. Additionally, ascertaining which parties need to be
advised and present if the child's attorney interviews one of the parents
is a concern which arises under the traditionally adversary-based rules of
confidentiality and discovery.
4 7
43. Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering
for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1505, 1568 (1996).
44. The evaluator will not report pursuant to a child abuse and neglect reporting act because
there is no present suspicion of a risk of abuse or neglect to give rise to the duty to report.
Similarly, there is no imminent danger which would give rise to a duty to warn under the rule in
Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 342-51.
45. But see Louis I. Parley, Representing Children in Custody Litigation, 11 J. Am. ACAD.
MATRIM. LAW 45 (the "attorney-client privilege did not bar discovery of evaluating psychologist's
report in a termination of parental rights action, even though expert was appointed at mother's
request, because mother knew report would produce [sic] important to the proceedings and could
not have expected the communications to be confidential"). Id. at 49, n. 17 (citing In re O.J.S.A.,
844 P.2d 1230 (Colo. App. Ct. 1992).
46. The attorney will ask the evaluator for a telephone report. If the evaluator states that the
report will be unfavorable, the evaluator may be directed not to write the report. Obviously, this
places the evaluator in an awkward position, knowing that the court will not be informed of this
assessment and that the potential exists for some danger to come to the child if the court decides to
return the child to that parent. The courts are aware of this dilemma. Attorneys, having no duty to
report under many reporting acts, and no duty to report if it would breach their clients'
confidences or potentially harm their clients' cases, would not, and perhaps could not, report.
47. See Parley, supra note 45, at 53. Parley states that:
[T]here are reasons why the child's counsel might want the information received to
be treated as confidential, or at least subject only to such disclosure as he or she
desires. These reasons range from merely strategy and tactics to wanting to
encourage parent interviews with the child's counsel so that the information may be
used by counsel to represent a child who cannot otherwise provide information, to
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Another demonstration of the barrier created by attorney-client con-
fidentiality is the dispute over whether attorneys should be mandatory
reporters under the child abuse reporting laws. 48 In many states, attor-
neys are noticeably absent from the list of professionals who are
required to report suspicions of abuse. Even in the states where attor-
neys are included, either specifically or as part of a universal mandate,
ethical considerations of client loyalty conflict with statutory mandates.
A parent who discloses abuse of a child during an interview with his
attorney may not be reported by that attorney unless the attorney
believes the abuse to be a continuing crime, for which there is no confi-
dentiality safeguard.4 9 A child who discloses to her attorney that she has
been abused by one of her parents may similarly have her disclosure
held confidential by her attorney, regardless of how that may affect the
outcome of the case.5°
The underlying premises for the rule of confidentiality are subject
to attack.51 In fact, little empirical evidence exists in either direction for
supporting, abolishing or diminishing the rule. It is not clear that clients
rely on the rule in disclosing information to their attorneys. Most prac-
wanting child's counsel to have the information to work toward a non-litigated
outcome.
Id.
48. See Boyer, supra note 29, at 1632-36, for a good discussion of attorney reporting vis a vis
the attorney-client privilege and the duty of confidentiality.
49. Jurisdictions differ in their approach to this situation. In California, for example, section
6068 of the Business and Professions Code states: "It is the duty of an attorney . .. (e) To
maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets,
of his or her client." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West Supp. 1997). Even where a
parent's actions might be considered an ongoing crime, such would not be an excuse for the
attorney to report the parent.
Under the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, however, an attorney "may reveal
such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary ... to prevent the client
from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1996). Yet,
even under the Model Rules, it is unclear whether ongoing incest or emotional abuse would fall
within this exception to client confidentiality. See also Robert H. Aronson, What About the
Children? Are Family Lawyers the Same (Ethically) as Criminal Lawyers? A Morality Play, 1 J.
INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETmics 141, 144 (1996).
50. It is not yet clear whether attorneys are under a duty to warn similar to the duty
established for psychotherapists in Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 342-51. In this situation, the question is
to whom the duty would run, since the victim has the information. An argument could be made
that the duty should run to an adult who is in the position of protecting the child; if that adult
happens to be the perpetrator, the warning should be to an authority who has the duty to protect.
Thus, the civil liability potentially imposed by Tarasoff, might result in the same kind of reporting
that should occur in a mandatory reporting statute or in those jurisdictions which require attorneys
to report ongoing or future crimes.
51. See Zacharias, supra note 39, at 356-70 (providing extensive documentation regarding the
development and rationalization of the confidentiality rule, stating that it may have greater
justification in criminal matters because of constitutional implications).
[Vol. 52:79
CHILDREN AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
ticing attorneys are aware that their clients may lie, or withhold informa-
tion from them, even when informed of the confidentiality rule.52 Some
lawyers would rather not obtain full disclosure from their clients, as
knowledge of the truth might jeopardize the lawyer's ability to put on a
convincing case, either from a professional ethical code perspective or
from a personal moral concern. Whether the law should be protecting
clients from disclosures which are harmful to their cases is an issue
which should be examined rather than taken for granted. 53  It is
extraordinary that we permit an attorney to divulge a confidence to
defend himself in a malpractice action, but not to protect the best inter-
ests of a child.54
52. See DAVID A. BINDER LIr AL., CLIENT COUNSELING 35-36 (1991) (discussing ego and case
threats which motivate clients to conceal information from their attorneys).
53. For a clear analysis of the rule and its implications, see Zacharias, supra note 39.
Zacharias concludes that the application of the confidentiality rule should not be absolute. I
cannot imagine a more convincing case for exceptions to the rule than matters regarding the best
interests of children.
54. The Working Group on Confidentiality at the Fordham Conference (see description of the
conference beginning at 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1290 (1996)) examined Model Rule 1.6, which
states:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client
unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph
(b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(I) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil
claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of
the client.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 1.6 (1995).
The Working Group proposed to amend the rule to allow an attorney to reveal information to
prevent an unimpaired child client from engaging in conduct likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm. Report of the Working Group on Confidentiality, 64 FORDHAM L. REv.
1367 (1996); see also Randi Mandelbaum, Rules of Confidentiality When Representing Children:
The Need for a 'Bright Line' Test, 64 FORDHAm L. REV. 2053 (1996); Kevin M. Ryan, Reforming
Model Rule 1.6: A Brief Essay from the Crossroads of Ethics and Conscience, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2065 (1996). Ryan states:
The Model Rules do not provide a confidentiality exception for the welfare
interests of a client when his own behavior is imminently dooming, perhaps reflect-
ing the view that as to matters of the client's welfare, the client knows best (unless
such behavior involves a criminal act likely to result in imminent death or substan-
tial bodily harm). When a child client confesses to the attorney an intention to
engage in noncriminal behavior that could quickly lead to the child's death, the
attorney typically may not reveal that information absent the client's consent. For
example, in jurisdictions that have not criminalized attempted suicide, an attorney
may not disclose the suicidal intentions of a child client if the information, in any
sense, relates to the representation. To be sure, self-destructive behavior may be
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D. The Process Is Not Dynamic
In the usual criminal or civil case, the court makes a finding about
something that has already occurred in order to decide who was "right,"
and thus, who wins. Child protection and custody and visitation dis-
putes are about the future welfare of the child. Although past acts may
provide some help in thinking about the welfare of the child, they are not
determinative. The family is a living entity, dynamic in nature, involv-
ing personalities and relationships which will change depending upon
how the family is reordered.55 Parenting may change after a divorce, so
that an examination of parenting at the time of divorce is not necessarily
a good indicator of what will occur later.56 The traditional legal
approach requires a snapshot judgment of the family structure which
does not serve the best interest of the child.
E. The Process Is Not Contextually Oriented
The traditional adversary process, bound by definitions of legal
causes of action, remedies and relevance, is limited in its ability to
examine problems contextually. Something either fits a definition or it
does not. Lawyers, judges, and the law in general, have no appreciation
for the ecological perspective of family dynamics." Greater under-
standing of cultural mores, for example, has no place in a system bound
by the act of fitting evidence into the fixed definitions of a cause of
action. The legal system's need for this neat fit forces the law to be
"crystallized," conflicting with the changing and multiple forms of fain-
indicative of an impairment that requires the attorney to seek the appointment of a
guardian ad litem for the child. In exigencies where time and process are elusive,
and the attorney cannot rely on a guardian's appointment, the decision to remain
silent or to disclose and prevent the child's death takes on moral and ethical dimen-
sions of extraordinary proportions. To the extent that attorneys confront this
dilemma, anecdotal evidence seems to indicate that many practitioners disregard the
Model Rule.
Id. at 2067-68 (footnotes omitted). The amendment proposed by the Working Group was not
adopted, due to concern that it created a "slippery slope" which would erode client autonomy. Id.
at 2073.
55. See Catania, supra note 15, at 1238-40 (arguing that the child custody determination
process does not recognize "these dissolving and reforming individual familial relationships"). Id.
at 1239.
56. CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE, supra note 21, at 11.
57. The ecological approach is a popular model used for understanding the etiology of abuse
and neglect. See, e.g., PANEL ON RESEARCH ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, COMMISSION ON
BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES AND EDUCATION, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 133 (1993) at 106-40 [hereinafter NRC]. It is also
important for planning treatment. See ANTHONY N. MALUCCIO ET AL., PERMANENCY PLANNING
FOR CHILDREN: CONCEPTS AND METHODS 8 (1986). Context is just as significant in examining
the dynamics of a family engaged in a custody dispute. See generally PARENTING OUR CHILDREN,
supra note 1.
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ily. The need to fit life into categories also creates reality gaps which
limit our ability to serve children and families experiencing difficulties.
Whether a matter is defined as a family law custody case or as a child
protection case may have fundamental ramifications for the future rela-
tionships of family members. For example, in custody disputes where
there is no immediate "protective issue," children, nonetheless, may lose
access to one parent as a result of a family court custody award com-
bined with a custodial parent who prevents visitation. The loss of mean-
ingful parental contact is not in the best interest of a child, and the child
may be emotionally damaged because of this loss. Yet, the need for
clear distinctions between child protection. cases and family custody
cases has created a chasm into which this child's needs will fall. It is
additionally troubling that no low-cost or free services may be available
to an economically disadvantaged parent who has lost a custody battle
because of attitude or skill deficits that are amenable to treatment.
Relationships and individuals are different depending upon the con-
text in which they are examined. 8 Furthermore, legal intervention itself
will change the dynamics and relationships-the very facts upon which
the court must base its decision. 9 Rules of procedure and evidence also
work to distort the "facts" upon which the decision will be made. 60 Par-
ties may be frustrated, feeling that they have not been able to "tell their
stories," as their lawyers attempt to make the "facts" fit into the catego-
rized requirements of the law. What seems to be relevant to the parties,
what they need to say in order to feel "heard," may be left out by their
attorneys, seen as irrelevant to the proceeding.
58. See Charles P. Barnard & Gust Jenson, 1i, Child Custody Evaluations: A Rational
Process for an Emotion-Laden Event, 12 Am. U.J. FAM. THERAPY 61, 61 (1984) ("Too often the
custody decision has been based upon an individual clinician's evaluation of the children and/or
one of the parents, or perhaps both parents, but usually a thorough consideration of the
individuals, their relationships and their contexts has not been made."); see also Jennifer A.
Freyer, Women Litigators in Search of a Care-Oriented Judicial System, 4 AM. U.J. GENDER & L.
199 (1995) (arguing that the adversary system does not allow for a contextual approach); Joan G.
Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 757 (1985) (making
custody modifications easy and subject to best interests standard leaves too much room for
decision-making without understanding context of child and parent situations, particularly given
the difficult transitions that family members must make after divorce).
59. See Theresa Glennon & Robert G. Schwartz, Foreword: Looking Back, Looking Ahead:
The Evolution of Children's Rights, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1557, 1564 (1995) (discussing three recent,
notorious adoption cases in which "the courts themselves altered the facts, rights and relationships
by needlessly prolonging the legal process"). The impact of a lengthy appellate process on the
best interests of children is portrayed in these cases and continues to be a major impediment to
protecting the best interests of children. See, e.g., Adoption of Haley A., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 505
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (during appellate process, which took over a year, the child became more
attached to foster parents), rev'd, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
60. See Catania, supra note 15, at 1241-42 (stating that the adjudicator is limited to skewed
versions of evidence, "laboriously reconstructed" and "editorially enhanced or laundered").
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F. The Process Is Not Inclusive
The adversary process is a battle between the parties to the pro-
ceedings. Although others may participate as witnesses, third party
interests are not relevant to the outcome. While the law may define the
family as consisting of parents and children, others, including relatives,
friends, counselors, and neighbors, can play substantial roles in the fam-
ily. Particularly for cultures within our society in which extended family
includes relatives as well as nonrelatives, the legal barriers that exclude
these members from participating in any decisions, restricts the ability to
understand the family, its needs, and options for maintaining its
integrity.
G. Other Professionals Are Forced into Advocacy Roles
The adversary system forces many helping professionals to become
advocates for one position.61 Therapists, evaluators, teachers, physi-
cians and others often find themselves being called upon to present
information that will help one side win the case. These other profession-
als, not trained to be advocates in the legal sense, are usually more
aware of the dynamic and contextual nature of the family, and are
uncomfortable taking such a position.
The imposition of the legal system upon social work requires social
workers to make a convincing case, disregarding their training and
impeding their necessary flexibility, in working with the family in an
effort to resolve difficulties. Forced from the beginning to decide
whether the facts are sufficient to take a legal position, social workers
become adversaries to the families they are supposed to serve.
Mental health professionals, who have testified frequently in best
61. See, e.g., Roseby, supra note 20, at 98-100:
The win/lose framework has driven professionals in the mental health and legal
communities to attempt to answer questions about which parent is healthier or more
competent without questioning the assumptions of the framework itself...
Although the mental health profession in general and individual practitioners in
particular have set high professional standards for their work with families in cases
of contested child custody, the pressure to answer the questions which are implicit
in the win/lose framework is significant. Not surprisingly, mental health
professionals have at times been criticized for exceeding the limitations of
empirically based scientific knowledge in their efforts to be responsive.
Id. at 98-99; see also Gardner, supra note 17, at 6:
Even though I was formally viewed by the court as an impartial examiner, after my
findings became known, I was usually considered to be the advocate of the person
whose position I supported and was treated as such regarding courtroom procedures
of examination .... Over the years, I became increasingly appreciative of the fact
that, when I serve as a mediator, I was more likely to protect parents from the
depravities of the adversary system, exploitation by attorneys and the psychopathol-
ogy that inevitably resulted from such exposure.
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interest cases, have been known to adapt to the process with frightening
success.62 Mental health professionals who rely upon the adversarial
legal system as a source of income are concerned with more than the
threat of being embarrassed by skillful cross-examination. Faced with
having to report to an attorney that an award of custody to the attorney's
client may not be in the best interest of the child, the mental health
professional may fear losing future referrals. This mutual dependence
creates the potential for expert evidence to be less than objective.
Where more than one mental health expert is involved, the fact that they
may be testifying for opposing parties may also tend to draw them into
the role of adversaries rather than neutral, objective witnesses.63
Discussions among mental health experts are also impeded by the
adversarial system. "[I]f each evaluator knows that what is said to the
other in an effort to try to help resolve the case may be used against him
or her, the candor needed to achieve the resolution may be lost."'
Opportunities for collaborative problem solving are foregone in alle-
giance to the adversarial process.
III. CONFLICTS IN PRACTICE
The barriers to serving the best interest of the child, as discussed in
the previous section, arise due to the inherent nature of the adversary
process. Other conflicts arise because of the way the adversary system
actually operates in the context of child protection and custody proceed-
ings. Additionally, unchallenged customs in court practice, and funding
and training problems, affect the best interests of the child consideration.
Most significantly, the inability to truly protect children comes from a
62. See Gardner, supra note 17, at 2. Gardner states that:
I gradually reached the point where I found it an enjoyable game .... I often
compared it to a fencing match. I learned the rules and I played rather well. I didn't
even view it as a fencing match between equals. Rather, it was a match between a
person with a longer sword and more protection (the lawyer) and someone with a
shorter sword and less protection (the witness). The rules of cross-examination put
the witness, even the so-called expert, in the weaker position. The witness is
competing with an intrinsic handicap, built into the rules of the sport-which is
what adversary litigation basically is (at least for the lawyers). Accordingly, when
the witness wins, it is an even greater victory. The cross-examining attorney was
allowed to confine me to yes-no responses, select and focus on out-of-context
material and pose questions in a way that distorted and misrepresented my opinions.
Getting across one's point under such circumstances was indeed a challenge, and I
often felt successful in accomplishing this. And this brought an ego-enhancing
gratification to many of my court appearances.
63. See, e.g., Philip Stahl, Second Opinions: An Ethical and Professional Process for
Reviewing Child Custody Evaluations, 34 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 386 (1996).
64. Parley, supra note 45, at 60.
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tension between the legal and psychosocial arenas, which results in role
confusion and ineffective problem solving.
A. Inconsistent Treatment of the Right to Appointed Counsel
The justification for our adversary system rests, at least in part,
upon the representation of clients by attorneys. The system can be com-
plicated and sophisticated, relying upon rules of law and procedures
which require knowledge acquired through legal training and experi-
ence. Attempting to maneuver the system on one's own would be a
difficult challenge in any situation; asking people who have difficulty
functioning in everyday life, or people in the midst of an emotional
upheaval, to represent themselves makes a farce of the adversary
process.
The right to appointed counsel is not universal in child protection
proceedings. Courts have been inconsistent in their holdings regarding
when the right to counsel attaches, applying a balancing test based upon
the particular facts of the case.65 The low functioning of many of the
parents involved in child protection proceedings exacerbates the imbal-
ance of power favoring the state. Parents need early counseling by their
attorneys to encourage them to engage in services where the system
appears to be the "enemy" who is trying to take away the children. It
may be that the parent's attorney is the only trusted voice who can pro-
vide such counseling. If an attorney is not provided until the termination
proceeding itself, chances of overcoming the impetus toward termina-
tion are greatly limited. Thus, parents who are able to hire their own
attorneys would appear to have a significant advantage.
Similarly, the inconsistency among jurisdictions in providing coun-
65. A constitutional right to counsel has been determined on a case-by-case basis, using the
three-prong test derived from Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and enunciated in
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981). See, e.g., In re A.S.A., 852 P.2d
127 (Mont. 1993) (holding that indigent parents have right under state constitution to court-
appointed counsel in proceedings to terminate parental rights); Bauer v. McClure, 549 N.E.2d 392
(Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that there is a right to counsel in termination proceedings of the
parent-child relationship); Farmer v. State of Oklahoma, 784 P.2d 89 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989)
(indigent, incarcerated father's right to counsel includes right to court-appointed counsel on
appeal); In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276 (Alaska 1991) (denying a biological father's request for court-
appointed counsel violated his procedural due process rights under State Constitution). But cf In
re Adoption of K.A.S., 499 N.w.2d 558 (N.D. 1993) (federal Due Process Clause does not confer
upon an indigent parent the automatic right to court-appointed counsel in case of parental rights
termination; rather, trial court, in exercise of sound judicial discretion, must decide whether due
process requires appointment of counsel for indigent parent under circumstances, subject to
review on appeal). A California Court of Appeal in In re Arturo A., 8 Cal. App. 4th 229, 238
(1992), held that the decision depends upon the "complexity of the issues presented and the
likelihood that counsel might sway the outcome." More recently, in In re Malcolm D., 42 Cal.
App. 4th 904 (1996), an appellate court held that the right to counsel is statutory, not
constitutional, even in termination of parental rights cases.
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sel for children in child protection proceedings" imposes barriers to
hearing the child's voice. Even where lawyers are appointed, they are
often underpaid, have high caseloads, and work in a system which has
low expectations about what they can do. 6 7
While attorneys may be appointed for parents in child protection
proceedings by statute, they generally are not provided in family court.68
Further, the burden of proof for determining the best interests of the
child is merely a preponderance of evidence. Courts apply this standard,
66. In commenting upon the inconsistent grant of counsel for children who are subjects of
protective proceedings, Ellen Wells states:
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the right to meaningful
access to the courts, to be provided by "adequate, effective, and meaningful"
judicial procedures. Most state constitutions also contain a provision guaranteeing
meaningful court access.
The constitutional right to access is not a substantive right, but a procedural
right to a judicial remedy available whenever the legislature creates a substantive
right. If the proposition that a minor has a substantive due process right to preserve
family relationships is accepted as valid, then any state action that impedes access to
the judicial process in relation to those family relationships is suspect and must
survive strict scrutiny.
Ellen B. Wells, Unanswered Questions: Standing and Party Status of Children in Custody and
Visitation Proceedings, 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 95, 104-05 (1995) (footnotes omitted). A
minor's right to counsel in dependency cases has been held to be statutory, not constitutional. See
In re Elizabeth M., 232 Cal. App. 3d 553, 567 (1991); In re Richard H., 234 Cal. App. 3d 1351,
1367 (1991); In re Candida S., 7 Cal. App. 4th 1240, 1252 (1992).
In California, minors have been considered to be parties to dependency proceedings by stat-
ute since January 1, 1995. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317 (West Supp. 1997). Minors are
appointed counsel under the Code whenever it appears to the court that the minor would benefit
from the representation. See id. § 317(c). Since the right to counsel is statutory rather than consti-
tutional, there is no constitutional right to competent counsel. All parties who are represented in
dependency matters are entitled to competent counsel. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317.5; see
also Ross, supra note 9, at 1574-76 (stating that federal law requires representation for children in
some matters; little consensus among states); Federle, supra note 39, at 1679 (noting that the
Supreme Court has never found a constitutional right to counsel for minors, and that federal law
requires guardian ad litem, but the role is not clarified); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, A Public
Role in the Private Family: The Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act and the Politics of Child
Protection and Education, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 393, 405-06 (1996) [hereinafter Public Role]; William
Wesley Patton, Standards of Appellate Review for Denial of Counsel and Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel in Child Protection and Parental Severance Cases, 27 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 195 (1996)
[hereinafter Standards of Appellate Review].
67. See, e.g., Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. & Sharon S. England, I Know the Child Is My Client,
But Who Am I? 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1917, 1925 (1996) (noting that "a 1983 study of attorney
GALs representing children in North Carolina child protection proceedings concluded that the
attorneys 'were not only ineffective but even tended to substantially delay a child's return home"')
(citing Robert F. Kelly & Sarah H. Ramsey, Do Attorneys for Children in Protection Proceedings
Make a Difference?-A Study of the Impact of Representation Under Conditions of High Judicial
Intervention, 21 J. FAM. L. 405, 407 (1982-83)).
68. Only Wisconsin mandates the appointment of a representative for the child in custody
disputes. See Federle, Ethics of Empowerment, supra note 39, at 1685; see also Leonard P.
Edwards, A Comprehensive Approach to the Representation of Children: The Child Advocacy
Coordinating Council, 27 FAm. L.Q. 417 (1993).
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even though social science research has demonstrated that custody and
visitation orders may be determinative of the future parent-child
relationship.6 9
In both types of cases, the confusion over the role of the child's
attorney, if provided, and the role of the guardian ad litem may seri-
ously impact the welfare of the child. Uncertainty about whether the
point of representation should be the empowerment of the child or the
protection of the child, and about what any particular attorney sees as
her role, leaves the question of the child's best interests not clearly
addressed. This situation is aggravated when appointed counsel do not
receive direction from the court about the role they are to play; informa-
tion provided to the court by the child's counsel is ambiguous as to its
content and purpose. This confusion led the American Bar Association
("ABA") to adopt a Practice Guideline for attorneys representing
minors.70 However, any clarity offered by the standards further
entrenches the best interests determination in the adversarial process, as
discussed in Section IV.
B. Lack of Training by Professionals Who Work in the System
The literature is abundant with accounts of the sorry state of profes-
sional training, in both knowledge and skills, for work in the areas which
deal with the best interests of the child.71 All professionals involved suf-
fer from this training deficit. Judges, attorneys, social workers, physi-
cians, mental health experts and other child advocates are inadequately
trained about the many issues which affect this type of work. Poor train-
ing leads to poor decision making.
Paradoxically, professionals are called upon to perform tasks which
69. Research shows that when custody and visitation has been decided against them, parents,
especially fathers, tend to disappear from their children's lives. See PARENTING OUR CHILDREN,
supra note 1, at 15.
70. In August 1995, the ABA Family Law Section adopted Standards of Practice for Lawyers
Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases. See Proposed Standards of Practice for
Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 29 FAM. L.Q. 375 (1995). In
February 1996, the American Bar Association adopted those standards.
71. See, e.g., Katharine Cahn & Paul Johnson, Reaching Timely Permanency Decisions: A
Recapitulation, in CHILDREN CAN'T WArr: REDUCING DELAYS FOR CHILDREN IN FoSTER CARE
129 (Katharine Cahn & Paul Johnson eds., 1993) [hereinafter CHILDREN CAN'T WALT]. Cahn and
Johnson state:
The authors of chapter I ranked turnover on the bench and among the ranks of legal
professionals with dependency caseloads as a major obstacle to permanency for
children. The lack of judicial and legal expertise in dependency matters is a
problem that was dealt with in some fashion by all the projects, and all found some
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they may never have intended to perform when they chose to enter their
respective professions. Judges and attorneys find themselves involved
in the lives of families in an intimate way for which they never prepared
in law school.72 Professionals are asked to assess parenting abilities and
risks to children, to determine the qualifications of the experts on whom
they rely, and to make many decisions beyond their training and knowl-
edge. The best interests standard, which has been criticized for being
vague, and for being an illusory determinant of the child's welfare,
exaggerates the training deficiencies because those who make the deci-
sions are forced to rely upon their personal biases and experience. With-
out basic training in an area such as child development, judges are left to
their own intuition.73 Judges and attorneys are also forced to rely upon
the word of other professionals who have more specific training in
issues relating to parent-child relationships, child development, and risk
assessment.
The legal profession, and the adversary process itself, rely too
much on medical and mental health professionals who do not escape
criticism for their lack of training about specific issues in child protec-
tion and custody determinations.74 The complexity of the family
dynamics which arise in these cases is often beyond the basic course
material covered in graduate programs. Just because a professional per-
son is licensed, or even has experience in this field, it is no guarantee of
expertise. Most importantly, the pressure exerted by the legal system for
these "experts" to push the edge of known, reliable scientific data,
requires training on dealing with the adversary system. Further, because
of their own inadequate training, neither judges nor attorneys may be
capable of determining the quality of the advice they are receiving from
other professionals, nor of meaningfully choosing between conflicting
experts.75
In many jurisdictions, juvenile court is used as a training ground for
72. For example, see Myers, supra note 8, at 246, where he states that "nothing in the
lawyer's training or expertise qualifies him to make psychological assessments or judgments."
73. See Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a Child's Capacity to
Choose, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1873, 1889 (1996).
74. See, e.g., Gerald P. Koocher, Different Lenses: Psycho-Legal Perspectives on Children's
Rights, 16 NOVA L. REV. 711 (1992). Koocher believes that many of the issues which mental
health experts are asked to address are more properly within the purview of the judicial fact finder,
since there is no hard scientific basis for addressing those issues. Id. at 725.
75. Some courts have attempted to acquire some control over the quality of mental health
treatment and evaluation related to dependency cases by creating training requirements or
establishing lists of approved providers from whom services must be obtained in order to qualify
for funding and/or be admitted into evidence. For example, Santa Clara County in California,
under the guidance of Judge Leonard Edwards, has established a court-run coordination system.
Also, San Diego County has a county-funded agency which determines which therapists and
evaluators qualify to perform these services for dependency matters.
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public sector attorneys; 76 attorneys who have developed knowledge
from their experience are then rewarded with a transfer to a more pres-
tigious area of practice.77 Thus, the experienced attorneys are regularly
replaced by neophytes and the system, again, adapts by moving back-
wards and slowing the process for children and families.
Judges are routinely rotated through juvenile and family courts with
the same effect.78 Moreover, the value of experience is lost to the chil-
dren and families as these judges move into civil or criminal
departments.79
Social workers find themselves performing law enforcement-type
investigations, having to determine whether they have sufficient "evi-
dence" to legally intervene in a family's life, and having to provide
ongoing monitoring of court orders. They may carry a caseload of
quasi-criminal matters for which they have no reasonable expectation of
providing meaningful help.8" Worse, many social workers have never
actually received graduate or even undergraduate training in the field of
social work."1
Social workers, too, are affected not only by the lack of sufficient
training in their own field, but also because they receive little, if any,
training about the legal process.
More often than not, they are unschooled in adversarial methods and
uneasy with this approach. Understandably, a social worker who has
been trying to help a parent improve finds it difficult to change roles
and speak against the parent's ability in a TPR [termination of paren-
tal rights] hearing. The lawyer's logic and process orientation seem
cold and passionless to the social worker. At the same time, lawyers
may not understand the social worker's dilemmas or approaches and
may feel frustration at the social worker's "emotionalism" or lack of
appreciation for the rules of the court situation. One project coordi-
76. See David Herring, The Michigan Agency Attorney, in CHILDREN CAN'T WAIT, supra note
71, at 18. The San Diego Juvenile Justice Commission made a similar finding in its 1995 Court
Report, recommending that promotion opportunities be created within the juvenile system for both
the District Attorney and the Public Defender offices, so as to reward those attorneys who develop
expertise in, and a commitment to, this work. San Diego Juvenile Justice Commission, COURT
COMMITTEE REPORT (1995) [hereinafter JJC Report] (on file with author).
77. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 68, at 419 (stating that more senior attorneys assigned to
work with children's issues may see it as punishment).
78. OREGON TASK FORCE ON FAMILY LAW, STATUS REPORT 3, May 8, 1996, at 3 [hereinafter
OREGON STATUS REPORT] ("[Iln most jurisdictions, family law cases are often given the lowest
priority and are usually assigned last to whatever judges are available to take them.").
79. See, e.g., MARK HARDIN, JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF PERMANENCY PLANNING
REFORM: ONE COURT THAT WORKS (1992) (suggesting that the presiding judge of a juvenile
court have a minimum 10-year commitment to the position); Jim Morales, Reinventing Children's
Rights: ABA Promotes New Advocacy Efforts for Children, Del. B. Found. (1994).
80. See Solove, supra note 38, at 804.
81. See Huxtable, supra note 21, at 64.
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nator remarked that watching members of the two professions try to
collaborate was almost like watching attempts at communication
between alien species. 2
Attempts to reduce adversarialness in the system have left profes-
sionals, particularly attorneys and judges, in an awkward void. Trained
in the adversary process and the zealous advocate role, lawyers are
uncertain about the role they are to play in an undefined, but less adver-
sarial process. Often, the result is that they do not zealously advocate,
but do retain their adversarial posture, a confusing situation for all
involved. Trial skills become sloppy, and records on appeal are incom-
plete and/or undiscernible. Role confusion creates tension and results in
counter-accusations of poor performance. The judges, too, are uncertain
about what should occur in these proceedings. Should they demand that
attorneys perform in the same manner as would be expected in other
courtrooms? Should they try to create a less formal, and more comforta-
ble, atmosphere for the participants? There appears to be little uniform-
ity in answering these questions. Some attorneys complain that judges
do not take control of their courtrooms, creating inefficiency and unfor-
tunate delays for children and parents; others react to judges who pull in
the reigns and may be less flexible, particularly in introducing evidence
and in granting continuances.
Lack of training is also reflective of the low status afforded to work
involving the best interests of the child. Family law and child protection
cases are among those most disliked by judges. Attorneys practicing in
these areas tend to be lower paid and have a lower professional status
than attorneys involved in cases where money is involved. 3 Social
workers are also notoriously underpaid and undervalued as a profession.
Even mental and physical health professionals who work with children
are undervalued, in part because the compensation for their services
often relies upon public funding. This issue of status, when combined
with the difficult nature of the cases presented, contributes to a demoral-
ized atmosphere among the various professionals participating in the
systems.84 These conditions cause lackluster work, in-fighting, and hier-
82. See Katherine Cahn & Paul Johnson, Critical Issues in Permanency Planning: An
Overview, in CHILDREN CAN'T WAIT, supra note 71, at 1, 7; see also Debra Ratterman, Changing
Agency Procedures, in CHILDREN CAN'T WArr, supra note 71, at 39 (stating that agency workers
are not confident enough in their knowledge of legal requirements to file petitions for termination
of parental rights).
83. See Edwards, Coordinating Council, supra note 68, at 418 ("Trained attorneys are critical
to an effective child advocacy system, but children's attorneys often have the least experience, the
lowest status, and receive the lowest compensation within the legal community.").
84. Richard Gardner, M.D., has stated, in regard to his experience in family court custody
disputes:
I have seen judges sleeping in the courtroom while the lawyers are going through
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archical power conflicts, as well as draw attention away from the shared
goal of protecting the welfare of the children. The training necessary to
do this work well requires time and resources which are not available.
C. Predominance of Psychosocial Concerns Over Legal Issues
The first real legal issue in a child protection case is whether the
child is at significant risk of harm to justify state interference into this
family's life. The second issue is whether the parents are unfit so that
their rights may be terminated. In a family custody and visitation pro-
ceeding, the determination of who has the legal right to the child (i.e.,
custody) becomes a legal issue only because the parties bring the issue
to the court for lack of another resolution. Then, the child is seen as a
piece of property and a legal issue to be determined in a win or lose
combat.
On the other hand, numerous psychosocial issues about the welfare
of the child and the parents are presented in these cases, including con-
cerns about development, relationship and self-esteem. The law may be
able to force parties to behave in a desired way in some situations, but
more often it cannot,85 as evidenced by the number of fathers who lose
touch with their children after losing a custody dispute, or after being
resigned to the role of visitor in their children's lives.
The law is not the appropriate forum for assisting dysfunctional
families to function better. Resolution of the legal case does little to
resolve the underlying family dynamics which will haunt the parents and
children into the future. The hurt, frustration, anger and fear, and the
loss of familiar support systems are not healed by the adversary process;
instead, the parties and the children are on their own to deal with these
concerns.
D. Best Interests Are Difficult to Determine
1. THE STANDARD IS VAGUE
The best interests of the child standard has been attacked for being
no standard at all because of its vagueness. 86 In an effort to make deci-
sion-making more certain, a number of psychological theories were con-
verted into legal presumptions only to be challenged by other theories so
the motions of the trial, making believe that the judge is still awake. On the stand, I
have seen judges reading newspapers and magazines in the course of the testimony
and only I, sitting close to them, was able to observe what they were doing.
Gardner, supra note 17, at 5-6.
85. See Myers, supra note 8, at 242 ("The machinery of the legal system is simply not
capable of dealing effectively with so complex a socio-psycho-legal phenomenon.").
86. See supra note 6.
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that, in the end, uncertainty remained.87
In child protection proceedings, one of the biggest issues in best
interests cases is the tension between leaving the child with, or returning
the child to, parents who are minimally functional, and placing the child
permanently with adoptive parents who probably could provide much
more in material comfort and psychological stability. Essentially, this is
a debate between the "psychological parent" school and the "biological
roots" school.
In family custody and visitation proceedings, this tension arises
because there is often very little difference between the capabilities of
the two biological parents to provide decent parenting to the child. The
best interests standard forces the court to make a decision as if this were
not the case. The parties, through their attorneys when available, create
issues out of every aspect of their former mate's personal life in order to
prove the best interests of the child. They also engage in speculation
about external matters which are contended to affect that interest. 88 This
kind of uncertainty may encourage litigation, as both parents can believe
they have a chance to "win."89 Again, the child may not be the focus of
these proceedings; many other interests are involved.90 "The power
struggle between women and men in the courts and legislatures, consti-
tutional issues such as race and religion, and the subjective perspective
of the judge deciding any particular custody case all obscure and finally
prevent examination of any real child's interests in custody disputes."'"
87. Fineman explains that:
No permissible, easily applied guidelines remain under the best interest test, and
questions exist as to which rules should govern. Without the old gender
presumption, the legal system is asked to do too much. Judges and attorneys feel
ill-equipped to make determinations about what placement will be in the "best
interests" of children. This discomfort has set off a search for more determinate
rules.
Fineman, supra note 21, at 740 (footnote omitted).
88. See, e.g., Ellen J. Effron, Fighting Over a Good Education: Quality of Schools Can Be a
Key Factor in the Outcome of Custody Cases, A.B.A. J., July 1996, at 78 (advising attorneys on
the process of acquiring useful information on "educational opportunities" for their custody
cases). While there is no question that a child's education is important, I fear that the child's
benefit is less in the minds of these attorneys than is "winning" for their clients.
89. See Charlow, supra note 6, at 5 ("In fact, the relitigation rate in divorces that include
children is ten times greater than in those without children.") (citation omitted).
90. Fitzgerald comments that:
Judicial intervention in custody determinations and imposition of the "best
interests" standard is jurisprudentially unsound. The standard is also inherently
political, identified less with any individual's interest than with the state's. The
"best interest" standard is peculiarly malleable to diverse political agendas precisely
because it reflects no individual's interest. Instead, the standard is a vessel which
judges and legislatures may fill with their own changing definitions.
Fitzgerald, supra note 1, at 56.
91. Id. at 59-60.
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In the end, the personal biases of the judge may be the deciding factor.92
2. POOR INVESTIGATIVE RESOURCES
Even if we understood how to determine the best interests of the
child, both the child protection and family court systems lack the
resources to gather all pertinent information. In both systems, high
caseloads, as discussed below, and insufficient funds to pay for qualified
experts are obstacles to the collection of meaningful data. Training in
investigation techniques is missing or inadequate. Confusion about the
rules and ethics of confidentiality between social workers and families
may create artificial barriers to effective investigations. 93 Attorneys, too,
may lack critical investigation skills for these kinds of cases. Addition-
ally, because the law recognizes a child's need for stability within the
child's developmental time frame, decisions need to be made as quickly
as possible. Little time is available for studying the welfare of the child
in the context of the family's dynamics.
Inadequate investigation at the initiation of a case almost inevitably
brings problems as the case moves along, as well as surprises which
slow the progress of the case toward the goal of a stable, permanent
home for the child.94 Furthermore, the lack of formality at the hearings,
the admission of hearsay evidence, and the lack of resources at later
stages of the cases all limit the reliable information upon which deci-
sions are made.95
92. See id. at 62. The "best interests" standard is integrally related to the concept of parental
fitness which is subject to similar ambiguity. See also Sandra T. Azar & Corina L. Benjet, A
Cognitive Perspective on Ethnicy, Race, and Termination of Parental Rights, 18 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 249, 249-50 (1994) (judges making decisions in termination cases have their own
conceptions of "adequate" regarding parenting, based on their own racial-ethnic background, as
do the experts who are providing advice).
93. For example, a social worker investigating a report of suspected child abuse may fail to
contact neighbors to gather information for fear of breaching the relationship between the social
worker and the family which is being investigated.
94. See, e.g., Herring, supra note 76, at 8-9. Herring states that:
As a consequence of poor child welfare casework, children wait while social
workers go back to find fathers or identify other relatives. ... A child may have
been placed with, and become bonded to, an unrelated foster parent when relatives
were available as a permanent resource. Resolving these dilemmas is heart-
wrenching and challenging to the children, communities, and professionals
involved.
Id. at 9.
Because a child cannot be freed for adoption without first terminating parental rights, it is
essential to undertake a search for the child's father in order to obtain consent or, if need be, make
a finding of his unfitness. Unfortunately, thorough searches do not often begin until adoption is
the selected permanent plan, resulting in substantial delays in permanency.
95. See Larsen, supra note 7, at 50.
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3. INABILITY TO ACCURATELY PREDICT FUTURE BEHAVIOR
Decisions about the best interests of the child rest upon an effort to
predict what will occur in the future. In child protection proceedings,
this translates into a conclusion that returning the child to her parents
will not place the child at substantial risk of harm, and that the parents
will not engage in activities which will endanger the child. In family
custody proceedings, it is a determination that one of the parents will be
better for the child than the other; that the actions taken by that parent
will be, among other things, more loving and protective.
Clearly, neither judges nor attorneys have the training to make such
predictions; therefore, they rely upon "experts" whom they hope can
provide these answers. While mental health professionals can test, eval-
uate and tell us quite a bit about a person's current state of mind and
emotion, they cannot predict future behavior.96 They can discuss poten-
tial behavior, but they cannot tell us whether the potential will be real-
ized. Nevertheless, the legal profession's lack of knowledge and
abhorrence for uncertainty, particularly in a matter as serious as the wel-
fare of a child, cause us to overvalue what mental health experts can say.
Pressure is placed on mental health professionals to provide us with
answers about parental fitness and the future welfare of children. These
"experts," at times, have little more than their own experiences and
biases on which to make such a determination.97
E. There Is Often No "Correct" or "Just" Answer to These
Problems, Making Decisions Artificial, Unresponsive
and Unfair
Family issues, whether in child protection proceedings or in cus-
tody cases, are rarely clear cut.98 Because family relations are dynamic
96. See, e.g., Appell & Boyer, supra note 6, at 78 ("[llongitudinal studies have shown that
predictions made about the development of particular children were wrong two-thirds of the
time.").
97. See, e.g., Azar & Benjet, supra note 92, at 251. The authors comment that:
Fundamental to [the termination] decision is the ultimate labeling of a parent as
unfit and incapable of improvement within a reasonable enough time period to meet
the child's needs. Though the duration of a reasonable time frame has been
specified in a few states' laws ... the criteria for fitness have not. Consequently,
the courts have turned to expert witnesses with the assumption that such criteria do
exist within the mental health field. This assumption may not be sound. Well-
documented, universal criteria are not available. Only loose frameworks and poorly
specified models exist, leaving room for individual evaluators' own conceptions of
adequate parenting to influence their testimony.
Id. (citation omitted).
98. See, e.g., Catania, supra note 15, at 1241 (commenting that the "facts" of family life are
unlikely to be objectively provable); Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest
of the Child, 54 U. CH. L. REV. 1, 7-11 (1987).
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and contextual, and the legal process is unable to incorporate these char-
acteristics into its decision-making process, the solutions may not fit the
problems.99 We are attempting to fit square pegs into round holes for
lack of a better place on our game board to put the pegs.
Arriving at a "correct" answer also requires some sense of certainty
about the underlying situation. Although facts in litigation are often
uncertain or ambiguous, the court decides upon a set of facts and draws
its legal conclusion from that factual fiction."° The law cannot hold
ambiguous or contradictory information; something must be discarded
or ignored in order to resolve the case.'"' Social workers, on the other
hand, are accustomed to working with ambiguity and uncertainty. The
legal answer, along with the operation of sequentiality, as discussed in
the next section, distorts the actual picture of the family.
Striving for the right answer also results in disregarding informa-
tion which may be significant for the family, but not important in the
eyes of the law. Cultural differences which affect family dynamics have
no real place in the law, but are an essential factor for consideration by
social workers and therapists.10 2
F. Sequentiality and Risk Aversiveness
Sequentiality describes the effect of the first decision on later deci-
sions when the decision-making follows a standard pattern. 10 3 In the
context of both child protection and family custody proceedings, the
effect of sequentiality is that the first decision is often determinative of
later decisions, and thus, "an error at one stage is more likely to be
maintained or exaggerated than reversed."" This occurs without con-
99. Social work relies on systems theory. Systems theory is a framework for examining
situations. It incorporates the reality that many factors are involved in the family dynamic and
that changing any one factor may result in changes in other parts of the family system. The theory
is itself dynamic and contextual, recognizing the influence of factors which are external to the
family. See Cervone and Mauro, supra note 25, at 1978 (citing NAOMI I. BRILL, WORKING WrrH
PEOPLE: THE HELPING PROCESS 63 (5th ed. 1995)).
100. See Elster, supra note 98, at 29 ("A judge is not paid to throw up his hands and say that
since the law offers no guide to the decision, he will impose a compromise or ... take account of
such other considerations as seem relevant.").
101. See Catania, supra note 15, at 1236 ("The 'binary' nature of the common law
adjudicatory process resolves conflicts between competing values in such a way as to demean the
less dominant value.").
102. See, e.g., Cervone & Mauro, supra note 25, at 1977.
103. For an excellent discussion of sequentiality and risk aversion, see Peggy Cooper Davis
and Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at Risk: Bias, Sequentiality, and the Law, 2
U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 139 (1995). The discussion in the text is based upon this article as
applied to my personal observation of the child protection process.
104. Id. at 146. The authors continue:
Hence, an error that is made in the pre-trial custody decision, whichever way it
goes, will tend to be self-strengthening, so that the decision in the final stage of the
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scious acknowledgment and has a serious impact on the ultimate welfare
of children and families. The influence of child development knowl-
edge, especially the child's need for stable caretaking, and, conversely,
the detrimental effect of custodial change, reinforces the significance of
the status quo and the operation of the sequentiality effect. Therefore,
"to the extent that judges in child abuse cases are vulnerable to this bias,
they will be inclined to continue an existing custodial arrangement, and
they will be inclined to do so in at least some cases in which a custodial
change is warranted."1°5
Child protection proceedings are often long-term affairs, given the
statutory preference for reunifying families. In the many cases where
the evidence is not clearly weighed on one side, the sequentiality effect
may play a determinative role. Thus, in spite of the policy preference
for reunification, the initial decision to remove a child is reaffirmed and
gains significance as the child bonds with his or her substitute caretaker.
The ultimate return of the child to the biological parents becomes more
problematic as the new bond is solidified.
In addition to the bias for retaining the status quo, there is a bias in
risk assessment in which the risks for not intervening will be exagger-
ated in cases of indigents, who do not have the resources to prepare a
convincing case. On the other hand, where parents have the resources to
hire counsel, "it is likely that risks of intervention will be exagger-
ated. ' '" °" Even where the resources are equal on both sides, judges are
likely to skew their decision-making based on the fear of harming a
child by placing him with parents who could hurt him. °7
People are more likely to take risks when they know they will not
learn the outcome. In these cases, the bias is toward taking the risk of
case is more likely to go in the direction of the initial decision. We will call this
phenomenon the "sequentiality effect."
Id.
105. Id. at 149.
106. Id. at 151. The authors assume that the parents may have appointed attorneys, but that
those attorneys will not have the same skills and resources as does the "prosecuting agency." The
authors do not consider the situation caused by lack of agency resources which might cause the
agency to seek to avoid intervention, and to dismiss the pleas of a child advocate who believes
intervention to be necessary.
While the authors are applying the sequentiality effect to judicial decision-making, the same
process occurs on the part of social workers within the child protection agency. "The
consequence of blaming caseworkers for harm to referred children is that children are likely to be
prematurely removed from their homes, with the attendant loss of parental rights and possible
psychological harm to children." Huxtable, supra note 21, at 64. Huxtable notes that this is much
more likely to occur in borderline cases.
107. See Davis & Barua, supra note 103, at 151 ("Judges cannot fail to take account of the risk
of neglect or abuse in the respondent's home, but they may neglect to take account of the not-
insignificant risk that the child will suffer harm as a result of being in official care.").
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unnecessarily separating the child and parents-"the course that poses
less risk of regret."' ° Judges are sure to learn of their mistakes when a
child who is left with, or returned to, biological parents is seriously
injured. Furthermore, the mistake is likely to be widely broadcast
through the media. When a child who is unnecessarily removed from
parents suffers from the break in the parent-child bond, the judge is
much less likely to learn about that mistake.
In child protection proceedings, the first decision is about the
detention of the child outside of the family home. This takes place in an
emergency hearing within seventy-two hours from the time the child is
removed. Given the nature of the risk to the child, the burden of proof
for detention is a preponderance of the evidence-a burden not usually
difficult to meet since the child protection agency has screened its case
to be sure it meets this burden. Usually within two weeks, the court
must determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether it has
jurisdiction over this child. Once the court takes jurisdiction of the
child, the allegations in the petition are deemed to be true. In California,
the result of the jurisdiction hearing is called a "true finding."" As
mentioned earlier, there are no compromise positions in the win/lose
adversary system. Once the "true finding" is made, evidence inconsis-
tent with that conclusion is basically disregarded.
At the disposition hearing, it is foreseeable that the court will find
that the child cannot safely be left in the home, since the language defin-
ing jurisdiction includes language regarding "substantial risk of
harm." 110 A dispositional placement of the child out of the parents'
home requires a finding by clear and convincing evidence of substantial
danger to the child."' It would be nearly impossible for a judge to make
the jurisdictional finding without also being able to make the required
dispositional finding, given the influence of risk aversiveness and the
sequentiality effect.'1 2
108. Id. at 152. See also David J. Herring, Exploring the Political Roles of the Family:
Justifications for Permanency Planning for Children, 26 Loy. U. CI. L.J. 183, 207-08 (1995)
(concluding that because judges are risk-averse, they may over-rely on experts so they don't have
to take the blame for a decision. He also believes that they may not understand the harm a child
can suffer from being in foster care).
109. This means that the allegations stated in the petition, basically that the child is within the
court's jurisdiction under section 300 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code, are true.
110. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(a), (b) (West Supp. 1997) (requiring a finding of
substantial risk of serious harm in regard to physical abuse and neglect).
11. See id. § 361(b). There are other reasons for removal of the child, not relevant to this
discussion.
112. Huxtable argues that:
[The clear and convincing standard of proof] may be insufficient to protect parents
from a mistaken or false charge of child abuse. Much depends on the evidence
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A parent who thereafter continues to deny the abuse is labeled as
"uncooperative." A parent's refusal to engage in services may be reason
to continue to find the parent unfit.'13 At subsequent hearings, this evi-
dence will reinforce the initial decision to remove the child and to accept
jurisdiction of the case. In the end, the parent's rights may be
terminated.
The combination of the sequentiality effect, system biases, risk
aversion, burdens of proof, and the application of labels such as
"denial" 114 and "uncooperative," work together to create a process with
its own momentum from which parents and children need protection. I
have observed this phenomenon at operation in dependency cases and in
my students as they work through simulated cases in our Interdiscipli-
nary Training Program in Child Abuse and Neglect.115 In our classes,
presented or omitted, making the efforts of the parent's attorney critical in complex
cases or those in which the evidence is open to differing interpretations.
[M]ost existing laws allow preventive action to protect a child from threatened
harm, so that proof of past actions is not a condition. The lower standard of proof
combined with the relaxed rules of evidence permits wide discretion in dependency
hearings, thus increasing the likelihood that there will be false findings of child
abuse.
Huxtable, supra note 21, at 61-62.
113. In California, with regard to status review and 18-month hearings, the "failure of the
parent or guardian to participate regularly in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima
facie evidence that return [of the child] would be detrimental." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§§ 366.21(e)-(f), 366.22(a) (West Supp. 1997). Parents can end up in a no-win situation, since an
admission to something the parent does not believe to be true may be seen as a sign of the parent's
progress, but at the same time, may reinforce the original, possibly inaccurate, concept of the
problem in the family. See Huxtable, supra note 21, at 63 (discussing how parents are confused
about what is the best way to get their child returned-by confrontation or cooperation).
114. "Denial" is a term which is often misused in the child protection arena. The term, used in
substance abuse treatment to describe a person who is known to have a substance abuse problem,
but who is denying the existence of the problem, fits only loosely in the child protection context.
While it may be true that real healing can only occur when the patient admits (i.e., no longer
denies) the existence of the problem, the term refers only to the actual "patient" or, in this case,
perpetrator. One example of misuse is labeling a parent in a child protection case where a true
finding has been made by a preponderance of the evidence. In situations where the evidence is
not clear and no one knows for certain that the parent was a perpetrator, the use of the "denial"
term keeps the parent from moving forward on a reunification plan if that parent refuses to admit
having perpetrated the abuse. See, e.g., Blanca P. v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. App. 4th 1738
(1996). In this case, when it was ultimately determined that the father had not molested his child,
the court, discussing the "Confession Dilemma," stated that "the very fact that Blanca and Rogelio
have continually denied that Rogelio is a child molester is now asserted by the social services
agency as evidence supporting the detriment finding." Id. at 1752. The court then described the
situation as "Kafkaesque." Id. at 1753.
Another example of misuse of the term is its application to family members who are not
considered to be the perpetrators. A grandmother who has a hard time believing that her son or
daughter has abused her grandchild may be considered in "denial," and thus, incapable of
protecting the child. Clearly, this is a misuse of the term which can create barriers to appropriate
intervention and the child's best interests.
115. Concerns about the inability of professionals from multiple disciplines to work effectively
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we referred to this process as "tracking"-an analogy to "a train getting
on a track and continuing to move down that track no matter what."
Regardless of what name it is given, it is a worrisome phenomenon in
which all the professionals participate.
In family court custody and visitation proceedings, sequentiality is
reflected in the tendency of the court to continue custody with the parent
who receives the initial custody of the child pending the final determina-
tion of the case. This phenomenon occurs when mental health profes-
sionals and court "mediators" and conciliators participate in the
proceeding, since these professionals would be subject to the same deci-
sion-making influences discussed above.
G. The Child Rarely Has a Voice in These Disputes
Many commentators note that children are often not heard in these
conflicts." 6 While it is best to keep children out of the conflict arena
where possible, 7 in most cases children are well aware that their par-
ents are involved in a dispute concerning them. In these situations, com-
mentators disagree about the role of the child in this dispute and about
what place attorneys have in accomplishing that end. Children may
come to court and be forced to take sides against one or both parents, or
they may have their concerns expressed to the court by their attorney or
guardian ad litem. Sometimes, children may speak in court only to have
their voices unheard because the system does not understand their signif-
together in child welfare cases gave rise in 1988, to the award of a number of federal grants by the
National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect. The grants were to provide seed-funding for
interdisciplinary training in child abuse and neglect. I am fortunate to have been participating in
such a training program since that time. Law students, graduate students in social work and
psychology, and a handful of other graduate students from departments, including education,
counseling, and law enforcement, engage in simulated interdisciplinary case work for two
semesters to prepare them for this kind of collaboration. The course is co-taught by myself, a
professor of social work, and a psychology professor. Each year we watch as our students
struggle with these phenomena.
116. See, e.g., Emily Buss, "You're my What?" The Problem of Children's Misperceptions of
their Lawyers' Roles, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1747 (1996):
The courts' process of ascertaining best interest is flawed, not only because it often
produces bad results, but also because it tramples children's dignity along the way.
Children are made to feel irrelevant and even worthless, by a court process that pays
no attention to them and presumes that they have nothing valuable to say.
Id. (footnote omitted) (Buss also cites reports about how seldom children speak in court and how
little time is given to these hearings deciding crucial matters for children). Id. at n.154. See also
Ross, supra note 9, at 1572 ("Courts frequently decide matters affecting children's essential inter-
ests without providing an adequate opportunity for them to present their views, preferences, or
justifications."); Federle, supra note 39; Fitzgerald, supra note 1, at 82-83 (arguing that the law
denies the existence of the child's perspective and categorizing cases as struggles between state
power and individual rights).
117. See Appell & Boyer, supra note 6, at 75 (stating that parenting issues are adult questions).
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icance. Despite the absence of important participants in the case, hear-
ings are conducted and decisions made." 8 The traditional assumption
that the parents represent the interests of the child are challenged by
common sense in both custody and child protection matters.' 19
Even where the court may inquire of the child as to his or her
wishes,120 the child's voice may be muffled. Many judges would prefer
to avoid these interviews.1 2 1 Huge caseloads create pressure to rush
through these matters, not taking the time to conduct an in-depth inquiry
into the child's reasons for her or his stated preference.1 2 Even with
full disclosure by the child, what training does the judge have to assess
what the child has said? The legal process values logical thinking.
Judges are apt, because of this bias, to value decisions which are based
upon logic. Thus, they are more likely to listen to children who can
frame their wishes in a logical structure than to children who cannot.
Unfortunately, this is no guarantee that the child's best interest is
served-the child's position is merely more convincing because we
value that kind of thinking.
118. Take, for example, the case of Bobby, age 12, a foster child:
At his most recent court appearance, Bobby spoke eloquently in his own behalf. He
told the court of his eight years in foster care, the difficulties with his brother (who
had been physically violent with him), and the uncertainties he faces every day.
Unfortunately, at this, his chance to have his voice heard, many of the critical
parties were absent: his regular attorney was ill, the social worker did not attend the
hearing, and the sitting judge was a pro tem judge (a substitute judge). Other than
his foster mother, there was no one at that hearing who had ever seen or spoken to
Bobby before that day. Without the appropriate parties present, what could have
been an opportune moment for Bobby to alert the court and its officers to his real
interests failed.
VOICES FOR CHILDREN, INC., THE VOICES OF THE VOLUNTEERS (Ct. Appointed Special Advoc.
Program, San Diego County), Summer 1996, at 1.
119. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 9, at 1583. Ross states that:
A clear example of a situation in which parents cannot represent their children's
interests occurs when the parents are at odds with each other. In bitterly contested
custody disputes, for example, each parent has an interest in the outcome of
litigation that does not neatly line up with the child's independent interest.
Id. See also Fitzgerald, supra note I, at 65 (arguing that a child's interest is not coterminous with
parents or state). In the child protective system, the child's interest is obviously divergent from a
parent who has harmed or failed to protect the child, at least in the short term.
120. See, e.g., Crosby-Currie, supra note 6. ("[I]n 1995, all 50 states allow for
consideration [of the child's wishes] .... [T]he important question in 1995 is exactly when and
how they are involved."). Id. at 293. The study conducted by Crosby-Currie found: "The
likelihood that a child would be asked about his or her wishes and the weight given any wishes
were highly and consistently related to the child's age." Id. at 305. The distinguishing age level
differed, however, between jurisdictions. Id. at 305-06.
121. See generally Solove, supra note 38.
122. See Frederica K. Lombard, Judicial Interviewing of Children in Custody Cases: An
Empirical and Analytical Study, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 807, 829 (1984).
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H. Inadequate Resources
Court time is costly. Judges are paid for their expertise in the law
and their skill in managing the trial process. Disputes over the best
interests of the child require different skills. Additionally, attorneys fees
for litigation involve preparation time and time spent in court waiting for
cases to be called. There is a good deal of inefficiency in this
expense. 123
Once cases do get called, the heavy calendars in both types of pro-
ceedings require cases to be moved through quickly. There is no time
for thorough and careful consideration of all the facts and concerns.
Giving too much time to any one case disrupts the entire calendar.
Neither the judges nor the attorneys can be completely familiar with
these cases because of the number of cases which they handle. The
attorneys who practice regularly in the system may hesitate to make
"waves" by creating conflict or asking for special consideration in a par-
ticular case.
The focus on the litigation process drains resources from where
they are really needed, which is in the delivery of services to families
who are experiencing disruption. 124 In child protection matters, the cost
of attorneys fees might be paid from the same budget which pays for
services or social workers. In family court cases, parents might have to
choose between having legal counsel and some other service, such as
therapy. 1
25
123. See, e.g., Elster supra note 98, at 22-23. Elster points out that the cost of decision-making
is rarely considered by the decision maker who is called upon to arrive at the "correct" decision:
She will call expert witnesses to the extent necessary; she will allow the parties to
call character witnesses; she will have to allow postponements and appeals within
the limits of the law. Although she may resist attempts at strategic procrastination,
she cannot object to bona fide moves that just happen to be time-consuming, if she
can distinguish between the two.
Id. at 23 (footnote omitted). In its study of the local juvenile court, the San Diego Juvenile Justice
Commission found that long delays in court hearings meant that large numbers of professionals
spent an inordinate amount of time waiting, taking them away from productive work. See JJC
Report, supra note 76.
124. See Duncan Lindsey, Ph.D. & Cheryl Regehr, M.S.W., Protecting Severely Abused
Children: Clarifying the Roles of Criminal Justice and Child Welfare, 63 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCH1ATRY 509, 510 (1993). The authors note that:
Historically, most children who come to the attention of public child welfare
agencies have not been battered or sexually assaulted, but are victims of neglect or
inadequate care. Given the new set of priorities, these children are now virtually left
out of the system.
... Requests for service or aid to families in distress or chronic crisis receive
low priority and, in some instances, no response at all.
Id. (citation omitted).
125. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 38, at 800 ("Parents can often expect to spend as much on
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1. HIGH CASELOADS
The caseloads maintained by most professionals working in these
systems is too high to expect quality performance. 126 Caseloads are high
because insufficient resources are expended on both the child protection
and family court systems to enable them to truly protect children and
support families.' 27 In some jurisdictions, these cases compete with
criminal and other civil matters for docket time. t28 Even in courts with
specialized departments, caseloads are often so high that none of the
professionals, including the judge, have much time for advance prepara-
tion.1 29 It is not unusual to see judges reading through case files during
attorneys and expert fees and costs as a year or more of college might cost."). See also OREGON
STATUs REPORT, supra note 78.
126. It has been indicated that:
The sheer volume of cases is causing the family court system to collapse. Children
are treated like property while parents clog the courts with bitter fights over money,
assets and support. The combative atmosphere makes it more difficult for divorcing
couples to reach a settlement and develop a cooperative relationship once the
divorce is final.
Id. at 1.
For child welfare workers, the situation is even worse. "The Child Welfare League of
America recommends that a case worker handle a maximum of 15 cases. But in many cities,
workers now have 50 to 70 cases apiece." David Stoesz & Howard Jacob Karger, Suffer the
Children: How Government Fails its Most Vulnerable Citizens-Abused and Neglected Kids,
WASH. MONTHLY, June 1996, at 20.
127. I consider support of the family an essential component to the protection of the child's
welfare, as the child's welfare ideally is best protected with its family. "[M]ost child welfare
workers aren't uncaring or indifferent, and they aren't necessarily incompetent. They're simply
overwhelmed. The problem is less individual misfeasance than institutional breakdown. Stoesz &
Karger, supra note 126, at 21. Stoesz and Karger also note that "few government services are in
as much disarray, and as starved for resources, as child welfare services." Id.
128. Even within family courts, issues regarding children may receive less time than issues of
asset distribution. "It is a place where motions for emergency relief-to get a restraining order for
an abused spouse or temporary support for a child-are scheduled in 15-minute increments, while
divorces involving substantial assets, but no children, occupy weeks of courtroom time." Lee M.
Robinson, The View from the Minors, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1996, at 74, 75.
129. Solove asserts that:
Many problems plague the domestic relations court system. The press of the
caseload creates a feeling on the part of the litigants that no one really cares. The
problems that they bring before the courts involve the very core of their emotional
being. They come to court seeking vindication for wrongs they perceive to have
been done to them by one once loved and now often despised. They want to see the
judge and tell their stories. Cases often get continued, and the litigants feel that they
are being shunted aside.
Solove, supra note 38, at 806. See also Buss, supra note 116, where Buss asserts that:
The best argument against bringing children to court is that the process they
observe is an abysmal and chaotic one. For the most part, children will not see a
decorous or thoughtful adversarial process [due to lack of resources]. They will see
long waits in dreary, toyless waiting rooms, followed by brief hearings, at which
hallway agreements are hastily presented. They will see families herded up to the
bar of the court and sworn in en masse.
1997l
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:79
the presentation of the case, nor to have critical reports distributed on the
day of the hearing. In ordinary litigation, that would be sufficient reason
for delay. In these cases, however, each cause for delay means that a
child's life is put on hold.
The work of attorneys, too, is impacted by high caseloads. Attor-
neys may be unable to investigate their cases, consult with experts, or
prepare for hearings. 31 It is typical for cases to settle just before a
scheduled hearing, not because the parties suddenly discovered a way to
resolve their differences, but simply because this may be the first time
all of the attorneys have had the opportunity to discuss the case with
each other.' 3' This conduct, though "necessitated by staff shortages and
limited court time, usually extends the amount of time children remain
without a permanent home."'132 Inadequate resources have much to do
with the fact that the concept of permanency planning in child protection
cases has never been fully implemented. 33
High caseloads prevent social workers from designing case-specific
services for families, as required by the reasonable efforts mandate;
instead, families often receive "boilerplate" service plans which can add
to, rather than alleviate the families' problems, waste valuable resources
and time, and heighten levels of frustration for all participants. 34  The
They will see lawyers trying to out-yell each other to get the judge's attention,
and judges making decisions with little or no reference to the governing legal stan-
dards. They may see their own lawyers derided for trying to force the court to
follow a more formal legal process, or to articulate a clear legal basis for its rulings.
They may even see the judge taking phone calls, or speaking with court personnel,
while important evidence or argument is being presented.
Id. at 1760 (footnote omitted).
130. See Edwards, supra note 68, at 419.
131. This dynamic adds to the inefficiency and frustration with the process, as social workers,
family members and experts interrupt their busy schedules to attend the hearing, only to have it
settled without them. Meanwhile, the courtroom, which has been scheduled for a trial, sits idly at
taxpayer expense.
132. Ratterman, supra note 82, at 58, citing E. SEGAL, EVALUATING AND IMPROVING CHILD
WELFARE AGENCY LEGAL REPRESENTATION (Washington, D.C., National Legal Resource Center
for Child Advocacy and Protection, American Bar Association 1988). According to the report
that Ratterman cited to, forty to fifty child welfare cases is a reasonable caseload for a full-time
attorney, and more than sixty is unmanageable. Few jurisdictions meet this standard of
reasonableness; in San Diego, for example, the Public Defender's Office, Child Advocacy
Division, expects its attorneys to handle a caseload of 200 children. It is not clear whether the
ABA study considers a caseload to be a child or a family, which may explain the huge
discrepancy.
133. See Herring, supra note 108, at 199-200.
134. See id. Herring asserts that:
Such poorly formulated and implemented case service plans render it
impossible for courts to monitor the implementation and effectiveness of the plan.
Courts lose focus on the true problems while monitoring a parent's participation in
the standard laundry list of services. As a result, courts often give up on monitoring
case-specific problems as they review a large number of cases which all appear
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sheer number of children and families to be served creates shortages in
services which would be appropriate for them, but social workers have
little time to attend to the individual needs of parents placed on waiting
lists and children placed in unsatisfactory "temporary" care.
2. LIMITED SERVICES
Support services for families are very limited. This is especially
true in family court matters, as there is little, if any, public funding for
services which could assist the family in working through its problems.
In the child protection arena, services are mandated by the federal
requirement of "reasonable efforts," but are under funded and often
inadequate or unavailable to families due to long waiting lists or incon-
venient locations. "By early 1996, the public services to care for chil-
dren had so deteriorated that child welfare agencies in 21 states and the
District of Columbia were under court supervision." '135
3. DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS
A further strain on resources presented by the use of the adversary
system in child protection matters is created by the need to document
extensively in order to prepare for the adversarial proceeding. Docu-
menting both the efforts made and the bases for opinions are important
to professionals, both for liability and billing purposes. The statutory
imposition of additional documentation requirements, particularly in
response to the need to prove that reasonable efforts have been made to
reunify families, have created an immense burden on child welfare
workers and courts. Social workers are forced into choosing between
making a necessary or required visit to a child or family, and sitting in
similar in terms of case service plans. If a court stays involved with a case, it will
often penalize parents by requiring the completion of unnecessary services prior to
reunification with the child.
Id. at 201 (footnotes omitted).
135. Stoesz & Karger, supra note 126. Stoesz and Karger further state that:
Reports of child neglect and abuse have sky-rocketed since the early '70s, but
public funding has stagnated. Therein lies much of the problem. Most federal
funding for child protection comes through Title XX, a social services appropriation
that was capped in 1974 at $2.5 billion. Today, Title XX is funded at only $4
billion. If it had been indexed for inflation between 1977 and 1992, appropriations
would have been $36 billion.
Id. The authors report that the adoption of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
("CAPTA") and the 1980 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act ("AACWA") added further
demands on the system. Id.
While the funds for services have been capped, funds for foster care have not; thus, the goal
of P.L. 96-272, to provide services whenever possible to avoid out-of-home placement of children,
has been unintentionally circumvented by the funding structure.
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the office completing paperwork.' 36 The result is that social workers are
excessively concerned with paperwork, which takes time away from
delivery of services and places emphasis on justifying one's actions
rather than doing good casework.
I. The Public Forum Is Inappropriate for the Resolution of
Family Issues
While we recognize the need for privacy in child protection mat-
ters, primarily to protect the interest of the child, we open family law
proceedings to the public. This seems contrary to the underlying value
of family integrity, and seems demeaning to the participants, including
the children. What argument can be made that the public has more inter-
est in observing the family court process than it does the child protection
process? At least in the former, the dispute is before the court because
the parties have brought it there. In child protection proceedings, the
matter is before the court because the government has decided to intrude
into people's lives. Yet, we understand the sensitive nature of these pro-
ceedings and keep them private, while we do not in family law cases.
J. The Adversarial Process Is Not Appropriate for Solving Problems
Where the Parties Will Be in Ongoing Relationships
The adversary process makes enemies and exacerbates existing
controversy. There is no healing element in the process to help to mend
relationships which have been damaged or to promote future healthy
interactions.137 The effects of these broken relationships on children and
parents are devastating and long-lasting.
As legal professionals, we have the responsibility to ensure that our
work benefits our clients; perhaps this is the true sense of what it means
to be zealous advocates. Yet, as demonstrated above, participating in
the adversary process does not appear to truly benefit the great majority
of family members involved in best interests cases.138 Perhaps it is
136. See id. The San Diego Board of Supervisors, in July 1996, adopted a measure which
requires social workers to do all of their own clerical work, including the word processing of court
reports, in an effort to make the Department of Social Services more financially efficient. The
measure was proposed by a board of business people who examined the Department with an eye
towards finding ways to save money. No comments in their report indicated an awareness of the
effect this would have on the social workers' ability to perform their statutorily mandated duties.
137. See, e.g., Catania, supra note 15, at 1239-40; Solove, supra note 38, at 800 ("if the
dispute is not resolved and goes to trial, that experience may well destroy any remaining
possibility that the parents can learn to communicate or cooperate in the care of their children.").
138. Even Stephan Landsman concedes:
[T]here are settings in which adversary procedure does not seem appropriate.
When the parties must continue to work or live together in intimate contact or in a
cooperative relationship, the adversary method may not be the best means of
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reflective of the system that we do not take the Hippocratic Oath, as do
medical professionals, vowing to do no harm. The adversary role seems
to force us to do harm. From the perspective of therapeutic jurispru-
dence, 139 we are failing our clients and ourselves.
The inadequacies of the adversarial system, in dealing with matters
relating to the best interest of a child, are pervasive and obvious. The
unavailability of vital information to the court, the inability to share
information for effective problem solving, the lack of resources and
training to attend to serious familial problems, and the inappropriateness
of attempting to apply traditional legal process to contextual and
dynamic situations, are some of the barriers to reaching our goal. How-
ever, my concern about the use of the adversarial system goes beyond
case outcome; it includes the damage caused to the parties by participat-
ing in the process.
IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM ON THE CHILDREN
AND PARENTS
The adversarial system affects all who touch it. Most parties, espe-
cially family members, typically experience acrimony, increased misun-
derstanding, frustration, and anger. While the purpose of this article is
to examine the specific impact of the process on the best interests of
children, it would be artificial and misleading to ignore the impact of the
process on the parents; after all, children are part of the family, are
dependent upon their parents, and are affected directly and indirectly by
what happens to their parents.
A. Children
The adversarial process is hard on kids. 140 Zealous advocacy, as it
has been practiced, focusing on rights and strategy, heightens and pro-
resolving their dispute. Adversary procedure may exacerbate rather than resolve
tensions and may not foster the kind of compromise essential to the restoration of
harmony.
Landsman, supra note 10, at 52. Landsman specifically refers to disputes between members of
intact families in this regard, reflecting, I believe, a failure to understand the dynamics of "reor-
dering" families and the needs of children and parents for continued relationships.
139. See David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law, 18 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 27, 32 (1992) (footnotes omitted):
Therapeutic jurisprudence is the study of the role of the law as a therapeutic agent.
It looks at the law as a social force that, like it or not, may produce therapeutic or
antitherapeutic rules, legal procedures, or form the behavior of legal actors (lawyers
and judges). In other words, one may look at the law itself as being a therapist-or
at least a therapeutic agent or tool. Likewise, like iatrogenic disease in medicine,
the law may itself produce psychological suffering ("law-related psychosocial
dysfunction" or "juridical psychopathology").
140. See Myers, supra note 8, at 182 ("Involvement in the legal system is hard on children.").
19971
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
longs conflict. Delays and uncertainty in the system are also difficult on
children, creating anxiety and problems in developing secure relation-
ships. The effects of the adversarial process exacerbate the detriment
caused by the original, underlying problem: the abuse, the neglect, or
the marital discord. Children may also be subject to the whims of judges
and attorneys who do not understand their needs because they lack train-
ing and/or the time and resources to competently deal with the case.
The heightened conflict between the parents, created by the adver-
sarial system, will also impact the children. Frustration and stress may
detract from the parents' attention to the children. Litigation costs drain
resources which could otherwise be used for the children's needs. Ironi-
cally, the very system which is intended to protect the best interests of
children, ultimately injures those children.
1. CHILD PROTECTION PROCEEDINGS
There is not a great deal of literature on the effects on children from
participating in a contested hearing regarding their safety and welfare.141
We know from a growing and substantial literature on custody battles in
divorce cases, that children are deeply affected when placed in the mid-
dle of a war between their parents.142 Children's loyalty to their parents
is normally so strong that even children who have been seriously abused
or neglected, long to be with their parents and feel guilty about playing
any role in the separation. 143 For a child who is old enough to have
some idea of what is taking place in a child protection proceeding, the
conflict must be great. Participation in the proceedings, for children
who are old enough and found competent to do so, is usually stressful. 1
Although Myers was speaking primarily to the criminal justice system, the same criticisms apply
to dependency proceedings, as well as custody battles.
141. See generally CYNTHIA CROSSON TOWER, UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
290-91 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter TOWER]; J. A. Lipovsky, The Impact of Court on Children, 9 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 238-57 (1994); Joan B. Kelly, Longer-Term Adjustment in Children of
Divorce: Converging Findings and Implications for Practice, 2 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 119 (1988).
142. See, e.g., Robert E. Emery, Interparental Conflict and the Children of Discord and
Divorce, 92 PSYCHOL. BULL. 310 (1982); Joan B. Kelly, Conflict and Children's Post-Divorce
Adjustment: A Closer Look, 14 FAM. L. NEWS 1 (1991) [hereinafter Conflict]; Hugh McIsaac,
Reducing the Pain of a Child Custody Struggle, FAM. ADVOC., Spring 1992, at 26.
143. See, e.g., TOWER, supra note 141, at 255; David M. Siegel & Suzanne Hurley, The Role of
the Child's Preference in Custody Proceedings, I I FAM. L.Q. 1 (1977); Katherine G. Levine, The
Placed Child Examines the Quality of Parental Care, 67 CHILD WELFARE 301, 306 (1988).
144. Buss argues that:
While coming to court can provoke considerable anxiety in children, we fool
ourselves if we think that avoiding court protects children from those anxieties.
Much of the anxiety is created by the existence of the court process (a process
whereby a child's future is determined by a judge) and the issues underlying the
court's involvement (the abuse, neglect, foster care placement, or divorce).
Lawyers' conversations with their clients tend to fan those anxieties, whether or not
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The proceeding in some sense pits the child against the parent, for the
child's welfare is the standard by which we judge the parent's behavior.
Yet, in most cases, the child's interests are bound up with her return to
her family.
For children who are too young to understand the nature of the
proceedings, the separation, which may be protracted because of adver-
sarial strategies, is often traumatic, or, perhaps worse, irreparably dam-
aging to the child-parent relationship. The child's sense of stability,
which is one of the goals of the family preservation movement and the
Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, can only
be threatened by ongoing litigation. Sometimes protection disputes are
purposefully prolonged as a strategy to buy the parent more time to "get
his act together." '45 Even where the delay is not tactical, it may arise by
virtue of the attorney's perceived sense of duty to pursue every possible
objection, appeal and writ as a zealous advocate.14 6
Delays mean that the determination as to the best interest of the
child is not made as soon as it might otherwise be. There is little doubt
that the consequences of uncertainty and instability can devastate a
child, and affect functioning and performance in all areas, particularly
the ability to form satisfying relationships as an adult.147 While it is
important that the process not be "steam-rollered" so as to result in
injustice to the parents and child, delays which have no real positive role
in the determination of the best outcome for this family and child are not
justifiable.
the child appears in court, because these conversations inevitably (if grounded at all)
focus on the court process and the decisions the judge will have to make.
Realistically, a child is not shielded from the court process until the court dismisses
his case.
Buss, supra note 116, at 1759.
There is debate as to whether testifying at criminal child abuse proceedings is part of the
healing process for child victims. See TOWER, supra note 141, at 290; Karen J. Saywitz & Gail S.
Goodman, Interviewing Children In and Out of Court: Current Research and Practice Implica-
tions, in THE APSAC HANDoOOK ON CHILD MALTREATMENT 297 (John Briere et al. eds., 1996)
[hereinafter APSAC]; Cathy J. Jones, Judicial Questioning of Children in Custody and Visitation
Proceedings, 18 FAM. L.Q. 43 (1984); Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Children's Preference in Adjudi-
cated Custody Decisions, 22 GA. L. REV. 1035 (1988).
145. The statutory scheme requires a permanent plan by the 18th month from the day of
removal of the child, but attorneys are ingenious at creating delay. In spite of federal funding
incentives, cases have been drifting in the system for years, noticeably more so in some
jurisdictions. See generally Judge Leonard P. Edwards, Improving Implementation of the Federal
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 45 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 3 (1994).
146. See Ratterman, supra note 82, at 39 (commenting that the process of freeing children for
adoption is plagued by delays from drawn-out court hearings, excessive adjournments, suspended
decisions and long appeals).
147. See, e.g., NRC, supra note 57, at 224 (finding that some of the long-term consequences of
child maltreatment include interpersonal problems, such as isolation and fear of intimacy);
TOWER, supra note 141; APSAC, supra note 144.
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The quality of care received by a child while placed out-of-home is
often less than desirable and less than we would expect from a loving
parent. Some believe that the harms from intervention outweigh the
benefits to the child in many protection cases.' 4 8 Intervention by the
system creates the danger of iatrogenic damage.
When the state interferes with the parent-child bond, it imposes a
disinterested caretaker upon the child. Over a long period of time,
the service rendered by a caretaker who is motivated by the bonds of
affection and/or a close alignment of interests with the child is likely
to be quite different than the service rendered over the long term by a
disinterested party. Caretakers with professional expertise in some
specialty may have a more refined clinical approach to some facet of
a child's development, but professionals have no special systemic
motivation to apply their services to obtain the maximum benefit for
a particular child when assistance requires a significant personal,
emotional, or financial investment or risk. 149
2. FAMILY COURT
The movie Irreconcilable Differences, about a child caught in the
middle of a custody tug-of-war, accurately portrays the difficult situation
of children involved in custody disputes. 5 ' The child is subject to
ongoing conflict between the two people the child loves and depends
upon the most. The protracted nature of custody disputes1 5 1 worsens the
impact on children, whose notions of time make perceptions of instabil-
ity even greater.' 5 2 Numerous studies have elucidated the short- and
long-term effects of marital and divorce conflict on children. 153 Inten-
148. See James Donald Moorehead, Of Family Values and Child Welfare: What Is in the
"Best" Interests of the Child? 79 MARQ. L. REV. 517, 523 (1996) (disagreeing with the Wald and
Goldstein group which calls for a minimalist approach to state intervention, stating that there is no
empirical research for either side of the debate, since we cannot measure what happens without
intervention).
149. Daniel E. Witte, Comment, People v. Bennett: Analytic Approaches to Recognizing a
Fundamental Parental Right Under the Ninth Amendment, 1996 B.Y.U. L. REV. 183, 187 n.4
(1996).
150. See Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving
Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 1523, 1559 (1994) (arguing that
custody rules encourage parties to treat children as property and that "bargaining occurs in the
shadow of hierarchy and exclusion").
151. See WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 19, at 30. In child custody and visitation matters
in divorce cases, there is no specific time frame for decision-making. In fact, these cases can
continue to return to the court to litigate each time the parents fail to cooperate. The result is no
sense of stability; no permanence for the children involved.
152. See Catania, supra note 15, at 1239-40.
153. See, e.g., Roseby, supra note 20, at 99-100 ("[c]hronic exposure to parental conflict more
predictive of serious behavioral and emotional disturbance in children in divorced families than
any other factor."). Cf. Kelly, supra note 142. Kelly notes that:
It appears that rather than discord per se, it is the manner in which parental conflict
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tionally or not, children are often forced to take a side in these dis-
putes.' 54  "Parents, unable to take responsibility and decide what [is]
best for their children, [place] that responsibility on the shoulders of
their hurting and often terrified youngsters." 55  What impact the
appointment of an attorney has on the child in this situation is not
clear. 156
No matter how helpful evaluations and other studies of the parties
and the child may be, it is important to keep in mind the fact that
involving the child in such evaluations is not a neutral event in the
child's life. It forces the child to take notice of the fact that the par-
ents [sic] engaged in a substantial dispute. At least one prominent
study of the effects of divorce on children has suggested that the best
thing a lawyer for a child can do is to keep the child out of the case so
that she can get on with the important activities of her life, such as
growing up and going to school and playing with friends. 5 7
Studies have also documented the serious loss of parent-child con-
tact for many parents who are not awarded custody.'58 This means that
a child loses a meaningful relationship with one of the most important
is expressed that may affect children's adjustment. High interparental discord has
been found to be related to the child's feeling caught in the middle, and this
experience of feeling caught was related to adjustment.
Id.
154. Roseby reports that:
A study of high-conflicted divorcing families reported that children were
preoccupied with surviving in the battle zone and conflicted about what is true and
what is not true with respect to the allegations and expressed fears of their opposing
parents; whether to trust their own or each parent's perception of the other parent;
and about having and expressing feelings, loyalties, and identifications which might
result in retribution or rejections by one or both parents. These conflicts and
preoccupations arouse intense anxiety which can distort the child's capacities for
reality-testing, trust, and self-integration.
Roseby, supra note 20, at 102 (footnotes omitted). Roseby also cites other authorities finding
these children to be "clinically hypervigilant, unable to trust or depend on other people, and chron-
ically overwhelmed by the demands placed upon them," as well as "profoundly emotionally and
cognitively constricted and [having] seriously distorted perceptions of human relationships." Id. at
104 (footnote omitted). See also RICHARD A. GARDNER, M.D., THE PARENTAL ALIENATION SYN-
DROME (1992) (discussing the author's controversial assertion of a syndrome by which a child is
purposefully alienated from one parent by the other, usually custodial, parent).
155. Solove, supra note 38, at 800.
156. I have observed a child taking notes for his attorney while visiting a parent. Children
may come to view the attorney as protection against one or both parents, even where the child's
safety is not at issue.
157. See Parley, supra note 45, at 59 (citing JUDITH WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE,
SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 288-94 (1989)).
158. Committee on Psychosocial Aspects of Child and Family Health, 1993-94, The
Pediatrician's Role in Helping Children and Families Deal With Separation and Divorce,
PEDIATRICS, July 1994, at 119 [hereinafter Committee]. ("Approximately half of all children do
not see their father after divorce and few have spent a night at their father's home in the past
month.") (footnote omitted).
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adults, usually the father, in his or her life. 159 Children begin to feel the
effects of separation from a parent in a short time, with young children
reacting most quickly. Irregular visitation circumstances exacerbate the
unpredictability of parental contact and its effect. 160
As the parents battle with each other, the child's own concerns may
be unheard, and the child's needs ignored, even in day to day parent-
ing.161  The change of dynamics in a family following a divorce can
result in new roles for children, as well.
The non-custodial parent and the children assume the roles of visi-
tors. The custodial parent assumes the role of single parent and mon-
itor of the visitation. The children assume roles such as "advisors,
practical helpers, buffers against loneliness and despair, replacements
for other adults-in other words, parents for their own parents.' 62
Furthermore, children left to be raised in single parent families suffer
159. The U.S. Commission on child and Family Welfare reported that
[A] large percentage of children who live with only one parent have little
contact with the other parent. The National Survey of Children found that 49
percent of the children in its national sample who lived with only one of their
parents in 1981 had not seen their nonresidential parent in the last year, and only
one in six averaged contact once a week or more often.
PARENTING OUR CHILDREN, supra note 1, at 15. "Children who have contact with their nonresi-
dential parent are more likely to receive child support." Id. See also Warshak, supra note 6, at
407. Walshak reports that:
Children in conventional mother-custody homes will tell you, as they told our
investigators in Texas and in every other study I can think of, that the worst thing
about their parents' divorce is the loss of regular contact with their fathers (Warshak
& Santrock, 1983). Despite their parents' reassurance that divorce is just between
grown-ups, these children discover that they must wait 12 days before seeing their
fathers for only 2 days and undergo the ordeal of lengthy separations twice each
month for the duration of their childhood.
This practice of restricting contact to every other weekend uproots the father-
child relationship from the fertile soil of natural, daily interaction and transplants it
to the artificial turf of weekends crowded with entertainment and gifts. Homework,
chores, and routine errands fall by the wayside. It is not possible to compress 2
weeks' worth of living into 2 days.
Id. The reluctance of the legal system to acknowledge that it may not have the power to control
these relationships was demonstrated in the extreme by an Illinois court, which ordered a 12-year
old to jail, and grounded her 8-year-old sister, for refusing to visit their father. See Mark Hansen,
Minor Adjustments, A.B.A. J., July 1996, at 38, reporting on Marshall v. Nussbaum, No. 93-MR-
6538. The court of appeals held that the "judge had the right to jail the ... child for refusing to
comply with a visitation order, but should have done so only as a last resort." Id.
160. William J. Dess, Ph.D., Childhood Development and the Reaction of Infants and Toddlers
to Divorce, Presentation at a 1993 Training Seminar, "The Kids' Lawyers," sponsored by the
Certified Family Law Specialist Committee of the San Diego County Bar Association.
161. See WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 19, at 30 (asserting that child experiences
diminished parental care because the parents are focused on their own needs and depression; child
may fear abandonment).
162. Catania, supra note 15, at 1247 (footnotes omitted).
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from a greater likelihood of poverty 163 and a greater risk of being
harmed by physical neglect or abuse. 164
B. Parents
1. CHILD PROTECTION PROCEEDINGS
When a court in a child protection proceeding examines a parent's
ability to care for his child, the court is using a minimal standard, or
what I would refer to as "barely adequate" parenting. The state's ability
to intervene in the private life of the family is limited to those cases
where that standard is not met-where the child is at risk of abuse or
neglect as defined by statute. For a parent who needs services in order
to be able to parent adequately,1 65 the sooner the services can be deliv-
ered, the sooner a reunification may occur. Often, however, these par-
ents are resistant, rather than receptive, to the services, making it more
difficult for them to receive immediate benefit.166 For example, a parent
denying that she is or has been abusive or neglectful, will probably not
be receptive to services. In fact, the parent may see the acceptance of
services as an admission of "guilt."'1 67  If a parent's attorney gives the
impression that there are some possible "legal loopholes" to the situa-
tion, or that the attorney may be able to manipulate information or pres-
ent a case that appears favorable to the client parent, the parent is
encouraged to continue denying that there is any abuse or neglect
involved. This legal advice also encourages the parent to be uncoopera-
tive with social workers, and perhaps even to believe that she is a victim
163. See PARENTING OUR CHILDREN, supra note 1, at 15 ("Children in single-parent families
are much more likely to be poor than children in two-parent families.").
164. See CHILD PROTECTION REPORT, September 27, 1996, at 165 ("Children of single parents
had an 87 percent greater risk of being harmed by physical neglect and an 80 percent greater risk
of suffering serious injury or harm from abuse and neglect.").
165. An array of services is available to parents to assist them in learning to care for their
children. Services include parenting classes, anger management training, counseling and therapy,
respite care, and homemaker services. Parents may also be required to undertake drug testing and
participate in substance abuse programs.
166. See, e.g., TOWER, supra note 141, at 296-98.
167. See, e.g., Boyer, supra note 29 (discussing the dilemma of attempting to achieve
vindication at trial and demonstrating amenability to services). Boyer states that "[i]f the higher
objective of the client is to reunify the family, this tension will often compel a parent to make
admissions at trial and cede the issue of the court's jurisdiction." Id. at 1648. This admission can
be troublesome for the client throughout the proceeding, particularly if the client later seems to be
retracting the admission. In jurisdictions which accept a plea of nolo contendere from a parent,
clients may be led by their attorneys to believe that they are not admitting wrongdoing, when, in
fact, the court and the child protection agency will treat the plea as an admission for purposes of
proceeding with the case. In one San Diego case, the parents' nolo pleas to a molest allegation,
which was later proven to be untrue (the actual molester confessed), almost cost them their
parental rights. James W. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. App. 4th 246 (1993).
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of the system, and that the system and the social worker are the
"enemy."
This is a difficult situation. On the one hand, these parents are
often among the most unempowered people in our society. They tend to
be poor, often on some kind of welfare (usually AFDC), relatively
socially isolated, and often with no support system. 168 It is important for
them to know, at this critical time when it may appear to them that they
are being victimized by the system, that there is someone who is "on
their side," listening to them, and there to help them. On the other hand,
when a parent truly is in denial about abuse or neglect, and an attorney
engages that parent in the adversarial process, making the protection
system look more like a game or a battle, it distracts the parent from the
real work that needs to be done. Twelve to eighteen months to reunify is
not a long time for making significant progress on deeply entrenched
problems, such as substance abuse. The majority of child protection
cases are about neglect; neglect tends to be the most deeply embedded
and difficult to treat,' 69 so these parents need to get working as quickly
as possible. While most parents' attorneys realize this and know that the
best interest of their clients is tied to an early reunification which
requires receptive utilization of services, some attorneys are still too
conditioned by the adversarial process to move away from adversarial
tactics. 170 This is especially true of attorneys who have not had special
training in the dynamics of abuse and neglect, substance abuse, and
other issues common to these cases. These attorneys need to assist their
clients in understanding the need for services and empower them to
engage cooperatively with the system.
It is understandable that attorneys do face the dilemma of having to
fulfill their ethical obligations by being zealous advocates. The issue of
what they are zealously advocating for (i.e., their clients' interests) is not
always clear, and this is an area where short-term interests may easily
defeat long-term goals. Where a client does not want to admit abuse or
neglect, the attorney must follow the directions of the client.
The problem is even further complicated by the threat or pendency
of criminal charges arising out of the same behavior. In such cases,
attorneys and their clients have a most difficult time determining best
168. See NRC, supra note 57, at 106-44; TOWER, supra note 141.
169. See TOWER, supra note 141, at 316-17.
170. In one recent case decided by an appellate court in California, the father had not received
services even though the child had been removed for more than two years. Apparently, there were
some unsuccessful attempts at mediation. The court found that the failure to receive services was
not a reason to overturn the termination of parental rights, because the father partly caused the
delay in getting the case to the point where services would be provided. In re David H., 33 Cal.
App. 4th 368 (1995).
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interest. Contested criminal proceedings, especially those involving
high profile topics such as child abuse, are not resolved quickly. Each
delay increases the potential for the termination of parental rights.
Finally, adversarial litigation increases the risk of loss of the child-
parent relationship due to protracted out-of-home placement. 171 During
this time, a very young child is likely to attach to its caregiver in kinship
or foster care. 172 This is exacerbated by the prevailing practice of pro-
viding minimal visitation under artificial conditions which does nothing
to promote the parent-child relationship.173
2. VISITATION AND CUSTODY IN DIVORCE
Nothing better illustrates the law's role in aggravating pre-existing
problems than does divorce litigation. 174 For most couples, the decision
171. The relationship between the parents and the child protection agency is likely to become
more adversarial, adding to the obstacles to reunification.
172. See 1 JOHN BOWLBY, ATrACHMENT AND Loss: VOL. 1 (1969); see also MICHAEL COLE
& SHEILA R. COLE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN 202 (1989) (stating that attachment to
primary caretaker begins at about 7 months of age).
173. Reunification plan language regarding visitation tends to be boilerplate, with minimal
visitation allowances due to transportation and supervision difficulties, as well as the needs of
foster parents. There may be additional practical obstacles to visitation, such as great distances to
travel, limited public transportation to foster homes in rural areas, and conflicting attendance
requirements for other mandated services. Unfortunately, the importance of meaningful visitation
has not been adequately recognized. See, e.g., MALuccio, supra note 57, at 80 ("Parental visiting
of children in foster care is the best single predictor of the outcome of placement.").
174. See Andrew Schepard, War and P.E.A.C.E.: A Preliminary Report and a Model Statute
on an Interdisciplinary Educational Program for Divorcing and Separating Parents, 27 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 131 (1993) (footnotes omitted). Schepard states that:
Despite a child's overriding need for conflict management, the prevalent adversarial
model of courtroom confrontation rewards parental conflict. The adversarial system
implicitly assumes that all parents who bring their dispute to court are incapable of
cooperation. Given the parents' completely conflicting relationship, the only
function the legal system can perform is to prevent violence by deciding which
parent is entitled to a greater right to make decisions and have access to the child.
This decision is made through the traditional adversarial process, perhaps preceded
by a forensic evaluation of the child and the family by a mental health professional.
Few custody cases result in a trial. The adversarial mentality, however, can
permeate the custody dispute and the thinking of parents and counsel. Precisely
when children need parents to lessen the degree of hostility and behave
cooperatively, the specter of courtroom combat-and especially the conflict over
the vague legal standard of the "best interests of the child"-encourages conflict.
... The adversarial process encourages parents to denigrate one another, rather
than to cooperate on the essential task of post-divorce child rearing. Embattled
parents demand, and sometimes seek to buy, the loyalty of their hopelessly torn
children. The custody dispute also drains resources from limited marital assets at a
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to divorce comes after prolonged problems. Once the decision is made,
it is difficult for many couples, who have had problems working out
their disagreements in the past, to work together toward a peaceful set-
tlement. One incentive to do so might be the widespread reputation of
the family court and divorce attorneys to make matters worse at great
emotional and financial cost to the parties. Another incentive might be
to minimize the trauma to the children. Unfortunately, not all parents
can place the needs of their children before their own needs for revenge,
or other "satisfaction."'' 7 5
It is probably unrealistic to expect parents in high conflict cases to
be able to objectively and clearly assess the needs of their children.
Such cases tend to create "villains" of adversaries, making it difficult to
imagine how the best interests of the child could be served by any con-
tact with the other party. The adversarial nature of divorce litigation
fuels the fire of the dispute, treating it as a zero-sum game, 176 and using
the child as a "bargaining chip."' 177 "The process itself can [intensify]
175. See Roseby, supra note 20:
Studies of . highly conflicted families suggest that these types of entrenched
disputes often represent a response to overpowering feelings of shame and
vulnerability which are evoked by the marital separation as well as by the
perception that professionals are increasingly in charge of what was once the
family's private life. Vulnerable parents frequently manage these feelings of shame
and helplessness by projecting all incompetence and badness onto the former spouse
and holding all competence and goodness for themselves. From this dynamic
evolves a wish that the judge, Solomon-like, will erase the shame by publicly
answering, once and for all, the question of which parent is good and competent and
which parent is bad and incompetent.
Id. at 97-98 (footnote omitted). See also OREGON STATUS REPORT, supra note 78:
The Medea-like anger that often spills into the courtroom over child custody, visita-
tion and financial support amazes even judges and attorneys. Medea was the Greek
goddess who sought revenge on her husband for rejecting her for a younger woman.
Her anger had no bounds; she felt there was no course of action that could save her
pride. Carried away by rage, she murdered her children.
Modem Medeas do not want to kill their children, but they do want revenge on
their former wives or husbands, and they exact it by destroying the relationship
between the other parent and the child. There is a great deal of evidence that such
anger and conflict severely injure children at every age.
Id. at 1.
176. See Appell & Boyer, supra note 6, at 75 n.54 ("[T]he child is treated like a prize in a zero
sum game between the two sets of parents."). See also Margulies, supra note 11, at 1484-85:
The involvement of the judicial system ... raises the stakes for everyone and can
elicit posturing from many parties that would otherwise not surface. This is clearly
true in adults, for example, when fathers seek custody as a bargaining chip in
divorce. It can be true of children, too. The difference is that with adults, posturing
may be the product of a desire to exploit children for strategic purposes. With
children, posturing may be the product of being exploited.
Id.
177. See Charlow, supra note 6, at 15-16. ("Under the current system, parents can threaten to
contest custody or visitation to obtain a beneficial property settlement or decreased child or
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pre-existent psychopathology and [cause] psychiatric disorders even
when they didn't exist previously." ' Rather than assisting people in
letting go of the past and getting on with their lives, it holds out the
possibility for ongoing and repeated attacks, often in the guise of the
best interests of the children. Rather than teaching parents to communi-
cate and collaborate effectively after divorce for the benefit of their chil-
dren, it builds higher walls.' 79 As with child protection proceedings, the
adversary process forces parties into positions from which it may be
difficult to retreat, worsening already damaged relationships. Social sci-
ence research has concluded that the child benefits from an ongoing
relationship with both parents if that can be accomplished with mini-
mized ongoing conflict; the adversary system, by naming the parties as
opponents, damages relationships and creates a barrier to collaborative
future dealings between the parents.
The litigation itself is often demeaning, as litigants attempt to exag-
gerate each other's flaws and reopen old wounds in order to win points
for themselves. I"0 Further, the process is disempowering as it forces the
parties to place their fates in the hands of their attorneys and the court.
In the process, the family's resources are expended and depleted with no
beneficial outcome for the child or the parents. 181
spousal support. The case may be settled out of court, but not until one parent has forfeited
valuable rights in order to avoid a custody battle."). See generally Elster, supra note 98. Elster
describes how treating the child as a bargaining chip, combined with the notion that joint custody
is in the best interest of the child, operates so that parents who ask for sole custody may be seen as
unfit, thus necessitating some rather contorted strategizing by the parties. Id.
178. Gardner, supra note 17, at 3. "I have seen normal people become neurotic, and neurotic
people become psychotic, as a direct result of embroilment in adversarial proceedings associated
with their divorces." Id. Gardner also describes the increases in litigiousness, resentment, rage
and hostility, including an urge to murder, which can develop in custody litigants. Id. at 6-9. This
may explain why metal detectors were in place in many family courts long before they were
installed in other courts. See also Solove, supra note 38, at 807 ("Courtroom security is a constant
concern.").
179. Many divorce attorneys do everything they can to avoid this kind of outcome. Yet, the
zealous advocate, directed by the client's immediate perception of personal interest, may be
required to play this role.
180. See Schepard, supra note 174. Schepard asserts that:
[O]ne parent usually leaves the courtroom having been stigmatized as the less
important parent in the child's life and embittered as a result of what the parent may
perceive as lies told by the other spouse. These feelings may lead to either of two
extremes: withdrawal by the parent from the child's life, or obsessive relitigation
that prolongs parental hostility and involves the courts in the perpetual management
of the family's relations.
Id. at 148.
181. In the end, parents may be so angered by the process that they continue to do what they
can to make life miserable for each other including resisting paying child and spousal support and
making it difficult for the non-custodial parent to visit the child. See OREGON STATUS REPORT,
supra note 78, at 3. Divorcing couples who go through mediation may be less likely to carry these
negative attitudes into their future relationship. See also Dane A. Gaschen, Comment, Mandatory
1997]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
From the perspectives of the children and the parents, the adver-
sarial process does not promote healthy family functioning. The una-
voidable conclusion is that the adversarial system is inapposite to the
best interests of children.
V. THE DEBATE OVER THE ROLE OF THE CHILD'S ATTORNEY
DISTRACTS FROM ATTENTION TO THE BEST INTERESTS
OF CHILDREN
Lawyers and academicians have spent a great deal of time debating
the role of the child's attorney.' 82 The debate is necessitated by our
unquestioning commitment to the adversary system as the proper forum
for resolving family issues and is based upon assumptions that are
neither empirically based, nor necessarily true. 183 The importance given
to the attorney's role may be based on false premises, and is an arrogant
usurpation of the proper roles of more qualified professionals. Perhaps
the best reflection of the gap between our professional arrogance and an
understanding of the needs of children is the ABA's adoption of a Prac-
tice Guideline requiring that "competent" children be treated as adults
for purposes of representation. 84
While attorneys give lip service to the developmental needs of chil-
dren, they do not have the training to identify them, particularly in the
complex context of best interest litigation. Lawyers have not been
trained to measure a child's capacity.' 8  For example, the expectation
Custody Mediation: The Debate Over Its Usefulness Continues, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL.
469 (1995) (discussing the study by Joan B. Kelly, Parent Interaction After Divorce: Comparison
of Mediated and Adversarial Divorce Processes, 9 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 387, 393 (1991)).
182. See Ventrell, supra note 36.
183. See, e.g., WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 19, at 314-15:
Although the wishes of children always merit careful consideration, our work
suggests that children below adolescence are not reliable judges of their own best
interests and that their attitudes at the time of the divorce crisis may be very much at
odds with their usual feelings and inclinations .... [T]he fact that several of the
youngsters with the most passionate convictions at the time of the breakup later
came shamefacedly to regret their vehement statements at that time, have increased
our misgivings about relying on the expressed opinions and preferences of
youngsters below adolescence in deciding the issues which arise in divorce-related
litigation.
184. See supra note 70.
185. See Ann M. Haralambie & Deborah L. Glaser, Practical and Theoretical Problems With
the AAML Standards for Representing "Impaired" Children, 13 J. Am. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 57, 61
(1995). ("The recognition by psychologists that competency is contextual, incremental, and
changing, even for adults, makes the attempt to label a child as either "impaired" or "unimpaired"
in toto a misleading and disempowering responsibility, and one for which the attorney qua
attorney has no particular qualifications."). The authors are critical of the Academy's adoption of
standards which would have the attorney for an impaired child take a diminished role, not arguing
for any position. Id.
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that a child's competence-and thus, a child's qualification to have a
true zealous advocate represent his expressed wishes-should depend
upon the child's ability to explain his reasoning about a decision in a
way that an adult would understand, is misguided. The American Acad-
emy of Matrimonial Lawyers Standards for the representation of chil-
dren requires such an approach.'86 The determination of the child's
capacity is the pivotal point for activating the lawyer's zealous advocate
role.187 Some have suggested that it is the lawyer's role to develop the
capacity of the child through counseling.188 An even more unrealistic
approach would require the attorney "to formulate a position based on
what the child-client would advocate if able to comprehend the situation
and express himself adequately."' 89
Katherine Hunt Federle goes even further, claiming that the child
must be an empowered participant regardless of capacity.
[B]y empowering the client, the lawyer ensures that the child, and no
other, has truly made her own choice. Of course, this may mean that
some decisions will be made by the child that the lawyer believes are
wrong or ill-conceived, but then, all clients, not just those of a certain
age, are capable of making and have made bad choices. Nevertheless
there is value in allowing a client to speak in her own voice and to
determine her own goals. This is the essence of empowerment and of
ethical lawyering. 190
Only a legally trained mind, with its focus on rights, could reach such a
conclusion about the welfare of a child. t91 Adults have a moral obliga-
tion to protect children.' 92 But, "adultmorphizing" children (imposing
186. See Margulies, supra note 11, at 1486.
187. The Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers would have lawyers for minors take a purely fact-
finding approach in any case where a minor does not qualify under its adult capacity standard to
make the critical decisions which guide the attorney. Id. This position is in reaction to the
concern that children may be particularly susceptible to being persuaded by their attorneys about
what position to take.
188. See, e.g., Peters, supra note 43, at 1564 ("To the extent that the child's developmental
status creates obstacles to communication and understanding, it is part of the lawyer's job to
overcome them creatively in order to provide the child client with the benefits of an advocate who
listens, informs, counsels, and answers questions.").
189. Jinanne S. J. Elder, The Role of Counsel for Children: A Proposal for Addressing a
Troubling Question, BosToN B.J., Jan./Feb. 1991, at 6, 9 (footnote omitted).
190. Federle, supra note 39, at 1696.
191. See Cervone & Mauro, supra note 25, at 1981. ("Unbridled rights theory ... is like the
unbridled adolescent himself. Even incorporating the compelling arguments that children deserve
competent and aggressive advocacy to the full extent of the law, one must question whether the
adversarial model works as an approach for the representation of children.").
192. Recently adopted legislation in California requires minors' attorneys to "advocate for the
protection, safety, and physical and emotional well-being of the minor." CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 317(c) (West Supp. 1997). In addition to advising the court of the minor's wishes,
"[c]ounsel for the minor shall not advocate for the return of the minor if, to the best of his or her
knowledge, that return conflicts with the protection and safety of the minor." Id. § 317(e).
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adult values and roles on them) may, itself, be a form of child abuse 193
caused by unrealistic expectations about children.
Certainly it is important to consider a child's cognitive functioning
in determining what role the child should take in the resolution of a
family problem.' 94  Lawyers, however, are not the professionals to be
undertaking this task. Even mental health professionals versed in child
development face difficult issues in these cases. For instance, how
much is known about how children's cognitive functioning is influenced
by other tensions in their lives such as abuse, neglect, and parental con-
flict? Even in the case of adolescents whose general cognitive function-
ing may be at an adult level, decision-making is often clouded by other
concerns, such as the struggle for individual identity and peer pressure.
The rules of confidentiality, which are an essential component of
our adversary system' 95 and are bound up with the attempt to treat chil-
193. See Cervone & Mauro, supra note 25. The authors state that
Self-determination ... does not always work for children.
The Conference [Fordham] recommended that the unimpaired child set the
goals of the representation as would an adult client. Under this rule, once competent
and verbally capable of communicating, the child should be entitled or empowered
to make her own decisions, regardless of age, developmental abilities, or impact of
the choice. Certainly for young children and even for older children, however, it
remains the intuition and experience of many that this freedom to direct their course
of their case does not work. For example, some decisions may be too large a burden
for a child to make (such as a choice between two parents, or between a stable foster
family and a mother who has just now become "clean" of drugs). Assuming that we
cannot divorce the advocacy role from the fact-finder role of the judge, how far do
we let children go in assessing the long-term consequences of their actions? The
limits of a child's cognitive abilities and emotional control suggest that ethics alone
are not sufficient to resolve this conflict.
... Somehow, someone must play the role of the adult in the process.
Id. at 1981-87.
194. See, e.g., Mlyniec, supra note 73, at 1874.
195. See Mandelbaum, supra note 54. Randi Mandelbaum states that:
Nothing is more fundamental and important to the operation of our advocacy and
legal systems than the relationship between attorney and client. The confidentiality
of a client's statements to an attorney is at the core of this relationship and therefore
also at the center of an effective advocacy system. Traditionally, the need for
confidentiality has been argued through a three-step syllogism. First, people must
use lawyers to resolve disputes and the lawyers must be able to represent their
clients effectively for the adversary system to operate. Second, lawyers need full
information in order to be effective. Third, clients may not fully disclose all of the
information in their possession unless confidentiality is guaranteed. Strict
adherence to confidentiality rules also has been found to improve the quality of the
relationship between attorney and client, especially the rapport and trust between
them.
Id. at 2057. This argument presumes that the adversary system is the only way to resolve dis-
putes, that advocacy is the same thing as the adversary system, and that only lawyers can be
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dren as adult clients, result in absurdities regarding the safety of chil-
dren. Most of the contributors to the Fordham Conference review
favored a confidential relationship between the child's attorney and the
child. 196 This position cannot be supported by its contribution to a best
interests outcome. Rather, it is supported by the child's need to know
that she has a voice and can trust an adult to express her will.1 97 We
must ask why the child's lawyer should play that role. The team of
adults who are working to mend the family and protect the child could
express the child's voice; so could the child's therapist. Putting these
children into an adversarial system where they can only trust the lawyer,
thus making the others "untrustworthy adults," is antithetical to a child's
best interests. Similarly, it is unclear why it should be the lawyer's job
to empower the child. Certainly, the lawyer can be part of the team, but
there may be some negative effect to empowering a child falsely (i.e.,
when the court will really know that the child's desire is not in her best
interest) or dangerously (i.e., when maintaining the confidence will
place the child at risk). The relationship of trust and empowerment (in
the sense of having one's position expressed) is not clearly any more the
lawyer's job than that of some other professional. We must ask what is
the ultimate benefit of such a role assignment. Lawyers may be practic-
ing as unlicensed child development experts by determining that these
values are more important than some other interests of the child, such as
safety and long-term developmental concerns. We lack the foundation
for making that judgement. As officers of the court, it is our job to
make sure that the best interests of the child are served, which is the
equivalent of doing justice in other proceedings. Perhaps all this is
merely an attempt by lawyers to satisfy our own need for clarity and
certainty in our work; in spite of our need to be comfortable with the
gray areas, lawyers love rules, definition and structure. However, the
profession's position regarding how these cases should be handled
reflects a lack of understanding as to the complexity and contextuality of
these cases.
A good parent would not sacrifice his child's safety for the sake of
privacy. The scenarios discussed in the Fordham Conference debate
over confidentiality make this point.1 98 Whether the case is one of a
advocates. Placing confidentiality at the core of the adversary system is essential because of the
win/lose nature of the process which requires withholding information for strategic advantage.
196. See, e.g., id. at 2060.
197. See id. at 2057. Mandelbaum states that confidentiality is especially important to children
who have been abused because they have a "need to feel and believe that they can trust and
confide in their lawyer." Id.
198. See, e.g., id. at 2056-57 (giving the "hypothetical" example of a foster child who runs
away from his placement because he is being abused and calls his attorney from a dangerous
neighborhood, but desires his attorney to keep his whereabouts confidential). Is the empowerment
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sexually molested child who wishes to stay in the custody of her
molester, or of an adolescent who has run away from a foster home and
is prostituting herself on the streets, common sense would dictate protec-
tion over privacy.' 99
While empowerment of children is a laudatory goal 2 °° it is a mean-
ingless one if the child is injured or killed by making an immature
choice. In a process which focuses on rights, the child must have rights
and the power to assert those rights by having a voice in the process;
but, both rights and power must be viewed within the context of protec-
tion and the child's welfare. A system, such as our adversarial system,
distorts this conversation by its focus on rights and the need to pit the
of the child the significant interest in such a situation? In proceedings where the focus is the
protection of the child, a rule which prohibits that protection cannot be consistent with effective
representation.
199. See Ryan, supra note 54. Ryan states that:
Our jurisprudence and its processes have undervalued, and often disparaged, the
empowerment of children. It is academic excess, however, to suggest that our
pursuit of integrity for child clients requires the professional community to
empower children to death. Of what value is autonomy to a cadaver? .... Despite
our studied embrace of professional amorality, we transgress a basic humanistic,
moral standard when we sacrifice clients' lives in the name of their own volition,
however short-sighted or impaired it may be.
... Empowerment-which should be a humanizing process that gives ear to
the child's dreams, plans, and aspirations-becomes a counterhuman force when
lawyers invoke it as a rationale against rescuing a child in immediate danger of
dying who also demands confidentiality. Passivity and silence work a fundamental
unfairness to the child client because they indulge a despair, a gross recklessness, a
short-term consciousness, which threaten to destroy childrens' [sic] lives. Unlike
transformative mistakes with adverse consequences that can yield valuable lessons,
life-threatening behavior risks an irreversibility that demands intervention. To do
otherwise, the attorney affirms behavior that screams out: "I am worthless; I do not
deserve nor want a future." The attorney can never act neutrally in this context; the
child client has too much at stake. The lawyer becomes, even in her passivity, a
source of affirmations, nodding in assent that the child does not deserve tomorrow.
Nothing could be less fair to the child client.
Id. at 2069, 2072 (footnotes omitted). Critics of proposed reform which would allow divulgences
of such confidences fear the slippery slope affecting eventual erosion of the confidential relation-
ship. My concern is that this kind of confidential relationship between the attorney and the child
sets up the child to think in terms of the child protective services worker or parents being
"against" him, while his lawyer is "for" him. I believe it is a mistake to lead the child to think that
others are not acting in his interests. What good is it to the child or the profession if the child
knows that others are trying to protect his safety in spite of his self-destructive wishes, yet his
lawyer will support his unsafe acts? What is the long-term effect on the child and society if we do
not do everything we can to protect the child? Lawyers are not trained to engage in therapeutic
helping behavior, and the rules of confidentiality may prevent a child from receiving it elsewhere.
The adversary system forces this kind of immoral line drawing, and the apparent amorality of
the profession which follows from it. See Susan Wolf, Ethics, Legal Ethics, and the Ethics of
Law, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 39, at 38, 53.
200. See generally Federle, supra note 39.
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parties' rights against each other. 20 1
Even assuming that all relevant information is presented to the
court, the judge lacks the ability to make these crucial decisions in the
many cases where the facts do not clearly favor one side or the other.
Our arrogance leads us to assume that somehow we are possessed of an
all-encompassing skill which enables us to engage in all kinds of deci-
sion-making, regardless of the consequences to people's lives. This
arrogance demeans the other disciplines which participate in family law
and child protection matters. It exemplifies lack of respect and the real-
ity of the hierarchical roles of professionals.2"2 This hierarchy, and the
accompanying antagonism and poor morale among people who are
required to work together, create barriers to effective collaboration, and
thus, to achieving our common goal.
In essence, the awkward limitations on, and rationalizations for,
attorney conduct in these cases, and all the energy spent agonizing about
the right role for children's lawyers, arise because we cannot envision
ourselves in another system-a system designed specifically with the
needs of children and families in mind.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
There is clear evidence that the adversarial system is inappropriate
for dealing with the best interests of children in the context of child
protection and family law matters. We need a new paradigm, one that
truly focuses on the children, as children, rather than as small adults.
The paradigm must protect the interests of the parents, but not allow the
interests of the parents to trump the child's needs. The shift must be
drastic. It requires our willingness to abandon what does not work, to
see that the patchwork quilt approach to "fixing" the problems in the
current system does not solve the underlying values problems of the
adversarial process.
A. Start Over
It is hard to imagine that any civilized society would not claim to
care for and nurture its children. Certainly, the United States claims to
do these things and to place a high value on families and children. An
examination of our willingness to "put our money where our mouth is"
might indicate otherwise. As previously discussed, the child protective
system and the family court system are both lacking in resources neces-
201. See id at 1658 ("Lawyering models implicitly engage in rights talk: what the lawyer is to
do (or not) for the client depends primarily on how one constructs and values rights.").
202. See Herring, supra note 108, at 208 (arguing that judges have difficulty valuing social
work).
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sary to support the families they see. Issues of privacy and inhibitions
about "intruding" into family matters remove us further from providing
that support. We understand that parenting is difficult and that relation-
ships are challenging, yet we maintain a "hands-off' approach to these
concerns until a child is discovered to be endangered or until the matter
is brought to the court by the parents. Even worse, poverty aggravates
the situation.2 °3
Our society needs to help children and families live more func-
tional, healthy, and productive lives. While there is some disagreement
about the role of government in family life, there should be no disagree-
ment that when the government, including the courts, must play a role, it
should do so without creating additional harm.
Criticisms of the adversary process are based primarily upon the
intensification of conflict which occurs through that process. The criti-
cisms also build upon what we understand about the needs of families
and children for support, stability, and new ways to maintain connec-
tions where traditional structures no longer work.
The adversary system is not inviolate; there is nothing inherent in
our tradition which demands its use, particularly in noncriminal mat-
ters.2°4 We must look with new eyes to consider what kind of system
we would design to deal with these kinds of problems if we were not
203. The Third National Incidence Study (NIS) of Child Abuse and Neglect made the
following finding:
Children from families with annual incomes below $15,000 were more than 22
times more likely to experience maltreatment than children from families whose
incomes exceeded $30,000. They also were 18 times more likely to be sexually
abused, almost 56 times more likely to be educationally neglected and more than 22
times more likely to be seriously injured.
Child Abuse and Neglect Shows Sharp Rise, HHS Study Finds, CHILD PROTECTION REPORT, Sept.
27, 1996, at 165.
204. See, e.g., David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note
39, at 83, 111. However, Luban would probably place child protection cases in the same category
as criminal cases, due to the interests involved and the fact that there is state intervention. See
also Kutak, supra note 40 (arguing that the adversary system is one of many competitive
institutions in our society reflecting individualistic values fostered by competition and that this
does not mean it is the kind of justice system we must have); Schwartz, supra note 39. Schwartz
states that:
No earthly adjudicatory system can be confident of total accuracy. To come as
close to that objective as possible, the rules of the system should be designed to
maximize the probability of an accurate result . . . . [N]either the idea of the
adversary system nor its effectuation requires the use of truth-defeating techniques.
•.. The point is that all ... rules of professional behavior should be analyzed
and evaluated by reference to their potential for increasing the probability of an
accurate result.
Id. at 157-58. Unfortunately, I believe the adversary system has been interpreted to require
exactly those kinds of truth-avoiding behaviors on the part of attorneys. As explained in this
article, I have concluded that the best interests goal is not achievable within the adversary context.
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constricted in vision by the usurpation of this area by the adversarial
legal system.2 °5 The focus should be on the psychosocial nature of the
problems, with the legal issues in proper perspective and appropriately
handled, 2°6 but not driving the entire system and not eating up its
resources.207  It should be a hybrid system which combines the protec-
tions of the legal system and advocacy with the healing goals of the
therapeutic and other helping disciplines.208 The change should be from
an adversarial process to a process which focuses on collaborative prob-
211lem solving, including the valuing of complete information.
An important part of this change would be a shift in the expecta-
tions of the professional and client participants with regard to both sub-
205. See Solove, supra note 38. Solove explains that: "a few short months on the bench
convinced me that the adversarial atmosphere of the courtroom was absolutely the wrong place to
make determinations about the welfare of the children of divorce." Id. at 801; see also Myers,
supra note 8, at 258 (non-adversarial approach is preferred because it has more hope of meeting
the goals of protecting children, treating deviant behavior, and supporting families).
206. Note that I do not propose to eliminate traditional legal values. The right to a hearing is
transformed, in a sense, into a duty to participate in the process, yet it retains the due process
safeguards of an impartial decision-maker, should a resolution not be achieved by the family
itself. It also includes a protection of the interests which underlie the right to cross-examine
witnesses, in that it calls for complete sharing of information, dialogue, and careful consideration
of all evidence. I do not share Fineman's belief that the process should be public. See Fineman,
supra note 21, at 770. Sufficient checks to abuse are provided within the political system without
exposing the private lives of children and their parents to a public audience.
207. I disagree with Catherine Ross, who believes that it is useless to attempt nonlitigation
alternatives with families who have demonstrated their inability to resolve their own disputes by
the mere fact that they have presented themselves in court. See Ross, supra note 9, at 1577
("Courts provide a regulated framework for resolving disputes that have already transcended the
ability of the parties to resume more temperate discussion."). There is no evidence to indicate that
lawyers are the best or most appropriate problem solvers in these situations. In fact, all evidence
indicates the contrary-that the adversarial process exacerbates disputes. The court does not have
a mechanism for healing relationships. When we are discussing the best interests of children, a
functional, if not completely healed, relationship must be our goal. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL.,
FREUD AND SOLNrr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 8 (New ed., 1979) ("[Llaw is
incapable of effectively managing, except in a very gross sense, so delicate and complex a
relationship as that between parent and child.").
208. See Cahn & Johnson, supra note 71, at 131 ("[T]he best outcomes may be preserved by
applying a collaborative, win-win decision-making process at some points, as long as all parties'
rights are protected."). Note that I do not propose the turning over of the decision-making task to
another professional group as Fineman discourages. See Fineman, supra note 21, at 729. Rather,
my proposal calls for attorneys and judges to be a part of the larger group of child welfare
professionals.
209. In the problem-solving model, the participants are assisted in focusing on their actual
objectives and looking for creative ways to meet their mutual needs, "rather than ... focusing
exclusively on the assumed objectives of maximizing individual gain." Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv.
754, 758 (1984); see also Myers, supra note 8, at 259 ("The premium on hostility and denial will
be reduced in favor of the positive approach of professionals trained in cooperative problem
solving.").
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stance and procedure. 210  The changed expectations must include
societal expectations for the system, professional practices and ethical
standards, and personal expectations among the participants. Changes in
the language used to describe these family disputes is another necessary
component for transformation. 21' Typical legal pleading formats which
require parties to be named as plaintiff or petitioner, and defendant or
respondent, and set off against each other ("versus"), are inappropriate
for a nonadversarial environment.212 Family members and the profes-
sionals who assist them must see resolving the problems, not "winning,"
as the goal of the participants, directly focusing on the best interests of
210. People's expectations can be quite powerful in determining events. Studies in schools
have demonstrated that students perform in accordance with their teachers' expectations of their
abilities. See RONALD B. ADLER & NEIL TOWNE, LOOKING OuTLooKING IN: INTERPERSONAL
COMMUNICATION 79 (1981). People experience what they expect to experience, at least in part
because they behave in reaction to their expectations. See Jeanne A. Clement & Andrew I.
Schwebel, A Research Agenda for Divorce Mediation: The Creation of Second Order Knowledge
to Inform Legal Policy, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 95, 110 (1993) (citation omitted).
("Individuals enter mediation with expectations about the other party, the process, the lawyers, the
courts, and so forth. These expectations may have a favorable, neutral, or unfavorable impact on
the process of mediation and the outcomes.").
Specifically, in the legal context, our substantive and procedural laws create expectations.
See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
143 ("[Clonstitutions, laws, and courts do have a modest bearing on habits and attitudes. And
nowhere are these legal influences more a factor to be reckoned with than in the legalistic society
of the United States."). See also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 209. Menkel-Meadow argues that:
The orientation (adversarial or problem solving) leads to a mindset about what can
be achieved (maximizing individual gain or solving the parties' problem by
satisfying their underlying needs) which in turn affects the behavior chosen
(competitive or solution searching) which in turn affects the solutions arrived at
(narrow compromises or creative solutions).
Id. at 760.
People also tend to conform to the expectations held for them, particularly to conform to the
norm of the group with which they identify. See SHARON S. BREHM & SAUL M. KASSIN, SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 393 (1990); see also Robert A. Cooke and Janet L. Szumal, Measuring Normative
Beliefs and Shared Behavioral Expectations in Organizations: The Reliability and Validity of the
Organizational Culture Inventory, 72 PSYCHOL. REP. 1299 (1993).
211. See OREGON STATUS REPORT, supra note 78, at 10. ("Language changes: Considering
language changes to replace terms such as 'custody' and 'visitation,' with 'parenting plans,'
'mom's house' and 'dad's house,' and other words that are less adversarial. The language change
would reflect the fact that divorce does not end a family; it reorganizes it.").
212. According to Fineman, helping professionals "view law itself as possessing vast power to
transform people's behavior." Fineman, supra note 21, at 734 (footnote omitted). If this is so,
then a transformation of the law should serve to shift people's behavior accordingly, from an
adversarial attitude to a collaborative problem-solving approach. In support, Fineman cites Meyer
Elkin, who states:
[T]he elimination of "fault" has made it possible for the Court to play a much lesser
part in banking the fires of hostility. It is a well-known fact in role theory that
people cast in the roles of adversaries probably will live up to those roles.... [T]he
elimination of adversary proceedings eliminated adversary roles and therefore
reduced the need to fulfill antagonistic roles and the need to strike out at each other.
Id. at 746 n.85 (citation omitted).
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the children. 213 In short, there must be a shift in legal paradigm, 214 from
a system based upon competition and selfishness, to one based upon
collaboration and the incorporation of larger interests, namely, children
and families. Rather than set out a new, rigid procedure to replace
existing systems, my focus in this section is on the values which should
be incorporated into whatever process is designed to help children and
families through their difficult times in child protection and family cus-
tody disputes. 215 Relying upon the wisdom of experience, we can safely
say that no one process will suit every case. The new design should
include a range of procedures, from family counseling, mediation, and
family group conferences, to a more coercive, involuntary process where
protecting the child is the primary goal. The roles of the court, judges
and attorneys should be played in the background and be supportive of
the important healing work in which the family is engaged.
B. What the Process Would Look Like
I recommend a hybrid process which takes into account the sub-
stantial role played by other professionals in serving children and fami-
lies in trouble. At the same time, the underlying legal issues concerning
the family relationship are protected by safeguarding fair process,
because ultimately, the concern of the courts is to ensure that whatever
action is taken, it is done fairly.
Others recommend removing the best interests decision-making
213. Catania has suggested that a negotiation-based resolution system be adopted for custody
disputes:
The law must be premised upon an understanding of family as existing beyond
the point of legal dissolution of the husband/wife relationship. And it must
encourage the individual members of the reordering family to accept that fiduciary
interdependence is in their mutual self-interest. . . . The law should regard the
family, at least insofar as it involves children, as a lifelong commitment and the
process of divorce and custody determination as "a serious and carefully considered
remedy for an important problem" in the family. Such a remedy is "purposeful and
rationally undertaken" and "indeed succeeds in bringing relief and a happier
outcome" for the family.
Catania, supra note 15, at 1258-59 (footnotes omitted).
214. See Schorr, supra note 9, at 34, 35 (arguing that a change in the system can only be
achieved through a change in the dominant paradigm).
215. For an interesting proposal regarding the adaptation of therapeutic techniques to the legal
resolution of these disputes, see Susan L. Brooks, A Family Systems Paradigm for Legal Decision
Making Affecting Child Custody, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1996). See also Barbara A.
Babb, An Interdisciplinary Approach to Family Law Jurispurdence: Application of an Ecological
and Therapeutic Perspective, 72 IND. L.J. (1997) (family law jurisprudence inconsistent with real
family life and social science research in child development and family relations); Mary A.
Duryee and James Garbolino, Family Law: Is the System Broken?, 7 AFCC CALIFORNIA
NEWSLETTER, Fall 1996, at 15 (mismatch between the kinds of disputes brought to the court and
the procedures available for resolution).
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from the adversarial process altogether.2"6 The New Zealand "Family
Group Conferences" rely heavily on the notion that families can and
should be supported to make the right decisions regarding the welfare of
their children.21 7 When intervention is determined to be necessary
because a child is believed to be endangered, the extended family is
called in to be a primary part of the problem-solving process. Team-
work and the provision of support resources to the family are integral
aspects of the process. These elements are essential to my proposal.
While I do not set out a detailed description of any process, there are
some general guidelines which would be appropriate to most situations.
1. CLIENTS WITH NEEDS WOULD BE REFERRED TO A TEAM
Clients entering the system because of alleged child protection
issues would enter the system upon referral from a social worker, fol-
lowing preliminary investigation.2"8 The child may or may not be
removed from the parent on an emergency basis. In the case where a
child had been removed, a petition would be filed and a meeting would
216. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 17. Gardner recommends a three-step procedure of
mediation, arbitration panel, and appeals panel for determining child custody issues in divorce
situations. His procedure would include attorneys in their role of providing representation at the
arbitration and appeals levels, but would not provide a traditional adversarial forum. Instead, it
would call for "free and open discussion." The expert panels (arbitration and appeals), consisting
of specially trained mental health professionals and attorneys) would control the proceedings and
gather data according to procedures used by mental health experts. Id. at 9-11.
217. The notion that families are generally in the best position to make these decisions is not
new. Family decision-making is based upon the premise that each family is the "expert" on itself.
This concept is reflected in the family group conference process, as discussed in Harry Walker,
Whanau, Family Decision Making, The Value of Trust; Denis Smith, Family Group
Conferences-The Process; Grant Allan, The Family Group Conference-A Lawyer's
Perspective; Denis Smith, Child Sexual Abuse in the Context of Family Decision Making; Judge
E.T. Jurie, Ancestral Law, Civil Law & the Law of Gifts. Series of papers prepared for the
"Beyond the Bench VII" Conference in Oakland, California (1995) (on file with author)
[hereinafter collectively referred to as The New Zealand Papers]. See also HARDIN, supra note 79.
218. John Myers, in advocating for a shift from the criminal prosecution of child abuse cases
toward a more therapeutic approach, states:
The most promising way to accomplish this goal is to shift the focus of the
response by restructuring the system so that cases originate in the therapeutic realm
as opposed to the adversarial.
A therapeutically oriented system in which the commitment to nonadversarial
problem-solving is genuine cannot be administered by attorneys, especially
attorneys who serve as or under prosecutors. The training, experience and
disposition of the lawyer pulls him toward reliance on litigation, and prosecutors are
particularly steeped in the adversarial approach. It is as unrealistic and unfair to
expect lawyers to administer a therapeutically oriented response to child abuse as it
would be to ask mental health professionals to litigate.
Myers, supra note 8, at 262. Myers raises questions about whether the juvenile court is capable
of administering a nonadversarial system. Id.
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be scheduled within seventy-two judicial hours of the removal, as is cus-
tomary under the current statutory scheme, in order to protect the rela-
tionship interests of the family members. The purpose of the initial
meeting would be to set the tone for the process by having the judge
explain it, including the role of the advocates, to the family and appoint
lawyers for the parents and child. The parents would be entitled to con-
test the initial removal at this time, if the parents believe the removal
was a mistake. The social worker would explain the concerns to the
judge, including contradictory information, and would explain why
removing the child was necessary. The judge would affirm that decision
unless she finds it to be arbitrary and capricious. If the social worker
and immediate family could not agree upon a plan of action, a group
meeting would be scheduled as soon as possible, preferably within two
weeks. The initial group meeting would include the parents, the advo-
cates, the social worker, and any other person who is available and
whose participation is believed to be relevant to the family. This may
include, among other support people, step parents219 and other adults
living in the home, relatives, neighbors, physicians, mental health prov-
iders, and clergy. At this time, all available information would be
shared, while being sensitive to the family's need for privacy.22° The
major topic of discussion for this first meeting would be to set forth all
known information and to gather additional information from the partici-
pants. Additionally, the group might decide what other information
would be useful in helping to resolve the problem and make plans for
gathering such information. 22' The second major topic for discussion
would be where the child should be placed until the matter is resolved.
One reason for including friends, neighbors and relatives so early in the
219. This would eliminate the controversy over who qualifies as a de facto parent, a
controversy that exists in determining who has standing to participate in the traditional adversarial
process. These determinations have led to some bizarre results. See, e.g., In re Kieshia E., 6 Cal.
4th 68 (1993) (blended families on inconsistent reunification plans). The only limitations
regarding participation should be whether someone's participation creates a danger to one of the
participants and/or whether someone's behavior is so disruptive to the process that it inhibits
forward movement. If such a person happens to be a parent, court intervention might be necessary
to issue orders for contempt purposes.
220. It might be determined that certain of the participants would be excused during
discussions where the family members desired privacy, unless the information to be discussed is
necessary for the group problem solving.
221. The desire for expert opinions, including psychological evaluations and second opinions
about causes of injuries, would be included in this process. All experts would be "hired" by the
group, rather than by an individual, as the group's goal is to gather all the information it can which
will assist it in taking wise action. Thus, experts will not be placed in the position of having to be
adversarial advocates for parties. This would be consistent with Gardner's thoughts that it should
be unethical to even serve as an impartial evaluator in the current adversary system, because it
serves to perpetuate the system that is psychologically detrimental to clients, violating the
Hippocratic oath-"Above all, do not harm." See Gardner, supra note 17, at 4.
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process is to expand the possibilities for placement in an environment
familiar to the child. It must be clear from the tone set at this first meet-
ing that the process is about assisting the family, and not about winning
or losing. While it may be difficult to explain this to a parent who has
had a child removed, the inclusion of participants who are not "parties"
to the conflict would make it clear that this is different from a normal
adversarial contest.
Families entering the system because of family court custody dis-
putes would be referred to the system upon the filing of a contested
custody petition, or earlier through self-referral. Family law attorneys
should encourage their client3 to engage in the process at the earliest
possible time, in an effort to avoid conflictual situations for the children.
Within five days of referral, a meeting would be scheduled.
In both situations, the initial meeting would be facilitated by a pro-
fessional, preferably someone trained in mediation. At the end of the
first meeting, another meeting would be scheduled for a time agreed
upon by the participants as appropriate, given the number of tasks to be
accomplished in the interim. Naturally, the advocates would be moni-
toring this scheduling to ensure that it is sensitive to the needs of the
parent-child relationship. Plans would be in place regarding visitation,
including provisions for safety concerns.222 Where agreed upon, a ser-
vice plan could be initiated at this point.
2. REGULAR MEETINGS OF CLIENTS AND PROFESSIONALS IN DIFFERENT
GROUPINGS, DEPENDING UPON NEEDS
Meetings would continue to be scheduled as needed, with attend-
ance varying according to the purpose of the meeting. Services would
be provided as agreed upon, with attorneys monitoring to be sure their
clients are participating in services and seeking assistance from the
group process if that is not the case.223 While the process is not adver-
sarial, parents do need to be advised of the consequence of their failure
222. Family custody contests may involve allegations of domestic violence, substance abuse,
or child abuse which give rise to safety concerns regarding visitation. As part of this proposal, I
am recommending that services be provided for families who are involved in contested custody
matters. Where psychological testing reveals characterological problems in one or both parents
which are likely to create ongoing conflict, experts can help the family develop a very structured
and specific plan which "can obviate, as much as possible, the need for parents to cooperate in
making decisions when they literally do not have the capacity to do so." Roseby, supra note 20, at
105.
223. Roseby, in regard to custody evaluations, insists that an important part of the process is to
minimize parents' sense of shame and maximize their understanding of the child's needs and
experiences." Id. at 102. The author comments that custody evaluations can exacerbate parents'
sense of shame and helplessness when delivered in open court. She suggests that the process
should be more private. See id. at 110.
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to take steps to ensure their child's welfare. In child protection cases,
clear warnings regarding the possibility of termination of parental rights
need to be given and included in the record of the process. These warn-
ings should serve as motivation and as satisfaction of the due process
notice requirement.224
All professionals should seek to maximize opportunities for safe
parent participation in the lives of their children (rather than mere "visit-
ing") and seek to connect parents and children who are separated.225
Parent education would play an essential role, particularly education
which teaches parents the effect of conflict and, if appropriate, abuse
and/or neglect, on their children. Many courts now require parents to
attend programs of this sort.2 26 The process would involve a dialogue
among the interdisciplinary group of professionals with an attempt to
engage the parents in an examination of their parenting and how they
might be assisted, instead of engaging in a win/lose combat. Again, the
224. To the extent that a parent attempts to revisit the initial decision regarding the
intervention, in spite of contrary advice from counsel, that parent should be advised of the
consequences of delaying compliance with the plan. However, continued denial of the underlying
jurisdictional facts should not be labeled as "denial" in the psychological sense, unless there is
very clear supporting evidence. Strong professional skills will be required to walk the tightrope
between discouraging manipulation by a parent truly in "denial," and closing the door to the
consideration of alternative hypotheses as the case moves forward.
Parents must be given specific and clear information about what they must do in order to
reunify their families. See, e.g., Herring, supra note 76.
225. To effectuate this recommendation in the child protection arena, I would propose the
development of neighborhood family centers. At these centers, parents would spend time
interacting with their children on a daily basis, if possible. Many parents involved with child
protective services are unemployed and would be available to participate on a full-time basis. Pre-
school age children in out-of-home placement could be brought to the center each morning, the
same way any child might be taken to daycare. A residential community might also be
appropriate for such a center. School age children could be brought after school. The center
would provide both recreational and educational activities, as well as facilities for preparing meals
and bathing. It would be a central location for provision of the most commonly utilized services,
including classes in parenting, anger management, substance abuse, drug testing, and counseling.
Professional personnel would be available to model parenting skills in the course of their
interaction with the parents and children. At the same time, they would be supervising the
interactions and observing the progress of the parents and children.
The benefits of such centers are numerous. Current reunification plans often list, in
boilerplate fashion, a number of services for parents. Such services are often located
inconveniently, particularly for those who use public transportation, and are of unknown quality.
Centralizing the provision of services would remove one more obstacle in the parent-child
relationship. It would provide meaningful contact between the family members in a supervised
setting. It would give those with responsibility first hand knowledge about the family's dynamics
and allow services to be provided according to the family's development, rather than according to
a plan on paper. Where parental rights must be terminated, observation could assist the group in
reaching that conclusion expeditiously and fairly, with greater confidence.
226. Oregon, for example, gives counties the option to require parents to attend Parent
Education Programs which include this kind of information, as well as information about other
relevant topics, including parenting tips and dispute resolution. See OREGON STATUS REPORT,
supra note 78, at 8.
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group discussion must focus on needs, not on rights.22 7
The group meetings would be confidential among the members of
the group. All experts called upon to render opinions would be included
as part of the team to allow for free-flowing communication among
them, tearing down the illogical obstacles which now keep such commu-
nication from occurring.228 All information would be shared, except
where it may pose a danger to someone, in which case it would be
shared among appropriate participants to ensure the protection of parties.
3. THE CHILD'S INVOLVEMENT
As discussed earlier, just how much involvement children should
have in child protection and custody proceedings is a matter of debate.
In the proposed process, the child would be a participant in the group
conferences to the extent the child wishes and the child's caretakers,
227. It may be that this kind of ongoing dialogue and involvement of parents in the process
will naturally result in consensus more often than we can expect from the present adversarial
system. See Ratterman, supra note 82, at 39. Ratterman describes a project in Chemung County,
New York, where permanency planning meetings were held with all service providers and the
family at the 12-month review stage. Id. at 43-44. Positive results achieved at that time lead me
to conclude that they would be available much sooner in my proposal.
Zwier suggests a process for physician-assisted suicide cases, which seems apropos to best
interest cases:
The care perspective identifies the central issue of care, asking what caring demands
in this particular situation with these particular persons to strengthen (or at least
maintain) the primary relationship and to avoid hurt and harm. This step can be
taken only after identifying the interdependent parties and the primary relationships.
One then must consider the view of both the one cared for ... and the one caring.
Using this care perspective and these procedural steps, consider what would
likely happen .... The care counselor will very quickly and directly involve all the
family members. There would need to be a joint meeting with the patient, the
client's other siblings and friends, the medical practitioner, and anyone else who
might have a strong caring interest.
The result is that the "do it/don't do it" [referring to physician-assisted suicide]
dichotomy may immediately be broken. The possible solutions multiply greatly
when the focus turns to what will create, maintain, or maximize the healthy
relationships already present in the situation. At the same time, care would not
automatically rule physician-assisted suicide out of bounds. The role of care-
providers more likely will force the asking of tough questions. Who cares about the
patient? What does caring demand? Where do these individuals live? What is each
party's capacity to care? What is fair for each to contribute? Depending on the
answers to these questions, the counselor and decision-makers can cut through the
adversarial rights-based analysis and frame a more tailored, particularized solution.
Paul J. Zwier, Looking for a Nonlegal Process: Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Care Perspec-
tive, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 199, 233-36 (1996) (footnotes omitted). Replacing the patient with a
child and the question of physician-assisted suicide with a question of removal from a parent, the
process seems appropriate for best interests cases.
228. To the extent the ethical codes of the involved professionals require confidentiality
inconsistent with this goal, they will need to be revised.
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therapist and/or attorney believe appropriate. In any event, the child's
voice would be heard through the child's advocate, therapist, social
worker, family members, and other concerned participants. The child
would never be forced into the position of having to make the difficult
decision. 29
It is an important part of this process that the parents hear about
how the situation affects the child, from the child if possible, so that the
parents can hold this information in the forefront at all times when mak-
ing decisions. Solutions would be flexible and creative to meet the
needs of individual children,230 rather than the current boilerplate
approach.
Intervention should be a healing process. Additionally, if develop-
mental assessments can be done without further disrupting the children,
they would be helpful to ensure that the children are doing well and
receiving the services they need. The needs of children for stability and
a sense of security must drive the process and serve to motivate the
family to resolve its problems. This may lead to a triage system for
cases where it is clear that the developmental needs of the child, and the
long-term problems of the parents, will not coincide in the foreseeable
future. Cases of severe mental health problems, long-standing substance
abuse problems, and chronic domestic violence might be considered in
this category. In such situations, decisions could be made by the profes-
sionals in the interests of the children, with the idea of moving to swift
resolution. There is no constitutional requirement for providing custody
or reunifying parents where their actions have proven them to be unfit.
Neither is there a constitutional requirement for providing services in
extreme cases where it is highly unlikely that reunification would ever
be accomplished.23'
C. Base the Problem-Solving Approach on an "Ethic of Care" and
Focus on Relationships
The term "ethic of care" may have been coined by Carol Gilligan in
her work describing the differences in the moral development of girls
229. See Mlyniec, supra note 73, at 1908 (citation omitted). ("[C]hildren choosing to state a
preference for a custodial parent should be heard. On the other hand, because custody issues may
be very disturbing for young children, courts should not encourage litigants to present such
testimony.") Even with older children, it is important to look at the dynamics and context to
determine the kinds of influences which might be affecting the child's stated preference. Because
children have been known to make dangerous choices based upon inappropriate influences, I
disagree with Mlyniec's position that the child's preference should be determinative.
230. See, e.g., Gilbert A. Holmes, The Extended Family System in the Black Community: A
Child-Centered Model for Adoption Policy, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1649, 1670-71 (1995).
231. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(b) (West Supp. 1997) (listing circumstances
in which reunification services need not be provided).
19971
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:79
and boys.232 The proposed paradigm shifts focus from individual rights
to relationships, incorporating notions of connectedness and responsibil-
ity among family members and between family and society.233 The
problems to be resolved in the system arise "from conflicting responsi-
bilities rather than from competing rights .... Our traditional focus
on rights has fallen short in terms of assisting parents to overcome their
self-centered concerns on behalf of their children.235  An ethic of care
describes not only what we expect from parents toward their children,
but what we expect from society, and those who would intervene in
families' lives.
232. See GILLIGAN, supra note 40, at 30. Gilligan describes the responses of Jake and Amy to
Heinz's dilemma: "Amy's judgments contain the insights central to an ethic of care, just as Jake's
judgments reflect the logic of the justice approach." See also Ellmann, supra note 26, at 2682.
Ellmann proposes an ethic for lawyers which would require the responsibilities of the lawyer to
the client to be commensurate with considerations of care.
233. See Annette Baier, Trust and Antitrust, in ETHICs 231 (Jan. 1986).
Men may but women cannot see morality as essentially a matter of keeping to the
minimal moral traffic rules, designed to restrict close encounters between
autonomous persons to self-chosen ones. Such a conception presupposes both an
equality of power and a natural separateness from others, which is alien to women's
experience of life and morality. For those most of whose daily dealings are with the
less powerful or the more powerful, a moral code designed for those equal in power
will be at best nonfunctional, at worst an offensive pretense of equality as a
substitute for its actuality. But equality is not even a desirable ideal in all
relationships-children are not but should not be equal in power to adults, and we
need a morality to guide us in our dealings with those who either cannot or should
not achieve equality of power (animals, the ill, the dying, children while still young)
with those with whom they have unavoidable and often intimate relationships.
Id. at 249 (citations omitted).
234. GILLIGAN, supra note 40, at 19. Gilligan was referring not to our legal system per se, but
to the moral development and practice of girls. Her description, however, is quite appropriate in
this context, as it reflects current attempts to modify the traditional adversary process and a rising
interest in the concept of responsibility. See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 210; Woodhouse, supra
note 28, at 1841 ("[A] child-centered perspective calls for a rhetoric that speaks less about
competing rights and more about adult responsibility and children's needs.").
235. See GLENDON, supra note 210. Glendon argues that:
Traditionally, it has been women who have taken primary responsibility for the
transmission of family lore and for the moral education of children. As mothers and
teachers, they have nourished a sense of connectedness between individuals, and an
awareness of the linkage among present, past, and future generations. Hence the
important role accorded by many feminists to the values of care, relationship,
nurture, and contextuality, along with the insistence on rights that the women's
movement in general has embraced. Women are still predominant among the
country's caretakers and educators, and many are carrying insights gained from
these experiences into public life in ways that are potentially transformative. Their
vocabularies of caretaking are important sources of correctives to the disdain for
dependency and the indifference to social bonds that characterize much of our
political speech.
Id. at 174.
CHILDREN AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
1. THE NEW SYSTEM WOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THESE PROBLEMS
OCCUR IN CONTEXT AND NEED TO BE
TREATED CONTEXTUALLY
Families and children live within a context within the larger soci-
ety.236 Members relate to each other within this context.237 To work
effectively with families, the system must also be able to deal with their
contexts, and must avoid pigeon-holing, stereotyping, boilerplating, and
snapshotting. People's stories must be heard, 23 8 and we must meet them
where they are, not where we would like them to be. 2 3 9
Children's needs vary depending upon their age, stage of develop-
ment, prior experiences, personal coping capabilities, support systems,
and other factors. We cannot continue to act as if all children are the
same and have the same requirements. An understanding of the interde-
pendent nature of relationship and its context, for each particular child,
is essential to serving the best interests of children. 2 0  Furthermore,
children must be allowed to be children and to have their perspective
respected, including their "claims as children to dependence on adults,
as well as parents' claims as parents to nurturing children." 24'
2. THE PROCESS MUST ALLOW FOR A DYNAMIC APPROACH
The process must be flexible to accommodate the changing family
situation, yet careful to provide the child with a sense of security and
stability. As discussed earlier, a court is required to make a finding of
facts which then becomes the "truth" in the case, even though the facts
may not be clear and though there may be at least two plausible realities.
236. See NRC, supra note 57, at 109-39. The developmental, ecological, and transactional
model of etiology examines the individuals, the family, the community, and the macrosystem of
the culture and society in which the abuse/neglect occurs. Id.
237. Brooks, supra note 215, at 4-8.
238. See GILLIGAN, supra note 40, at 19 (arguing that moral problems require a contextual and
narrative mode of thinking, rather than formal and abstract).
239. I particularly appreciate the Hasidic saying which addresses this thought:
If you want to raise a man from mud and filth, do not think it is enough to stay on
top and reach a helping hand down to him. You must go all the way down yourself,
down into mud and filth. Then take hold of him with strong hands and pull him and
yourself out into the light.
MARTIN BUBER, TEN RuNGs: HASIDIC SAYINGS 84-85 (1947).
240. See Federle, Looking for Rights, supra note 150, at 1564-65; see also Barnard & Jensen,
supra note 58, at 62, in which the authors recommend a consultation model for custody
evaluations, which includes extended family, friends, and support networks, in gathering relevant
information which is then presented to the parents and the court. My process more directly
involves the members of this larger context in the problem-solving activity. See also Fitzgerald,
supra note 1, at 105 ("Perhaps our legal touchstone for family disputes should not be the 'child's
best interests,' but some new understanding of 'family interests."').
241. Id. at 22.
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Unlike the judicial process, the proposed model would allow the partici-
pants to "hold" apparently contradictory facts at the same time as part of
the larger, dynamic picture. These facts would not be lost because they
are inconsistent with the preponderance of the evidence.
The family is a living, changing entity. In the process of a child
custody or child protection case, the family changes as do its mem-
bers.242 Relationships which may have been nurturing or supportive in
the past may become less so, and vice versa.243 New circumstances may
arise which require changes in plans. 244 The process must be available
for quick responses and accommodating change.
3. THE SYSTEM MUST INCORPORATE BROAD-BASED PARTICIPATION FOR
FAMILY SUPPORT
The system must include extended family, incorporating cultural
concepts of family. It would also include friends, neighbors, and the
community to whatever extent is helpful to supporting the family.245
We might borrow, from other cultures, helpful notions of the role of
242. See Lawrence S. Kubie, M.D., Provisions for the Care of Children of Divorced Parents:
A New Legal Instrument, 73 YALE L.J. 1197 (1964) (discussing how the needs of children change
as they develop and as new situations arise in their families and environments).
243. See Charlow, supra note 6, at 11 (citation omitted); see also Kenneth J. Rigby, Family
Law: Alternative Dispute Resolution, 44 LA. L. REV. 1725, 1751 (1984) (primary emphasis on
discovering and serving the child's changing needs). Rigby suggests a committee system for
resolving custody disputes. The committee would include various professionals, including a
special "friend" for the child. The committee would engage in discovery and focus on serving the
child's changing needs. Id. at 1750. This is similar to the suggestion made in Gardner, supra note
17.
244. See Bruce A. Boyer, Jurisdictional Conflicts Between Juvenile Courts and Child Welfare
Agencies: The Uneasy Relationship Between Institutional Co-Parents, 54 MD. L. REv. 377, 416-
17 (1995).
245. See Woodhouse, supra note 66. Woodhouse argues that:
Families do not exist in a vacuum, but are embedded in their societies and deserve
support because they are its only source of self renewal. Responsible parenting is
something that we learn to do, in part, from our own parents and, in part, from the
extended families, neighborhoods, religious, and political communities that shaped
our parents' parenting and in which our own parenting is necessarily embedded. All
these communities play an important role in modeling a collective concern for
children and in fostering our capacities to care for our own, as well as for other
people's children. They play a role as well in protecting our children from harm and
in marking out the point at which parents' rights to privacy begin to intrude on the
rights of children and on the compelling interests of the community in the welfare of
all its children.... In order to avoid the high costs to society and the even higher
costs to individual children, our social and political institutions must continue to
play a positive and supportive role in creating family-friendly communities and in
fostering the responsible parenting on which our children's lives depend. Id. at 420-
21.
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community in raising and safeguarding our children.246
Some societies have moved in this direction in helping families to
solve problems. One interesting and useful example is the Family
Group Conference developed in New Zealand for working with Maori
families. In that process, extended family members are given extensive
freedom to solve problems based upon complete disclosure of informa-
tion surrounding the situation. Social workers and lawyers have found
that families can generally rise to the occasion and arrive at solutions
which would not have been available within the traditional governmen-
tal structure.2 47 Authorities in New Zealand soon learned that the pro-
cess was useful for all their clients, not just the Maoris, and its use was
incorporated into law.24 8  A similar problem-solving model, subse-
quently adopted in Australia for dealing with juvenile delinquency
problems, has been imported to the United States. 4 9 Several jurisdic-
tions within the United States have implemented some form of the Fam-
ily Group Conference process.25 °
We must set aside our rigid adherence to concepts of privacy and
individualism in favor of a broader-based duty toward our children,
adopting an "it takes a village" attitude; issues of rights, empowerment,
and capacity need to yield to concerns about communication, connec-
tion, and resources. We might acknowledge that some people, particu-
246. See, e.g., HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE AND OTHER LESSONS
CHILDREN TEACH Us (1996). See also Woodhouse, supra note 66. Woodhouse states that:
I have argued that parental rights should be reconceptualized as flowing from
parents' responsibilities, and that parenthood is not a form of ownership but rather
of stewardship of children. I have suggested a scheme of children's "needs-based
rights," conceptualized not as rights of autonomy but as rights to receive basic
nurture and protection, not only from their parents but also from their communities,
states, and nations.
Id. at 394-95. I echo this sentiment. We must further safeguard our children's needs by ensuring
that the process we use to achieve that end does not injure them.
247. See The New Zealand Papers, supra note 217.
248. See generally CHILDREN, YOUNG PERSONS, AND THEIR FA~mtiEs ACT (1989).
249. See Mark S. Umbreit, Ph.D. & Susan L. Stacey, J.D., Family Group Conferencing Comes
to the U.S.: A Comparison with Victim-Offender Mediation, 47 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 29 (1996); see
also, Judge F.W.M. McElrea, Accountability in the Community: Taking Responsibility for
Offending (May 1995) (paper prepared for the Legal Research Foundation's Conference, Re-
thinking Criminal Justice: a Conference on New Initiatives in Criminal Justice) (on file with
author), which reports on the use of the group conference model for delinquency cases in New
Zealand.
250. Oregon uses various types of decision-making meetings, including the Family Unity
Model, the New Zealand Model (Family Group Conference), the Roseburg Model (Family
Resource Model), and the Mediation Model. See Salem/Woodburn CSD Family Meeting Study
Group, Commonly Asked Questions About Family Decision-Making Meetings (on file with
author). The Family Unity Project, one variation of the family decision-making model, has been
conducting training for social service agencies throughout the United States. Discussion with Jim
Nice, Family Unity Project (Oct. 1996).
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larly the very young, may need to be treated with paternalistic/
maternalistic care and concern.251
This broad-based approach requires a cultural shift-the abandon-
ment of a focus on "rights," with its concomitant concerns about power,
privilege, and rules. It imposes a collective responsibility for children
on family, friends and the community.252 It presents challenges to our
traditional ways of relating to each other and our notion of personal
responsibility. It also challenges us to develop new kinds of support for
those without extended family and for parents afflicted with substance
abuse and/or mental health problems, which prevent them from attend-
ing to their children's needs.
4. THE SYSTEM SHOULD HELP THE FAMILY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS BY
EMPOWERING THE FAMILY MEMBERS AND ENGAGING THEM IN
THE PROCESS WITHOUT STIGMATIZING THEM
Parents involved in the child protection system or in custody dis-
putes find themselves caught in a process where they are forced to
become dependent upon professionals who claim to know more about
their child's needs than they do. For many families who are already
disempowered by poverty or dysfunctional behavior, the adversarial sys-
tem becomes one more disempowering experience. Children, in particu-
lar, are historically and developmentally disempowered, as reflected in
the uneven approach to children's participation and representation in the
disputes which are so central to their welfare. 53 The proposed system
tries, as one of its central principles, to empower the family, including
the children, by having them participate in the problem-solving process,
and allowing them to engage with specially-trained professionals who
have the knowledge, self-awareness, 254 and commitment to deal with all
family members in a respectful and empowering fashion. 5
Those who experience a sense of control over the outcome of their
problem are more likely to feel that the process has been fair.256
251. See Ellmann, supra note 26. Ellmann states that: "[I]t does not at all follow that the
caring lawyer will refrain from paternalistic intervention when she believes that the very
knowledge she has gained from her close engagement with her client demonstrates the need for
action." Id. at 2704.
252. See Woodhouse, supra note 28, at 1841.
253. See Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking Ahead: An Empowerment Perspective on the Rights
of Children, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1585 (1995).
254. Personal biases distort the way we view and work with others. The professionals who
work with clients in best interests cases need to be aware of their own feelings and biases and
"learn how to handle their reactions in a constructive way." MALUCCIO, supra note 57, at 112.
255. See id. at 85-86 (emphasizing the need to shift from focus on family problems to
enhancing family strengths and regarding parents as partners in the helping process).
256. See Poythress, supra note 34, at 361-62. The author describes a dichotomy between
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Accordingly, requiring the family to fully engage in the process, includ-
ing requiring the other participants to listen to what they have to say, 257
should have the additional benefit of the process not merely being fair,
but also being experienced as fair by the parties. This experience of fair
treatment should result in a better chance for future cooperation,258 as
well as secondary benefits of enhancing self-respect.
D. Work Involving the Best Interests of Children Should Be
Considered a Separate Professional Field, Interdisciplinary
in Nature, and Requiring Specialized Training for
All Participating Professionals
To some degree, the social workers, attorneys, mental health pro-
fessionals, and other specialists who spend the majority of their time
working in child protection and/or family custody matters, have become
specialists. 2 9  The next step is for these professionals to become suffi-
ciently educated in the interdisciplinary aspects of their work so they can
function effectively in collaborative problem solving.26°
litigation and alternative dispute resolution models, where traditional litigation is perceived by
parties as the process which gives them most control, while it is not the process which provides
the decision-maker with the most information. In fact, a party has far more control in a process
which engages her and respects her voice. The combined values of shared control and complete
sharing of information are reflected in the proposed process. Id.
257. Trained mediators understand the value of participants being heard. Professionals must
be trained to listen. "A 'listener' recognizes that moral persuasion can best occur only after a
person has been understood." Zwier, supra note 227, at 231 (footnote omitted).
258. See Thomas A. Bishop, Outside the Adversary System: An ADR Overview, FAM. ADVoC.,
Spring 1992, at 16. ("[B]ehavioral scientists and researchers [have found] that couples who
determine their post-divorce judgment rights and obligations are more likely to follow them.").
259. See Haralambie & Glaser, supra note 185, at 74 (footnote omitted). ("Child advocacy,
particularly as it relates to abused children, has emerged as a recognized specialty, with its own
multidisciplinary professional organizations, periodic professional literature, ongoing professional
conferences, and resource centers.").
260. See, e.g., Schepard, supra note 174, at 133. Schepard describes an interdisciplinary
volunteer (Parent Education and Custody Effectiveness) effort by Hofstra University, lawyers, and
mental health professionals, in cooperation with the New York court system, to help divorcing
parents manage conflict for the benefit of their children. Schepard quotes Chief Judge Judith S.
Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals:
Interdisciplinary efforts of this kind .... to my mind, promise us and offer us a
splendid model for addressing the sort of social problems, new societal problems
that are increasingly coming into our courts. Pervasive problems that reach far
beyond simply litigation and deciding an isolated finite dispute between two private
parties.
Id. at 133. Elkin describes the Los Angeles Conciliation Court from its inception as "a unique
and pioneering interdisciplinary approach on the part of the law and the behavioral sciences to the
contemporary social problem of family breakdown." Meyer Elkin, Conciliation Courts: The
Reintegration of Disintegrating Families, FAM. COORDINATOR, Jan. 1973, at 63.
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1. ATTORNEYS AND JUDGES WHO WORK IN THESE AREAS
SHOULD HAVE DUAL DEGREES FOCUSING ON CHILDREN
AND FAMILIES
While the value of experience and a smattering of special courses
goes some way in helping attorneys and judges deal with cases regard-
ing the best interests of children, they are not enough. Perhaps it is
reflective of the professional arrogance discussed above that leads us to
think we can ply our trade in any subject, and upon any subject (e.g.,
child and family) without specialized training. To be effective advo-
cates, lawyers must have more than a superficial understanding of the
many dynamics which underlie these family issues.26 Requiring a grad-
uate degree in an area such as child development, social work, counsel-
ing, or family studies, would go a long way toward achieving the goal of
a well-trained professional.
Judges should be selected from among these dually-trained profes-
sionals. The awful unpreparedness of the judiciary to handle these most
difficult cases has been discussed time and again. 62 I have been amazed
and dismayed to observe the reluctance of the bench to move toward a
specialized system, be required to receive training from other profes-
sionals, or to self-impose in an institutionalized way their own
261. One of the major benefits of requiring that children's attorneys be specially trained
is that attorneys will have particular competence to fulfill advocacy roles which are
somewhat different than those ordinarily performed by attorneys for adult clients.
They will have more knowledge to make objectively child-oriented decisions in
cases of 'impaired' children.
Id. at 75. The removal of the adversarial process under my proposal does not diminish, but rather
increases the need for specialized training for advocates. See Dennis P. Ichikawa, An Argument
on Behalf of Children, 2 CHILD MALTREATMENT 202, 209 (1997) (mandatory training, including
sociopsychological issues, should be a prerequisite to allowing attorneys to represent children).
262. See Mlyniec, supra note 73, at 1906-07 (footnote omitted) ("If statutes or court rules
required judges to develop some expertise about children before they begin to decide cases, then
the decision making in [these] types of cases might occur differently. Serious initial and in-
service training should be required of all judges assigned to hear children's cases."); see also
Christopher Allan Jeffreys, Note, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in Child Custody
Resolution, 15 HOFSTRA L. REv. 115 (1986) (discussing a "special judge" model in which "a
behavioral psychologist judge would be appointed to hear custody cases with a legal judge in
order to promote the psychological best interests of the child, and to compensate for the legal
judge's inadequate psychological training"). Id. at 127 (footnote omitted). Jeffreys also discusses
what he believes to be due process problems when delegating decision-making in such a system,
and talks about another "behavioral panel" model which:
calls for child custody disputes to be resolved by panels dominated by trained
behavioral specialists. These panels would be comprised of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and members of the bar who have specialized in family law.
Determinations made by this panel would be binding on a court and subject to
limited review.
Id. at 128 (footnotes omitted).
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training.263
2. ALL PROFESSIONALS ENGAGED IN THIS WORK SHOULD HAVE
INTERDISCIPLINARY TRAINING WHICH INCLUDES TRAINING
IN EFFECTIVE COLLABORATION
Many authors have noted the dire need for interdisciplinary training
for judges, attorneys, social workers, and mental health professionals. 26"
This need was recognized by the federal government in 1988, when the
National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect ("NCCAN") awarded
grants for interdisciplinary training in academic institutions to prepare
graduate students for work in this area. The similarity of issues arising
in family custody cases warrants the same training requirements for pro-
fessionals working in family courts.
The knowledge required by participating professionals covers a
263. I would acknowledge the efforts of some San Diego judges who have put great time,
energy, and thought into creating a training program for juvenile dependency judges.
264. See Herring, supra note 76, at 922-23; Ratterman, supra note 82, at 21-22. Herring
asserts that:
The importance of this interdisciplinary training cannot be overemphasized.
The agency attorney must have a background in child welfare to be able to provide
the counseling, support, and zealous advocacy required by the private model of legal
representation. The attorney must speak the language of the social worker and must
have the knowledge required to assist in developing and assessing the social
worker's case plan. The attorney must know what services are effective and
available in the particular community to help reunify a dysfunctional family. Only
with this knowledge can the attorney identify cases where the social worker should
currently be reaching a permanency decision, and then help her or him to make a
timely decision.
This interdisciplinary training is necessary even to understand child abuse and
neglect legislation .... To fully understand and implement this law in individual
cases, the agency attorney must know why it is important for children to have a
permanent home and when they need such a home. The attorney also must be aware
of the damage that can be done to children by disrupting their previously permanent
parental home, even if that home presents some risk to a child.
Training is also essential for the agency attorney to participate effectively in
periodic social worker case conferences, which may include professionals from
other relevant disciplines such as psychiatry, psychology, and medicine. The
attorney must be able to operate beyond the role of a legal mechanic to get the social
workers and other professionals to come to concrete case plan recommendations and
to address permanency planning issues from the very beginning of the case. The
training enables the agency attorney to realize that attendance and full participation
at social work and multidisciplinary case conferences are vital.
Id. For excellent discussions of the need for interdisciplinary training and collaboration in child
welfare work, see Lynn M. Akre, Struggling With Indeterminacy: A Call for Interdisciplinary
Collaboration in Redefining the "Best Interest of the Child" Standard, 75 MARQ. L. REv. 628
(1992); George J. Alexander, Big Mother: The State's Use of Mental Health Experts in Depen-
dency Cases, 24 PAC. L.J. 1465 (1993); Cervone & Mauro, supra note 25; and Marian D. Hall,
The Role of Psychologists as Experts in Cases Involving Allegations of Sexual Abuse, 23 FAM.
L.Q. 451 (1989).
1997]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
broad spectrum. It includes human behavior, intervention methods, fam-
ily dynamics, child development, substance abuse and mental health
issues, an understanding of the legal requirements for intervention and
the process by which legal decisions are made,265 and effective collabo-
ration skills.2 66
Some fear that this broad training would blur the distinctions
between the professionals' roles and create the danger of overstepping
professional boundaries.2 67 These concerns, rather than serving to block
the needed training, should be addressed as part of the training. We
have found in our own interdisciplinary training course that explicit dis-
cussion of professional roles must be accompanied by an examination of
the specialized training, both didactic and practicum, of each profession.
Law students have been very impressed by the number of clinical hours
required of social work and psychology graduate students, particularly
when compared to the minimal practicum training (often not required)
provided in law school. Knowing the rigorous training that the other
professionals have undergone, including a basic understanding of what
that training consists of and what kinds of tasks the other professionals
are specifically trained to perform, helps clarify roles. It also lays a
foundation for mutual respect and collaboration which does not now
exist. In turn, the hierarchical structure in child welfare and family law
cases can be broken down, creating further opportunities for effective
collaborative work and positive morale for participants.
Other areas which need to be included in interdisciplinary training
for professionals are sensitivity to race, class, gender, and cultural
261issues. Schools of social work are generally quite aware of this need
and include these topics in the required curriculum. Mental health pro-
fessionals may or may not be trained to the extent required for this work.
Certainly lawyers and judges are not.
265. See MALuccio, supra note 57, at 224. See generally CHILDREN CAN'T WAIT, supra note
71.
266. See MALuccio, supra note 57, at 207. ("Collaboration among different organizations,
disciplines, and persons is highly regarded in the human services field, since it is a means of
utilizing community resources efficiently and meeting client needs effectively.").
267. See Boyer, supra note 244. Boyer states that:
The effectiveness of participation by persons of different disciplines in the child
placement process depends on their learning from one another. A workable child
placement process will provide for a conscious, restrained, open and reviewable use
by professional participants of knowledge acquired from a discipline not their own.
The art of collaboration grows out of a recognition that borders do exist, even if they
cannot always be sharply defined, and that under certain circumstances they may be
crossed.
Id. at 410 (citing GOLDSTEIN ET AL., IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 54 (1986)).
268. See, e.g., Cervone & Mauro, supra note 25, at 1982-83.
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E. Teamwork and Consensus Building Should Be Emphasized
Collaborative problem solving requires teamwork and consensus-
building skills.269 As mentioned above, mutual respect is one require-
ment for effective teamwork; but, an ability to communicate between
disciplines is also essential. The failure to recognize that members of a
profession share a common language which is foreign to outsiders gives
rise to misunderstandings and creates barriers to serving children and
families. Interdisciplinary training is vital to achieving effective com-
munication, allowing for dialogue and power sharing, diminishing hier-
archical barriers to teamwork. 270
A team is not effective if its members merely divide up the family
issues according to discipline. True effectiveness comes from an inter-
action which produces a cumulative result-the work of the whole
should be greater than the sum of its parts. For this to happen, profes-
sionals must feel confident enough in the underlying subject areas to
question each other and require explanations for opinions, decisions, and
actions which may not be obvious to them. Only in an atmosphere of
mutual respect can this occur.271  The existing hierarchical nature of
practice prevents such collaboration. Instead, professionals defer to
each other, with physicians receiving greatest deference, and social
workers the least. Qualified professionals fail to challenge one another
for fear of looking stupid (asking the "stupid" question), and avoidable
mistakes are made. When professionals do challenge each other, they
often do so in an adversarial manner that arouses defensive behavior and
further inhibits teamwork.
At the same time, training must be provided to guard against the
dangers of "group think" 272 and sequentiality, or "tracking," which
would be even more dangerous in this setting than in the traditional
adversary system. As guardians of the process, lawyers in particular
need to be trained to look out for these behaviors and to work with
others in ensuring their recognition and avoidance.
Confidentiality issues will need to be reconceptualized in this work
269. See, e.g., MALuccio, supra note 57, at 213 ("collaboration is enhanced as service
providers adopt a team approach, . . . pooling their resources and expertise to help a particular
child or family."); Cahn & Johnson, supra note 71, at 138-39 (asserting that interagency
collaboration holds great promise for improved outcomes for children).
270. See Myers, supra note 8, at 260 (arguing that attorneys must share power with mental
health professionals).
271. See Cervone & Mauro, supra note 25, at 1987.
272. "Group think" has been defined as "a mode of thinking that people engage in when they
are deeply involved in a cohesive group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their
motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action." BRmm & KAssmn, supra note
210, at 505-06.
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to be consistent with the new paradigm of nonadversarial problem solv-
ing. Information must be shared among the members of the problem-
solving team, which most likely will include professionals, as well as lay
people. The notion of child protection teams273 can be a starting point
for this work, but the most significant change will be in the attitudes of
responsibility and care imbued in all discussions.
F. The Court and Its Role
Our notions of what a court looks like and does must be adapted to
accommodate the needs of families and children. As discussed earlier,
"judges" would have specialized training for dealing with the issues
raised in child protection and family law matters concerning the best
interests of children. They should be specifically selected, based upon
their experience and training, as well as their expressed commitment to
this area of the law. The appointments should be permanent rather than
rotated.274 Multidisciplinary panels of judges also would be appropriate
(although not as essential as having judges with appropriate training), as
well as a consultant panel of specialists to assist with particular
concerns.
Because there are narrow, but significant, legal issues involved in
best interests cases, the court's role must be clearly defined and under-
stood. The place of the law in the overall process must not be allowed to
determine the tenor of the process as is now the case. Thus, the court
must be seen as the safeguard of process, but must also reinforce the
family-centered, problem-solving approach in its rulings.275 The court
must set the tone for the rest of the system-a fair process that includes
sharing information and empowering participants. The court should be
involved only where the problem cannot be resolved by less formal
processes.276 Even then, the court process must not take on an adver-
sarial tone, but rather one of expressing its affirmation or concern with
what has occurred and keeping the process in motion. The court, itself,
273. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 18961.5, 18965 (West Supp. 1997) (allowing
members of multidisciplinary teams to cross confidentiality boundaries when working together
toward a best interests result for a child). In practice, however, confidentiality and liability
concerns about sharing information prevent free-flowing collaboration.
274. See HARDIN, supra note 79 (suggesting minimum 10-year commitment for presiding
judge of juvenile court).
275. See Gary A. Weissman & Christine M. Leick, Mediation and Other Creative Alternatives
to Litigating Family Law Issues, 61 N.D.L. REV. 263, 266 (1985) (quoting Chief Justice Warren
Burger) ("[C]ourts should resolve only what can't be resolved in some other way.... [W]e must
consider whether the court system is the best way to resolve many of the matters now handled in
the adversary system.").
276. But see Elkin, supra note 260, at 66 (arguing that court authority is important for
providing external structure, particularly important for people in crisis).
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might be in the form of an administrative law court, or in some other
way. different from the traditional adversarial arrangement expected in a
court of law. The specialized training of the judges and other profes-
sionals participating in the process would provide a principled basis for
eliminating most "rights" to appeal. Whatever appellate review is pro-
vided should also be done by a specialized panel and within extremely
expedited time limits. All challenges would be reviewed using the abuse
of discretion standard.
While some have been concerned about the potential for agency
abuse in a legal process where the court defers to agency judgment,277
the proposed process would not incorporate such deference. Agency
judgment may be appropriate in a situation where the agency can be said
to have superior expertise in the area. Under this proposal, however, all
professionals are specially trained in the field and may legitimately raise
concerns. Further, family participants have a significant role in deter-
mining the right steps for them in correcting the situation. For this rea-
son, disputes about the plans for the family should be handled by a
group process and, where facilitation may be required, something like
mediation. Only disputes about the process itself should go to the court.
Such hearings would not require trials in the traditional sense, but only
reports of the process to date and the expression of concerns regarding
that process.278 Due process does not require a trial de novo. So as long
as the group process operates fairly, providing notice and an opportunity
to be heard to the parties, due process is met. The court, with its exper-
tise as required above, should be able to decide the matter without a fact-
finding hearing, unless the process employed by the group in delineating
its concerns is itself in dispute.
At first glance, it might seem that one role for the court would be to
decide upon disputed facts. Fact-finding, a term best suited for a court,
or court-like, hearing, will occur in a different way in this process.
Because the process will be dynamic and will revolve around family
conferences where all information will be shared, one clear set of indis-
putable facts may not be produced. Rather, the entire array of facts,
consistent and inconsistent, will be examined by the participants to
277. See, e.g., Boyer, supra note 244, at 401-02.
278. It is conceivable that one process question might be whether a participant was adequately
"represented" by his or her advocate in the proceeding. Notions of traditional advocacy can be
expected to contaminate the process until a new tradition has been established. Some alternative
process, perhaps something like an ombudsman, should be created to examine these concerns.
Advocacy in this system does not mean that the lawyer will argue for what the client wants; it
does mean that the lawyer will ensure that the client's voice is heard and that the client has a fair
"hearing" (using the term "hearing" here, in both a literal and a loose sense, as the process calls
for family members to truly be heard, but in meetings or conferences rather than formal hearings).
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determine what the next steps should be to help the children and their
families. While a particular decision will necessarily be supported by
some of the facts but not others, it could be said that certain facts are not
"found," in the legal sense, but rather provide the basis for concern and
action. Reliance upon such facts does not eliminate the inconsistent
information from the group awareness or preclude it from future consid-
eration; it merely represents a considered decision about what should be
done now in light of current information.27 9 One significant advantage
of the proposed process is its ability to allow inconsistent and contradic-
tory information to be "held" by the group throughout the process. As
discussed earlier, the law's need for categorization and finality in deci-
sion-making forces decisions to be made even when the information
presented is not complete. Rather than discard information which does
not conform to an initial course of action, the group would be able to
return to that information as the context and dynamics of the situation
unfold. This does not mean that patently untrue information will con-
tinue to be raised, but that where evidence does not clearly favor either
side, such evidence will continue to be considered where appropriate as
further decisions are made. As long as the group decision can be sup-
ported by the information available, the existence of contradictory infor-
mation does not threaten group action which is not arbitrary or
capricious. The only question for the court is whether the process used
by the group in arriving at its decisions was fair-that is, whether the
participants were allowed to voice their concerns and present relevant
information, and whether the group's narrative explanation of its action
demonstrates appropriate exercise of discretion. zS
279. The process should require the group to document the considerations used in reaching its
"decisions." This narrative, rather than having to support group actions by omitting contradictory
evidence or making the supporting evidence appear more certain than it is, would include the real
dialogue and uncertainties of the case and the reasons why the plan of action was selected. This
kind of decision-making reflects reality rather than the imaginary black and white world of the
law. It also lends itself to flexibility as matters develop. Further, it does not have the danger of
being misused for related criminal proceedings.
280. The standard of review proposed here, arbitrary and capricious, is similar to reviews used
for other administrative decisions. Assumedly, one of the advocates would bring the matter to the
attention of the court if that advocate was unable to persuade the group of the need to reexamine
its decision.
If resort to the juvenile court follows the full treatment of the issue in an
administrative proceeding, where all parties have had notice and an opportunity to
be heard in a setting affording due process protections, then the court has the benefit
of a fully developed record to explain and support the agency's conclusions.
Boyer, supra note 244, at 420.
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G. Role of Attorneys
1. PROTECTORS OF PROCESS
While attorneys may not be experts in determining the capacity of
children or what is in a child's best interests, they are specially trained to
attend to process, particularly, to ensuring that process is fair.28 1 In the
proposed system, lawyers would be available to all parties and appointed
where necessary to ensure fairness. This would include the appointment
of attorneys for all children.282
The attorneys' first job would be to set a tone of "care" for the
process. Because people are so accustomed to lawyers playing the
adversarial role and to courts being the arena where the win/lose game is
played, attorneys will need to educate their clients about the nature of
this system with its emphasis on problem solving and assisting families
and children. Clients will need to learn that their attorneys will not con-
ceal damaging information on their behalf or assist them in making an
argument that is clearly contrary to the best interests of the child.283
Rather, the attorney will counsel the client to engage in the process and
28 1. See Richard Wasserstrom, Roles and Morality, in TiH GOOD LAWYER 25, supra note 39,
where he discusses the appropriateness of reexamining the lawyer's role:
I think that the way in which most roles operate to restrict moral reasoning could be
altered so as to make them less restrictive without impairing greatly the systems and
the systemic justifications within which they are embedded and vindicated. Just as
we can ask whether it is right that a certain role exist at all, so we can also ask
whether it is right that the role continue to exist in its present form.
... The precise dimensions and specific features of the lawyer's role that are
truly justifiable seem to me to be uncertain, even if there is a persuasive argument of
some sort for some kind of role to structure the kind of moral deliberation that is to
occur within it.
Id. at 36.
282. Some thought needs to be given to whether separate law offices should specialize in
representing parents and children. While this separation and "specialization" appears to have
some logic, or at least convenience, identifying a group of attorneys as "parents"' attorneys or
"children's" attorneys may concretize positions and encourage adversarial behavior. The
interdisciplinary training called for in this proposal should make each attorney qualified to
represent both parents and children. One attorney who has represented both expressed her
concern to me that attorneys who work in an office representing only parents or only children lose
perspective about their roles.
283. See Zacharias, supra note 39. Zacharias states that:
Absolute confidentiality can enhance lawyer client relations. It often makes the
client feel as if the lawyer is a true fiduciary, with loyalty to no one other than the
client. It also avoids the unseemly situation in which a lawyer induces the client to
be open and then informs on the client.
But these considerations alone do not justify the strictest of rules. ...
Arguably, client distrust will increase if the lawyer insists that she will always act in
accord with the client's wishes. So long as the attorney informs the client at the
outset of the relationship that she may feel compelled to disclose particular types of
information, subsequent disclosures are not unseemly. The client may more readily
accept her as an ally within the defined boundaries, both because the lawyer has
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take whatever steps may be necessary to put the family into a workable
situation. Of course, the client will not be prevented from speaking up
on her own behalf where she disagrees with her lawyer's advice.284 In
some situations, attorneys would participate in group meetings with their
clients and ensure that the client's voice is being heard. Preferably, this
would occur by empowering the client to speak for herself. Where the
client is unable to do so, the lawyer can express the client's concerns.285
The role of counsel who represent the children is simplified in this
process, since the elimination of the adversarial system also removes
issues of competency, capacity and role conflict.286 In this process, all
information is to be brought to the table. If a child has something to say,
the child can say it and the group can evaluate for itself what kind of
weight to give to the child's wishes. 2 7  The lawyer will not be in the
position to hide information which may be critical to the group in help-
ing to resolve the family's problems. The child will have a voice in the
exhibited integrity and because the limitations on the alliance make the total
package more believable.
Id. at 367-68 (footnote omitted). Cf. LANDSMAN, supra note 10. Landsman states that:
It has frequently been suggested that the attorney can serve his client and, at the
same time, ensure that the truth is disclosed. This position fails to preserve attorney
zeal and loyalty because it requires the attorney to act as an agent of the court
whenever there is a potential conflict between his client's interests and the pursuit of
material information. The likely results of casting the attorney in this impossible
situation are unethical conduct if the lawyer chooses to act on behalf of his client in
a doubtful case and substantial discouragement of client candor, cooperation, and
trust if the lawyer chooses to act on behalf of the court.
Id. at 38-39.
284. Ensuring the client's active participation in the process, rather than mere representation by
an attorney, mitigates the danger of inappropriate attorney influence on the client. See Boyer,
supra note 29, at 1650 (cautioning that clients "handicapped by a dependence born of economic
and social powerlessness and ignorance of judicial systems" are particularly subject to influence
from attorneys). It also eliminates the ambiguity and arbitrariness of a system which would allow
attorneys to follow their own moral instincts. See Zacharias, supra note 39, at 361.
285. As discussed earlier, there is some debate about the role a child should have in these
proceedings. This debate might be somewhat quieted by a transformation of the process from an
adversarial one, to a collaborative, problem-solving approach. See, e.g., Martin Guggenheim, A
Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel for Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1399 (1996).
Nevertheless, there will probably be times when, because of the child's developmental needs, it
would be inappropriate for the child to participate in group meetings.
286. This process would not necessarily be inconsistent with the empowerment focus
suggested by Katherine Hunt Federle, supra note 39, in that it does away with considerations of
capacity and the potential for the child's voice to go unheard. The "coherent account of rights"
called for by Federle, is probably far different from what I am suggesting, but not necessarily
contradictory. Id. at 169. The child's "rights" to be safe and cared for are the focus of my
proposal. However, by taking the process out of the adversarial system, the discussion is focused
not on rights, but on the needs of the child and family.
287. Of course, the situation must be made safe for the child to speak. An underlying rule of
the Family Group Conference is that the situation be safe for all participants. Interview with Jim
Nice, Family Unity Project (Oct. 1996).
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process, and not be dependent upon the lawyer's determination of the
child's capacities. There will be other professionals participating in the
process who will be better trained at assessing the child's maturity and
needs. Thus, the child's voice will be considered in the context of the
child's developmental issues. The child's lawyer would be responsible
for ensuring that the child's voice and needs were being considered in
the discussion.2"' In this way, the role combines aspects of the guardian
ad litem and the advocate. The attorney would be free, as a part of the
team, to see the whole child, not just to hear the child's words. The
team, including the attorney, would respect the child's views and values,
but would not necessarily be compelled to abide by them if they do not
believe them to be in the child's best interests.289
Another important process issue, and one usually harmed, rather
than protected, by attorneys, is the need to keep the case active and
moving, rather than stagnant or drifting.290 Delays could be avoided by
advocating for the timely and effective provision of services to the par-
ties. Further, since the lawyers are not involved in the adversarial pro-
cess, delays for strategic purposes would be unnecessary. Rather, if an
attorney believes that the client needs more time to achieve one of the
family's goals, this issue can be discussed in the group and a decision
can be made based upon all relevant information. At all times, the group
would consider the child's need for timely resolution,291 balanced
against the desirability of maintaining important family connections.
Advocating for and achieving meaningful visitation, discussed supra,
would mitigate some of the difficulties of temporary separation.
2. INFORMATION GATHERING AND ASSESSMENT
While lawyers would not be the primary investigators in these
288. This role is consistent with the role suggested by Jean Koh Peters and includes helping to
create other support mechanisms for the child. See Peters, supra note 43.
289. See Roy T. Stuckey, Guardians Ad Litem as Surrogate Parents: Implications for Role
Definition and Confidentiality, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1795 (1996) (favoring guardian ad
litem role by opining that it is the guardian who is to act in loco parentis, not the judge).
290. See, e.g., Kelly & Ramsey, supra note 67, at 407, 447 (describing a study on the use of
attorneys as guardians ad litem in North Carolina). The authors state:
Regrettably, the North Carolina study found that for the most part attorneys for
children were not only ineffective [measured by the ability of the child's attorney to
prevent removal of the child from the home and to facilitate the child's return to the
home] but even tended to substantially delay a child's return home. An encouraging
finding, however, was that those attorneys who spent more hours on their cases did
expedite return.
Id. at 407. The longer the case was in the court system, the less likely the child was to be returned
to her parents. Id. at 444.
291. See, e.g., Peters, supra note 43, at 1554 (stating that the lawyer must strive to see options
from the child's perspective).
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cases, their training in critically assessing information and their ability to
attach more than one inference to a fact is essential to fairness in these
matters.292 As discussed earlier, the effects of the sequentiality, or
"tracking" dynamic can be disastrous for a family. The lawyer's train-
ing in the role of devil's advocate can be very useful in ensuring that the
group continues to look at all information presented to it in an objective
manner. Though the attorney would not necessarily "press" for a partic-
ular inference or interpretation, the job is to ensure that all plausible
inferences are considered.293
Because of their focus on process, another important role for law-
yers is to protect against the misuse of information. Although the pro-
cess is informal and "hearsay" evidence might be discussed, attorneys
can remind the group of the importance of not over relying on informa-
tion which may not be reliable or trustworthy. Attorneys can also elicit
important information, through their critical thinking training, in the
questioning of experts. Additionally, attorneys can monitor for biases
among the professional participants or within the system.
Attorneys would not, however, be agents of deception or ruse. The
process proposed calls for complete disclosure of information with the
goal of achieving the best possible result for the child and family. Old
notions of the zealous advocate as synonymous with the hired gun have
no place in protecting the best interests of children. When counseling
one's client does not succeed in eliciting the kind of forthcoming discus-
sion of pertinent information required, the attorney herself must provide
to the group whatever information is known that should be considered in
solving the problem.294
292. The need for professionals to rely on facts, rather than merely impressions, is fundamental
to fair process and is a role lawyers are well trained to handle. Cf. CHILD WELFARE: CURRENT
DILEMMAS, FUTURE DIRECTIONS (Brenda G. McGowan & William Meezan eds., 1983) (discussing
the need for increased formality in juvenile court proceedings as part of the need to rely upon
facts).
293. See David R. Mandel et al., Should This Child Be Removed from Home? Hypothesis
Generation and Information Seeking as Predictors of Case Decisions, 18 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 1051 (1994).
294. See Schwartz, supra note 39. Schwartz states that:
Those rules [rules which might achieve "the correct result"] would require a lawyer
to report to the court and opposing counsel the existence of relevant evidence or
witnesses the lawyer does not intend to offer; prevent or, when prevention has
proved unsuccessful, report to the court and opposing counsel the making of any
untrue statement by client or witness or any material omissions; and question
witnesses with purpose and design to elicit the whole truth.
Id. at 159. Schwartz's suggestions may appear to some to be outrageous in the context of adver-
sarial litigation. The process proposed in this article occurs, for the most part, outside of the court.
Those who cannot envision the role of the lawyer as an advocate apart from the traditional adver-
sarial process will probably be equally outraged by the suggestion in this context.
[Vol. 52:79
CHILDREN AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
3. ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN THE PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS
The attorneys, as guardians of process, would ensure that their cli-
ents are being heard, are counseled, 295 and are treated fairly. As dis-
cussed above, the law's emphasis on fair process warrants this special
role for lawyers. System abuses, which gave rise to legal interventions
and case law setting forth due process requirements, usually arose in the
absence of counsel for the parties. While appointing counsel may
appear to be an expensive reaction to history's lessons, it does seem to
be the only guarantee that bureaucratic forces will not overcome best
intentions. If the proposed process works as a problem-solving and col-
296laborative system, empowering families and reducing adversarialness
between parties, the result may be that problems are handled more effi-
ciently and rapidly, reducing the time that any family requires the atten-
tion of the system and compensating for the resource costs at the front
end. While each professional brings a particular set of skills to the table,
the group works together, collaborating toward solving the concerns
which brought the family into the system.297
Perhaps the greatest service the lawyer can provide is to be an
advocate. Being an advocate is not synonymous with being an adver-
sary. In a family system, there are family members, not adversaries.
The advocate in this process works with the client to make the system
work as designed. Since this system is not designed to be adversarial,
the attorney must not take on an adversarial role. Rather, the attorney
will do the counseling, encouraging, etc., as mentioned above, and will
actively participate in the process to ensure that the client is receiving
the services necessary to resolve the problem. In the child protection
Kutak, supra note 40, discusses the uneasy balance between the need for confidentiality and
public/moral concerns:
In a collective society where, at least in theory, the greater good is achieved by
cooperative endeavor in pursuit of the common interest, a rule of full disclosure
would logically prevail.
... Full disclosure leads to the discernment of truth; knowledge of truth per-
mits justice to be done; and doing justice advances the common good.
Id. at 173. I would argue that the best interest of children is in the common interest, requiring full
disclosure.
295. See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 11, at 1494 (stating that the lawyer's job is to enhance the
competence of his client).
296. See Cervone & Mauro, supra note 25, at 1987 ("The representation of children is, or
should be, an enterprise of collaboration.").
297. See Margulies, supra note 11. Margulies states that:
The better, more contextual approach to dealing with the problems of attorney
arrogance identified by the restrictive view [of attorneys' roles] is to allow the
lawyer to play a range of roles, including fact finder, mediator, and advocate, while
offering both training and some substantive guidance to reduce the effect of
invidious biases on the advocate.
Id. at 1501.
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system, this means that the client is receiving counseling, substance
abuse treatment, parenting courses, assistance with housing, or whatever
other services the client needs, in a timely and appropriate fashion.2 98 It
also means that the attorney is advocating for meaningful visitation
between the parent and child. These service issues are the most impor-
tant aspect of child protection cases which are on a reunification
track. 99 Failure to provide the services results in heartbreaking delays
in reunification, and sometimes in termination of parental rights,
because of loss of the parent-child bond. There is little else more impor-
tant that an attorney can do than to advocate for these services.
In the family custody context, few jurisdictions provide services to
families. The unfortunate result is that many children are deprived of a
meaningful relationship with one parent because services are not avail-
able or affordable. As part of this recommendation, services would be
available to all families participating in the system, whether there is a
child protection issue or not. The building of strong family connections
is well worth the investment, as numerous studies have demonstrated
that children raised in single-parent homes suffer great disadvantages,
including a higher risk for delinquent behavior."° While the services
may not result in an "intact" family, as it is traditionally viewed, they
might result in a connected, but newly arranged, family which can still
work together for the best interests of the children.
H. Changes Which Must Occur
A shift in paradigm and in its concrete implementation will require
a number of changes at all levels of participation. Societal commitment
to the best interests of children will have to be demonstrated, particularly
in the area of resources. Traditional legal and bureaucratic systems will
have to let go of old, ineffective ways of doing business. Professionals
will be required to commit themselves to appropriate training in both
substance and collaborative processes, and parents will have to give up
self-interest based expectations in favor of looking at the needs of their
children.
298. See Boyer, supra note 244, at 384 n. 18. ("[L]itigation has proliferated charging agencies
nationwide with a failure to provide minimal services for children and families enmeshed in the
child welfare system."). Attorneys, as protectors of process, can help the system avoid mistakes
which delay the case. See Herring, supra note 76.
299. See, e.g., Herring, supra note 108, at 200-01.
300. See, e.g., PARENTING OUR CHILDREN, supra note 1; NRC, supra note 57, at 225; TOWER,
supra note 141, at 78, 104-5, 126; Kathleen M. Heide, Why Kids Keep Killing: The Correlates,
Causes and Challenges of Juvenile Homicide, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 43 (1996); Hattie
Ruttenberg, The Limited Promise of Public Health Methodologies to Prevent Youth Violence, 103
YALE L.J. 1885, 1900 (1994); Linda J. Waite, Social Science Finds: 'Marriage Matters,'
RESPONSIVE COMMUNrrY, Summer 1996, at 26.
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1. RESOURCES MUST BE PROVIDED_
The system must be supported by resources for solving the
problems which arise in consideration of the best interests of children.
Professionals who work in these areas must be acknowledged and com-
pensated for their expertise. In other words, society must put its money
where its mouth is in regard to our concern about children and fami-
lies.3° ' We need to address poverty as an underlying cause of family
problems.3 °2 Home visiting from birth should become routine. Family
centers need to be created in communities so that parents and children
can receive services on a voluntary basis without stigma. These centers
would provide places for parent-child interaction, parenting classes, res-
pite care, counseling, and other support.
Families involved in custody disputes should be eligible for such
services, as well. Counseling, education, and support services are sorely
needed by parents and children in times of conflict. 303 The arbitrary
distinction between which families receive help and which do not is
foolish when examined according to the needs of children and the needs
of society for healthy, functioning families and future adult citizens.
Preventive measures which might strengthen families must be
301. See Myers, supra note 8. Myers states that:
While the positive aspects of the legal response to abuse are important, the negative
consequences of increased reliance on prosecution and the adversarial process often
outweigh the benefits. The belief that the legal system can cope with child abuse is
unfounded because reliance on the law ignores the deep social and psychological
roots of abuse. The legal system has an important role to play, but the ultimate
solution lies in a greater understanding of human behavior, a genuine societal
commitment to programs aimed at prevention, education and economic equality,
and a humane and therapeutically oriented approach to deviant behavior. The law is
a blunt and punitive instrument, ill-suited to the achievement of such far-reaching
social reorganization.
Id. at 179 (footnotes omitted).
302. See Federle, supra note 253, at 1603; Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking:
In Search of the Least Drastic Alternative, 75 GEo. L.J. 1745, 1828 (1987) ("[O]nly when there is
a national commitment to provide families with sufficient resources to ensure adequate child care
can the least drastic alternative for needy children truly be achieved."); Myers, supra note 8, at
179 n.103 (stating that a therapeutic approach deals with the "stark relationship between poverty
and maltreatment").
303. See WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 19, at 317. This need has been acknowledged in
Oregon which created its Task Force on Family Law, charged with creating "a non-adversarial
system for families undergoing divorce that provides the families with an opportunity to access
appropriate services for the transition period." OREGON STATUS REPORT, supra note 78, at 1. The
Vision created by the Task Force is:
Oregon families involved in divorce or related family conflicts are served by a
comprehensive family law system that provides non-adversarial dispute resolution,
counseling, education and related legal services. This system is staffed by highly
skilled practitioners who acknowledge the importance of the family, understand
family law, and strive to serve the best interests of all family members.
Id. at 4.
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included as resource needs. A Task Force in Oregon issued a report
listing a number of suggestions in this regard, including school curricula
(conflict resolution, relationship management and family life skills), pre-
marital education, family resource centers, and conflict management
services. 30
2. A SEPARATE CODE OF ETHICS FOR PROFESSIONALS PRACTICING IN
THIS FIELD
This is probably the most controversial aspect of this proposal,
though it is not necessarily a new idea.3 °5 It requires professionals to
share information and to consider the goal of their representation in a
different manner.30 6 Competition and strategy would have no place in
this process. Loyalty to children and families, rather than to a particular
client, represents a huge deviation from the current ethics practice which
leads us to absurd conclusions regarding the duties of advocates for chil-
dren and parents. Attorneys practicing in best interests cases could not
be held to the same standard of client loyalty, as it has been defined,
while practicing within the proposed system.3°7 I would discard the
304. See OREGON STATUS REPORT, supra note 78.
305. See, e.g., Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 63 (1980) (calling for a new code of ethics requiring lawyers to take personal responsibility
for their actions); see also Aronson, supra note 49, at 148-49 (discussing the need for different
rules of conduct for family law practitioners and citing the American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers' Bounds of Advocacy standards).
306. All of the professionals involved in these cases have duties of confidentiality to their
clients. Changes must be made in ethical standards to allow collaborative work for the welfare of
children and families.
307. See, e.g., Ellmann, supra note 26:
[T]he ethic of care appears to authorize a significantly greater degree of intervention
in client decisions than do the existing codes of ethics. Admittedly, the Code and
the Rules do not offer a clear statement of the proper constraints on the manner and
intensity with which lawyers should render this advice. Instead, they contain
tantalizing hints: that the lawyer may press her point rather than merely stating it,
that under some circumstances she may temporarily withhold relevant information
to forestall what she deems an unwise reaction on her client's part, and that the
lawyer-client relationship can become more a joint venture than a principal-agent
relationship. Perhaps these add up to a suggestion that lawyers are authorized to
design their counseling so as to make distinct inroads into client autonomy, even in
the framework of the existing rules of ethics.
Id. at 2709-10 (footnotes omitted). Ellmann concludes that the above described behavior may be
permitted within the existing codes and rules, but is inconsistent with the "ethos of autonomy that
is so prominent in the Model Code" and the rules. He acknowledges that the standard for practice
left open to such discretion would be subject to "unjustifiable breaches of human liberty," and that
the ethic of care should not replace the right of client self-determination, but merely guide it. Id.
at 2710-11. Ellmann's conclusion leaves the situation ambiguous and undefined, providing no
clear standard for attorneys working in best interests cases. Without a complete "revisioning" of
these cases and the process for resolving them, it is difficult to break away from values which are
vital to the adversarial process. I also believe Ellmann assumes a counseling aptitude and skill on
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ABA Standards for a completely new set of ethics for this group of
professionals.
a. Zealous Advocacy and Confidentiality
Zealous advocacy must take on a very new meaning for attorneys,
not merely a modified version which calls for protection against its
extremes.3 °8 In this context, it would mean guarding fairness in the pro-
cess, ensuring that the client is heard, and working to make sure the
client receives necessary services for appropriate strengthening of family
connections.
Confidentiality rules for all the professionals would give way to the
needs of the family. This process is about relationships, responsibilities
and connections. There is no constitutional right to a confidential rela-
tionship with any of these professionals. A process based upon the best
interests of the child must be more successful in reaching that result than
a process which is based on competition and adversarialness. Lawyers
must become part of the solution rather than continue to be identified as
a major part of the problem. 30 9
b. Practice in This Field by All Professionals Is Limited to Those
Who Are Specially Trained and Certified
Matters dealing with the best interests of children would be the
work of a special "profession" which includes judges, lawyers, social
workers, mental health providers, physicians, and others. A special
license or certificate should be required to enter this field. Family and
juvenile court judges would need to be appointed on the merit of their
interest, training and experience in these areas and their commitment to
ongoing training, since knowledge in the field is in flux.
the part of attorneys which is neither inherent, nor part of lawyer training. Exercising such control
over clients may be damaging in the long run to client welfare and seems to be manipulative
behavior in the guise of "caring."
308. See id. at 2724. Ellmann would have the rules state that there are exceptions to complete
client loyalty and require ethical consultation in difficult cases. Id. This does not go far enough;
the paradigm for the lawyer's role must be changed. See Zacharias, supra note 39, at 373-74
("Empowering [lawyers] to exercise and express moral judgments might bring lawyers and clients
closer to recognizing that zealous legal representation does not necessarily mean pulling out all
the stops in every case.") (citing Leubsdorf, Three Models of Professional Reform, 67 CORNEtL L.
REv. 1021, 1046 (1982) ("the traditional system encourages the lawyer to pursue his client's
supposed interests to the limit ... without taking responsibility for the results.")).
309. "'The image of the co-conspiratorial lawyer helps explain why society considers the
profession unsavory. . . . Clients and observers of the legal profession naturally come to look
upon lawyers as 'dissemblers, distorters who subordinate truth to winning, and as technicians who
answer to but one command, that of their client."' Zacharias, supra note 39, at 375 (citing
Thurman, Limits to the Adversary System: Interests that Outweigh Confidentiality, 5 J. LEGcAL
PROF. 5, 19 (1980)).
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3. CHANGES IN SUBSTANTIVE LAW
The purpose of this article is to suggest a major change in the pro-
cess used for determining the best interests of children. The transforma-
tion called for will require a substantial shift in attitudes and behaviors,
particularly among attorneys. Some changes in substantive law will be
required to accommodate this proposal. Other changes, specifically
directed at the assumptions we use in determining what is in the best
interests of children, are not considered here.
a. Child Protection
The transformation would require a change in procedure and might
require some modification of the federal and state laws to provide more
flexibility in meeting time limits to avoid the all or nothing dilemma
against which the clock currently runs. Especially if family centers can
be established, allowing parents and children to remain in meaningful
relationship, although living separately, more flexibility would be appro-
priate in making long-term choices for children.3"' I am not suggesting
that we should return to the pre-permanency planning days of foster care
"drift," but rather that each of our decisions should be made with the
child's need for permanency, stability, and connection to family in mind,
with the child's best interests being our predominant concern. Existing
laws which prevent us from protecting those best interests should be
changed.311
b. Family Court
Others have described how changes in substantive law, arrived at
through the legislative process or indirectly through alternative dispute
resolution, 3 2 have resulted in injustices to women and children. The
310. Martin Guggenheim has expressed concern that the current federal mandate for
permanency planning requires termination of parental rights in situations where children might
benefit from ongoing relationships with their parents. See Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of
Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care-An
Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121 (1995); see also Federle, supra note 150, at
1564-65 (asserting the need to focus efforts on ways to support the shared interests of children and
parents).
311. See, for example, Court Orders Girl, 2 1h, Back to Her Mother, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, Sept. 9, 1996, at A-3, in which the superior court held that the:
[Law] does not ... allow for any consideration of the best interests of the child but
simply directs return of the child to the birth parent.
While we recognize, and deeply regret, the havoc that will be wreaked upon
the life of a 21h-year-old child as a result of this decision, the directive of [the law]
must be followed.
Id. (citing Judge J. Anthony Kline, of the Contra Costa County Superior Court in Adoption of
Haley A., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 505, 519-20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)).
312. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 21.
[Vol. 52:79
CHILDREN AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
best intentions often wreak such havoc when generalizations, stereo-
types, categorizations, and legal presumptions must be applied to indi-
vidual family situations. The proposed process calls for far greater
attention to individual family needs. The question remains whether the
collective wisdom of the trained professionals, working in conjunction
with the family, can be relied upon to achieve the best interests of chil-
dren. It may be that some presumptions about appropriate custody
arrangements are still required as guidelines,313 yet the inability of any
guidelines to address the individual needs of each family spells danger
in the hands of the untrained, the rushed, and the overburdened of any
system. Furthermore, policies devised with the best intentions often
have unintended consequences.31 4
c. Combine Courts So That All Family Matters Are Consolidated in
a Court of Expertise
The idea of true "family courts" with combined jurisdiction for all
best interests cases has been explored and is in practice in some
313. See, e.g., Carol Bohmer & Marilyn L. Ray, Effects of Different Dispute Resolution
Methods on Women and Children After Divorce, 28 FAm. L.Q. 223 (1994). The authors report on
two studies comparing mediated agreements with negotiated settlements and judicially-assisted
cases, one from New York and the other from Georgia. The well-being outcomes for women and
children in Georgia seemed to indicate that state support guidelines protected women whose
custody arrangements broke down, so that the dispute resolution method used did not affect them.
In addition, the authors felt "it ... significant that the vast majority of mediators in Georgia are
lawyers, whereas in New York (and elsewhere) they are most often mental health professionals or
members of the clergy." Id. at 245. This might indicate that safeguards in statutory law, known to
the professionals who will assist the family in resolving its dispute, can be helpful. See also
Marygold S. Melli et al., The Process of Negotiation: An Exploratory Investigation in the Context
of No-Fault Divorce, 40 RUTGERS L. REv. 1133, 1160-62 (1988) (stating that private ordering
may not be appropriate in support and custody matters and that some constraints on the
negotiation process are necessary). Some recommendations for change may be so abstract that
they do not provide guidance in concrete decision-making. Perhaps suggestions regarding an
ethic of care, a child-centered focus, or the passage below lack such guidance:
From a politics-of-meaning perspective, I would want our substantive body of
family law to support a moral vision of commitment, trust, responsibility, and
nurturing, while at the same time providing for the autonomy and justice needs of
those involved in separating from committed relationships. This means both
economic justice and a justice of dignity. For this to be realized, we must have a
political community committed to these goals and able to translate them into a
legislative agenda.
Schorr, supra note 9, at 37. These concepts provide little to direct decision-makers who do not
embody the values expressed above. I concur with Schorr who suggests that "we need judges who
are capable of understanding the full depth of the competing claims they are faced with, and thus,
we need human beings in the judicial role who are capable of experiencing, both affectively and
cognitively, the impact of their decision on others." Id.
314. See Solove, supra note 38, at 799 ("[A]n unintended impact of the no-fault [divorce]
system may be a perceived shift in the policy of the states regarding the desirability of the
maintenance of intact families.").
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states.315 The current, fragmented, "patchwork ' 31 6 system is unable to
be a full-service provider and is forced to categorize and compartmental-
ize pervasive family problems.317  This apparently illogical situation is
due in part to the law's need for categorizing rights and duties. It also
reflects the complicated federal structure for reimbursing states and
counties for services to families who have abused or neglected, or are at
risk for abusing or neglecting, their children. Changing to a unified fam-
ily court would not achieve the desired end without changing the reim-
bursement structure to allow services to be provided for other family
needs.3 t8
A unified court, focused on the needs of families and children,
could also be expected to create an atmosphere more friendly to families
and conducive to problem solving.31 9 Perhaps they need to be primarily
places for people to hold meetings 320 and to provide some commonly
needed services, such as parent education. This would require a dra-
matic change of function and form.
315. Though a need clearly exists for more funding and space, the Family Court of Delaware
has gained jurisdiction "over all cases involving children and relating to family life." To meet
statutory qualifications, a judge of the Family Court must demonstrate "an interest in and
understanding of family and child problems." Morales, supra note 79, at 14 (citation omitted).
Oregon has "[e]nlarged the jurisdiction of family court to include all relationship disputes
involving children and emotional dynamics that resemble and include those in a marriage."
ORErON STATUS REPORT, supra note 78, at 9. This does not go as far as needed to bring all best
interests cases into the same court. The Task Force acknowledged that these proceedings should
be coordinated. Id.
316. Solove, supra note 38, at 804.
317. See Woodhouse, supra note 66. Woodhouse states that:
The statutory and court systems which are implicated in state intervention in the
family are extremely complex. They are marked by overlapping rules of local, state
and federal law and involve many different kinds of courts that attempt to address
everything from domestic relations custody issues, to adoption, to emergency
protection from abuse orders. One family may be involved in simultaneous cases
before a domestic relations court, a dependency court, a special court dealing with
domestic violence, and a criminal court, all arising out of a single incident. In
addition, each forum is applying its own specialized branch of law to the specific
aspect of the family's problem that is properly before it. Due to shortages of funds
for computerization and coordination of local court systems, these various judges
may not even know that they are entering overlapping or inconsistent orders in the
case.
Id. at 407 (citations omitted).
318. While recent welfare reform measures may give more flexibility to states and local
governments regarding provision of services, funding will continue to be inadequate to
accomplish this result.
319. See Judge Lindsay G. Arthur, Tomorrow's Choices, 47 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 39 (1996)
(arguing that a single judicial team should handle the problems of a family).
320. Family Group Meetings are held in an informal, neutral and comfortable setting where
refreshments can be served to provide the family with adequate time to do the necessary work.
Discussion with James Nice, Family Unity Project (Oct. 1996).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The current adversary system, built upon a paradigm emphasizing
competition, rights, and the individual, must be supplanted by a new
paradigm which reflects an attitude of care and shared responsibility
toward families and children. More than ten years ago, Myers proposed
a change in the criminal prosecution of child abuse cases voicing the
same concerns expressed in this article, and a hope that change is
possible.
The time is right to offer alternatives to the current response to abuse,
alternatives which hold greater promise of bringing to fruition the
goal of protecting children. It is said that "nothing endures but
change," [citing Heraclitus] and with the welfare of countless chil-
dren at stake, the inadequacies of the legal approach to abuse provide
compelling incentives to suggest changes which will enhance the
ability to prevent the "nightmare" of child abuse.32 1
This change has not occurred, but, hopefully, the call for change is more
palatable to those responsible for protecting the best interests of children
outside of the criminal justice system.
One result of taking the adversarialness out of the problem solving
mechanisms used in best interests cases may be an equalizing of socio-
economic classes. Those who traditionally have had little voice in the
systems would be on par with those who have benefitted from legal
representation. All parties would be heard in the group process. All
would be assisted by advocates. All advocates would be appropriately
trained in the subjects which are relevant to best interests work. The
universal application of the system to any family with protection or cus-
tody issues could serve to remove the stigma associated with govern-
ment intervention or receiving services for family problems.
I do not pretend, nor hope to have, the final answers to the present
dilemma. It is well known that reformers usually create new problems
from their "good ideas. 32 2 Yet, the current system is so illogical and so
damaging to children and families, that I believe we must have a new
vision.
321. Myers, supra note 8, at 269 (footnote omitted).
322. See Garrison, supra note 302, at 1827. ("Each generation of reformers ... tries anew to
effect improvements. Some of these ideas work, but seldom do they work as well as their
proponents had hoped or promised. Often the 'solutions' cause new problems, creating the need
for new reforms").
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